siderably in the fourth century and was no longer able to absorb the goods that Greece had to offer. The reason was that the other countries had gradually developed their own agriculture and industry and competed with Greece proper not only in their own markets but also in foreign trade. Such countries as Italy developed their own viticulture and production of olive oil. In the Persian Empire, during the Peloponnesian War, local silver coins, often imitating the Athenian 'owls' (silver pieces bearing the figure of an owl), had already begun to supplant Greek coins. Finds in northern Italy show that around 400-375 B.C. the importation of Attic vases to this region dropped to about one-fourth the amount bought before the Peloponnesian War. At the end of the fifth century, Attic vases were sold in southern France in increasing quantities, but the competition of imports from southern Italy soon became fierce, and this French market, too, was lost after 350 B.C. In this way Greece became less and less able to pay for the imported goods which she absorbed in ever-increasing quantities.

The crisis in the foreign commerce of Greece together with the anarchic political conditions brought about the difficult economic situation in which Greece found herself at the time of Alexander the Great. The decline was gradual. Greece was faced with the necessity of readjusting her economic and political life.
Macedonia and Her Struggle with Persia

In the middle of the fourth century B.C. the position of affairs within the Graeco-Oriental world may be described as follows. Greece was torn by political and social anarchy. The principle of autonomy for the different city-states had been victorious over the principle of unification, either in empires, like that of Athens, or in federations, like that of Boeotia; and this victory led to painful consequences in the foreign and domestic affairs of Greece. Of the eighty-five years that divide the beginning of the Peloponnesian war from the conquest of Greece by Macedonia, fifty-five were filled with wars waged by one state against another. Every considerable Greek city experienced at least one war or one internal revolution every ten years. Some cities, such as Corcyra, were perpetually under the strain of revolution, past, present, or future. These convulsions were social rather than political. Abolition of debt and redivision of land had become the programme of the popular party. At Athens the strife of parties was carried on without those atrocities which attended it at Argos, for instance, or Corcyra; yet the democracy, when restored after the Peloponnesian war, included in the jurors' oath a clause that no person taking the oath should demand abolition of debt or a redivision of land.

Anarchy in politics being thus complicated by social anarchy, Greece was filled with exiles from different cities, homeless ad-
venturers, prepared to follow any leader and serve any cause for pay. In the cities the number of citizens with full rights grows smaller, and the unenfranchised, both freemen and slaves, become more important in society and in finance. The militia of citizens is no longer competent to bear the burden of foreign and domestic wars; patriotic feeling is less keen; every one tries to shirk military service by some means or other or to buy exemption. The citizen army of heavy-armed hoplites vanishes from the scene, and the new fashion is a mercenary force of light-armed peltasts. The same conditions prevailed in the fleet also.

What Greece had lost politically, Persia seemed to have gained. It looked as if a Persian conquest was imminent, and as if the enslavement of Greece was inevitable. From this point of view only is it possible to understand the fanciful notion represented by Isocrates—that there was no salvation for Greece, unless all Greeks would combine to attack Persia; but who was to lead them remained uncertain. Nor were the fears of Greece exaggerated. It is true that the process of disruption was going on even in Persia. The more Asia Minor prospered in consequence of her active share in the international trade organized by Greece, the more stubbornly did the different parts of the country strive to cut themselves loose from the Persian monarchy. Asia Minor in the fourth century consisted virtually of a number of half-Greek monarchies which paid tribute to Persia.

And the same tendency was shown by the satraps who represented Persian power in the country: each of them, if he had the chance, was ready enough to declare himself independent. Things were no better in Egypt. During this century she was constantly in revolt, and was brought back each time under the Great King's sceptre with difficulty and not for long. Phoenicia was less unruly: her competition with Greece in trade and finance strengthened her connexion with Persia. About the state of central Asia we are ill informed; but there, too, the same process of disruption into separate kingdoms was going on.

For all this, Persia was still a mighty empire. Under Artaxerxes
Ochus, a contemporary of Philip of Macedon, she showed her strength by dealing with the seceders and restoring the unity of the empire by harsh and cruel measures. But she was weakened partly by dynastic disputes, and partly by her stubborn conservatism in military matters. The war with Greece had proved the great superiority of the heavy-armed Greek infantry to the light-armed troops of Persia; but still the Persians did not even attempt to improve their standing army, and ignored the mechanical skill, especially in siege operations, which the Greeks had attained. While recognizing Greek superiority they refused to reform their own army, and preferred to add to it detachments of Greek mercenaries, who were, of course, swamped in the heterogeneous mob that fought for Persia. And it must be remembered that each contingent sent to swell the Great King's army carried its own national weapons and fought in its own national manner. Yet, as I have already said, Persia was the only power in the civilized world of that day which had immense material resources and endless reserves of fighting men at its disposal. Disunited Greece was, beyond doubt, far weaker than Persia.

