principle of the party in the 1860 campaign was based on his Ordinance of 1784. Its candidate was the strongest Jeffersonian over occupying the Presidential office, Madison excepted. Abra-
ham Lincoln in his Douglas debates and other speeches had
currently appealed to Jefferson, to Jefferson’s Ordinance and
his Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was constantly
quoted or cited, and Madison, the man who had demanded the
word “slave” should not be used in the Constitution.

A further Democratic character was given the Republican
Party of 1860 by the large number and great influence of the
Free Soil Democrats who were members of it. These Demo-
crats in Massachusetts and other eastern states had gener-
ally combined with the Republicans and the Conscience Whigs
against the Cotton Whigs, or Woolly-head Whigs as they were
called, before 1860, and Western leaders like Blair and Chase,
in great numbers became outright Republicans so long as Lincoln
lived.

Still another Democratic influence was wined by Lincoln. As
he used Jefferson to support his position on slavery-extension, so
he cited Jackson’s attitude toward the Supreme Court decision
on the bank charter to justify his own position toward the Dred
Scott decision, and Jackson’s stand on the indissolubility of the
Union and the power and duty of the President to enforce federal
laws in recalcitrant states as establishing those principles. He
wrote Nicolay in 1860 after his election—“The right of a state
to secede is not an open or debatable question. It was fully
discussed in Jackson’s time and denied not only by him, but
by the vote of Congress.” A comparison of Lincoln’s first annual
message with Jackson’s Nullification message and proclamation
is interesting to Democrats. Lincoln plumbed the line Jackson
drew down.

In view of the Republican Party’s subsequent adoption of
Alexander Hamilton as its ancestor and prophet, it is curious
to note that Lincoln in all his speeches and writings mentions
Hamilton only twice and each time merely casually. In a
speech in Congress on the veto power Lincoln recites the fact that
Washington consulted Jefferson and Hamilton touching the ques-
tion, gives the position of each and then, paying no more atten-
tion to Hamilton, proceeds to quote at length Jefferson’s reason
for his opinion. The other reference is equally slight, only naming
Hamilton along with some other members of the Constitu-
tional convention as opposed to slavery.

Well might Woodrow Wilson say, in 1912, that Lincoln, being:
a founder of the Republican Party, was one of the mysteries of Providence.

How much a coalition Lincoln's party was is shown by the complexion of his first cabinet; Blair, Postmaster General Cameron, Secretary of War; Chase of the Treasury and Wells of the Navy were former Democrats, while Seward of State, Smith of the Interior and Bates, Attorney General, had been Whigs. Seward indignantly withdrew his acceptance of the State portfolio, but Lincoln persuaded him to desert by reminding that he, Lincoln, was a Whig, which made the balance equal or more. When Cameron resigned, Stanton, a Breckinridge Democrat and member of Buchanan's cabinet, succeeded him; when Chase resigned, his place was offered Tod, a Douglass Democrat, who had presided over the latter days of the Baltimore convention; and when Blair left the cabinet Denison took his place.

In Congress and among the Northern people there were Peace Democrats in large numbers and Peace Whigs in lesser numbers, and Democrats who, like many Federalists in the War of 1812 and many Whigs in the Mexican War, supported the war, but went no further in support of the government, who all together made up the opposition. The War Democrats became in time more loyal to Lincoln than the Radicals of his party. Buchanan, Cass and Douglass rallied to his support the moment hostilities began, the greater number of their followers with them, and it was the Blairs—old Francis P. and his sons Montgomery and Francis P., Jr., who defeated the movement to deny Lincoln a renomination in 1864. The South bitterly exclaimed against these Democrats.

The Thirty-seventh Congress called in special session in July, 1861, contained 12 Democrats and 4 Unionists from slave states in the Senate, most of whom cooperated heartily with the administration. The House stood 106 Republicans, 42 Democrats and 28 Unionists. On a resolution pledging any amount of money and any number of men to support the war there were only 5 voting nay.

While loyally supporting the government in war measures the Democrats in and out of Congress, except those who went bodily over to the Republican Party, still maintained their party principles and allegiance in state and national politics. Daniel S. Dickenson, Breckinridge Democrat of New York, and David Tod, Douglass Democrat of Ohio, headed the Unionist ticket in their respective states, the former carrying his state by 107,000 majority, the latter his by 55,000, but in the main the regu

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lar Democrat kept up their organizations and put out party tickets.

Politics standing adjourned to a great extent, Congressional voting was at a standstill. Conservatives voted conservatively and vice versa. The vote on the legal tender act, 22 to 17 in the Senate, 93 to 59 in the House, was according to the financial ideas of the members of Congress. Men held to their old theories of government and economics, except so far as modified or rendered obsolete by the new condition of affairs, and except also when they were waived for the time being and other policies supported as emergency or war measures.

The conservative Republicans and Democrats stood together while the radical elements of both parties voted together. Thus when Lincoln sat aside General Hunter's Fort Royal emancipation order, and when Blair left the cabinet Denison took his place.

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the party,” went far to overcome every adverse influence, and brought the administration a majority in Congress. Lincoln's ascendency had grown enormously since April, 1861, when Seward had, in the most remarkable paper ever presented to a President, offered to formulate a policy for the administration and carry it out, plainly intimating that Lincoln was competent to do neither.

It was not pleasant reading to any American, least of all to Republicans, it would seem,—the harsh abuse, ridicule and unlimited contempt visited on Lincoln by many leading Republican statesmen, politicians, publicists, and newspapers. Nothing more severe or unmitigated came from Northern Democrats. The scorn visited by the Whigs on Tyler did not descend to the sour, vitriolic depth of Radical Republican comment on the greatest and best man their party had ever given to the country. Pride of intellect,” says Schouler, made many of them putrid to Lincoln's real greatness. There were others who belittled him with their eyes wide open, and because of his real greatness, his Democracy.

The representatives of the border slave states supported Lincoln in his conservative positions on slavery and opposed him in his progressive acts against the institution. The Emancipation Proclamation was unpopular in many states. Justice Curtis, who held great influence and popularity by reason of his dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case, declared it unconstitutional. Lincoln justified it as a war measure, inserting in it and insisting upon the retention of the three words “upon military necessity.” But it was still disliked by Democrats and Conservative Republicans. Some said that a war for union was being turned into a war for abolition to the destruction of all hopes of the Union.

On the other hand Horace Greeley in his “Prayer of Twenty Million” in the Tribune of August 20, 1862, fairly represented the sentiment of millions in demanding that emancipation be carried out so far as possible under the new laws. It was in answer to this “Prayer” that Lincoln wrote Greeley that his paramount object was to save the Union and if he could do it without freeing a single slave he would do it, or if by freeing some and leaving others alone, or by freeing all, he could save the Union he would do that—a position not far removed from Douglass' indifference as to whether slavery was voted up or down in the territories.

The Democratic opposition to the administration is credited by the best historians as being loyal but conservative, with excep-

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tions so few and so extreme as to prove the rule. Their creed and slogan was, “The Constitution as it is; the Union as it was.”

That the Copperheads, as Northerners who opposed the war came to be called, voted against the administration goes without saying, but so did many Abolitionists who openly desired separation from the South. The peace element, especially when the war situation was gloomiest was larger and comprised many who never were and never would be Democrats. Robert C. Winthrop, Whig Speaker of the House in 1847-48 and Webster's successor in the Senate, gloried in the name of Copperhead. On the other hand, Seymour and Tod and other Democrats were as loyal as the most loyal.

Vallandigham of Ohio was the most extreme Peace Democrat, and his speeches in