The position was very similar in the West. Carthage became more and more the predominant power. Her trade grew, her territory increased, she went on annexing African tribes who furnished her with good soldiers. She did not, indeed, score any decisive successes over the Sicilian Greeks; but she succeeded at least in establishing herself in the west of the island when the empire of Dionysius came to pieces. It was also an ominous presage that the Greek population in Italy was growing steadily weaker, as one city after another fell into the hands of their semi-Hellenized neighbours—the native clans of south and central Italy. This weakness of the Greeks encouraged the growth of one of these clans—the Latins with their capital of Rome in the centre of the peninsula, who had inherited from Etruria the ambition to unite Italy under one government.

More or less similar was the position of the Greeks in relation
to the peoples inhabiting the north of the Balkan peninsula. On
the borders of central Greece and strongly influenced by her
civilization, three considerable powers were growing up which
Greece could not disregard; these were Epirus with an Illyrian
population, Thrace, and Macedonia. All three kept up constant
relations with Greece; and in each there was a marked tendency
to concentrate in the hands of a single dynasty the control over
all the inter-related clans which made up the population. Instead
of hindering this process Greece was more inclined to help it on.
This patronage of upstart and more or less Hellenized nations
we can trace with special clearness in the policy of Athens. To
Athens all these countries, and especially Thrace and Mac-
donia, were very important from the point of view of commerce.
Thrace was steadily becoming an agricultural country and in-
creasing her export of corn to Greece. She had abundance of
cattle and was one of the sources which furnished a constant
stream of slaves. In all these ways her services to Greece and
especially to Athens were like those of the distant kingdom of
the Bosphorus, on the Kerch strait, which forwarded to Greece
an immense quantity of grain, hides, fish, and slaves, supplied
by the dwellers on the steppes of south Russia, subjects of the
Scythians. In addition, Thrace and south Russia exported metals,
especially gold, which was dug up in Thrace or carried from the
Ural mountains through Scythia into Greece.

Macedonia was no less important to Athens and to all Greece.
She possessed excellent timber, especially the pine-wood required
by Athens for shipbuilding. The only other sources for a supply
of good timber were round Mount Ida in the north of Asia
Minor and the mountains in south Asia Minor and Syria; but
all these districts were included in the Persian Empire, and prac-
tically inaccessible to Athens and the rest of Greece. The pine
forests of Macedonia also produced great quantities of the pitch
and tar indispensable for building ships. Epirus, with its primit-
ive and purely pastoral population, was of less importance to
Greece.
In all these countries Athens found it more agreeable to deal with a single person in possession of executive power than with a number of petty tribes and rulers; and the productiveness of the land also was increased by political unity. For this reason Athens kept up friendly relations with the kingdom on the Bosphorus (see Chapter XII), even after the tyranny of the semi-Hellenic Spartocidae had been established there; and in Thrace, when the Odrysian kings were able for a time to unite a number of Thracian clans under their rule, Athens showed them favour. Thus also there were ties of friendship between Athens and the kings of the Macedonian coast. Two of these, Archelaus, who reigned during the Peloponnesian war, and his successor, Amyntas, were Athenian allies in the north and highly valued by her. In those days no one at Athens dreamed that a strong Macedonia would ever be a danger to Greece.

But vast possibilities in the way of civilization and political development were now opening up before Macedonia. The origin of this people is still an unsettled question. Perhaps they were Greeks, just as the Aetolians and Acarnanians were; perhaps they belonged to the family of Illyrian or Thracian clans; or perhaps there gradually settled in Macedonia detachments from each of the three Indo-European stocks above mentioned, overspreading a non-Aryan population and gradually blending with it to form a new nation in many respects unlike the Greeks. But no certain conclusion is possible. The Greeks found their language difficult to understand, and ranked them as 'barbarians'. It is clear that the language was a dialect of Greek, with a strong infusion of foreign words, phrases, and expressions. For the future fortunes of Macedonia it was of more importance that the valleys on her coast, together with her mountainous district, including Paeonia, form one geographic and economic whole, divided by lofty mountains from Epirus, Illyria, and Thrace. These parts of the country are bound into one by three great rivers, which are quite large enough for navigation—the Haliacmon (now the Bistritza), the Axius (now the Vardar), and the
Strymon (now the Strunmitza). The natural wealth of Macedonia was abundant and various—rich mines, excellent forests, extensive pastures, and wonderful cornfields. On the pasture lands horses were bred as well as sheep and oxen. The level land on the coast runs along two deeply indented bays—the gulf of Therma and the Strymon; and these bays are divided by the peninsula of Chalcidice (now Mount Athos). There are good natural harbours in both bays, especially in the former, where Therma (afterwards Thessalonica and now Salonica) is still among the most important roadsteads of the Mediterranean. Greeks had long before this time settled on the coast of Macedonia and both the bays; Amphipolis had been built on the Strymonian gulf. Macedonia used the Greek cities for exporting her produce; and they served her also by introducing Greek civilization.

Under these conditions, Macedonia naturally grew rich in the palmy days of Greece, especially after the Persian wars, and her higher classes became more and more Hellenized. Nevertheless, the process of political unification, complicated by the continual intrigues of the chief Greek states and by the dynastic quarrels inevitable in monarchies, went on slowly in Macedonia, till the second half of the fourth century B.C., when the efforts of Arche-laus and Amyntas pushed it forward with some success. In this way it became possible for Philip, who succeeded Amyntas on the throne in 360 B.C., to take as his task the complete unification of Macedonia; by this means he could create a powerful kingdom and begin extensive political activities in Greece, with the definite object of heading the Greek nation in a crusade against Persia. By long and persistent labour he succeeded in reforming the political and military system of the country. Out of a feudal kingdom based upon clanship he made a powerful empire, ruled by a single head and depending on a standing army, well trained and well supplied. The nucleus of this force was supplied by small landowners, who served as infantry and formed the phalanx which later proved invincible. The large landowners, the
former feudal aristocracy, now became the king’s ‘Comrades’, and furnished the army with a force of heavy-armed cavalry superior to any then existing.

Philip introduced into his army all the latest improvements in Greek tactics, which he had learnt during his long residence at Thebes with Epaminondas, and also adopted all the Greek mechanical appliances for war. By means of this army he was able to check the disruptive tendencies of the country, to protect his frontiers against attack from their northern neighbours, to cripple the Odrysian kingdom of the Thracians, his most serious rival, and even to penetrate farther north and inflict some blows on the Scythian kingdom, which at this time was expanding southwards and westwards and seizing one part of the Balkan peninsula after another. At the same time he never relaxed his efforts to annex Thessaly and that strip of Macedonian coast which was occupied by Greeks. Without access to the sea, a wider political influence over the whole Greek world was out of the question. By degrees, and after a succession of wars, the Greek cities in Macedonia, Paonia, and Chalcidice, became part of his kingdom.

I said above that in his youth, and before he ascended the throne, Philip spent a long time at Thebes while the Boeotian league was at the height of its power. There he became thoroughly familiar with the features of contemporary Greek politics; and there, probably, he conceived the plan of using the political and social anarchy of Greece, in order to unite that country under his own leadership, for the purpose of a common attack on Persia. He learnt the details of Greek politics even more thoroughly during the struggle for mastery on the Macedonian coast, which first brought him into collision with Athens. The Athenians were beginning to understand the greatness of the danger which threatened their political and commercial interests, if Macedonia were converted into a strong maritime empire.
Philip interfered in the complicated politics of Greece herself, after he had finally annexed the Greek cities of Chalcidice and destroyed many of them, during 349 and 348 B.C. His pretext was a mournful business, typical of the time and place, which was transacted in northern Greece. A small alliance of Phocian cities had been at war with Boeotia from 356 B.C., when Boeotia declared a Sacred War against Phocis for laying hands on the property of the Delphian temple. The Phocians, taking advantage of their own proximity to Delphi and the weakness of Boeotia, had seized the temple with all the treasures amassed there, and used their spoils to create a strong army of mercenaries; they then proceeded to enlarge their territory at the expense of their neighbours, Boeotia and Thessaly. Thus they came into collision with Philip and were driven out of Thessaly by him. Just at this time Philip had overcome the Athenian defence of Chalcidice and had forced Athens to conclude a treaty of peace. He was now at liberty to interfere in the affairs of Greece. On the invitation of the Amphictyones, the official guardians of the Delphian temple, he undertook the command in the contest with the Phocians, defeated their army and destroyed their cities, and imposed on them an annual tribute to make good the losses suffered by the temple. The Phocians were expelled from the Amphictyonic assembly, and their place there was taken by Philip.

When Macedonia in this way became recognized as a member of the family of Greek states, Philip came forward with his plan of uniting Greece into one allied kingdom under the political and military direction of Macedonia. The statesman and soldier saw clearly that the question of his domination over Greece could not be settled in his favour without a decisive conflict against Persia. For, under the vigorous rule of Artaxerxes Ochus, Persia laid claim to Greece as her own property, and regarded her as the regular source of those mercenary troops which made it possible to maintain the unity of the monarchy. Hence the in-
assault of the young and romantic Alexander? The murderer was
seized and killed on the spot by the king’s guards. Whether the
muder was merely a piece of personal revenge, or whether the
injured and formidable figure of Olympias, Philip’s rejected wife
and mother of Alexander stood behind the murderer, was never
cleared up; but tradition, even when hostile to Alexander, has
never charged him with parricide.

The devotion of the army to the young prince, who had been
associated with it from his childhood and had even commanded
a division at the battle of Chaeronea, saved Macedonia from the
strife that usually attended the succession. The army at once
acknowledged Alexander as king. His rivals were removed, and
the danger of disturbance vanished. But Philip’s death forced
Alexander to postpone the campaign against Asia. The king was
almost a boy, and no one believed in the capacity of this boy to
continue his father’s policy. The outskirts of his empire were in
excitement; Greece was in a ferment, which rose to the highest
pitch of intensity when Alexander disappeared from view in the
mountains of Illyria and a rumour of his death spread abroad.
Thebes, and then Athens for the second time, headed a move-
ment of hostility to Macedonia. But Alexander, after a success-
ful march to the Danube, and after assuring the safety of his
rear, made a sudden appearance under the walls of Thebes. He
took the city by assault and destroyed it; the inhabitants were
either slain or sold into slavery. Greece calmed down after the
settlement with Thebes. Alexander was acknowledged as leader
in place of his father, and Corinth was again the place where the
acknowledgement was made. He started at once for Asia, to
continue the design planned by Philip. The fate of Greece was
no longer to be decided in Greece itself, but in Asia Minor,
Syria, Babylonia, and Persia. Greece was a spectator of the
drama that followed, and there were Greeks fighting on either
side.

During the two years from 336 to 334 B.C. Persia had done
nothing to anticipate the Macedonian attack. The fate of Philip
had fallen also on Artaxerxes Ochus, and Persia's hands were tied until the usual palace intrigues came to an end. In this way Alexander's antagonist was not the able and experienced monarch, Artaxerxes, but his successor, Darius III, surnamed Codomannus, who had given no proof of his quality before this conflict.

Alexander's task was not easy. The war, nominally waged by Macedonia and Greece, was in fact waged by Macedonia single-handed. The Greek contingents in Alexander's army were negligible; it was impossible to rely upon them or upon the Greek fleet. In resources and especially in money Macedonia was decidedly inferior to Persia. But she possessed the same advantages which had once enabled Persia to become a world-empire—a young and vigorous nation of soldiers, the best weapons then attainable and all the military appliances devised by Greek science, well organized communications, and a young, bold, and able leader, backed by a number of generals who had gained experience in the service of his father.

Nevertheless, it was difficult for a contemporary to foresee the issue of the struggle. One of the chief advantages of Persia was her powerful fleet and command of the seas. The maritime power of Macedonia and Greece was not, indeed, inferior to that of Persia; but Athens, stronger at sea than any other Greek state, showed no enthusiasm in the cause, and, without her active assistance, Persia ruled the waves. Alexander's task was first to weaken and then to destroy this superiority of the enemy. To attain this object, he had to seize by land the bases of the Persian fleet one after another, beginning with Asia Minor and proceeding to Syria and Phoenicia. His victory on the Granicus in the north of the country gave him access to the harbours of Asia Minor, and he took them all in turn. A second victory at Issus, at the entrance into Syria from Asia Minor, put the Phoenician coast in his power. Tyre alone held out, but was taken after a long siege in which Alexander's engineers showed their ability to master the most difficult problems of siege warfare.
Alexander was now able to march against Babylonia and Persia without exposing his rear to danger. But he directed his steps first to Egypt and established his authority there. This expedition was indispensable, to supplement his conquest of Phoenicia; for thus he deprived the Persian fleet of their only remaining base. He needed Egypt also in order to supply Greece with food-stuffs and to secure by this means her friendly neutrality. The decisive conflict between Alexander and Darius was fought at Gaugamela in Babylonia (331 B.C.). The huge Persian army was destroyed, and Darius fled to his satrapies in central Asia, and was there put to death. Alexander's subsequent campaign in Turkestan and India was intended to complete the conquest of all the satrapies belonging to Persia. This romantic enterprise, though it produced an immense impression at the time, was not of great historical importance: Greek institutions could not find a home in the heart of Asia.

By the victories of Alexander it was decided that Greeks should take the place of Iranians as rulers of the East; and by them also the future destiny of Greece was settled. The Greek cities lost for ever their political independence: in spite of repeated attempts to recover it, the city-state was forced to submit to a monarchy. Ceasing to exist as an independent political unit, it became part of a great monarchical kingdom, while retaining only a shadow of self-government. The Greek city-state had played its part in the history of the world, and Greek monarchy now held the stage.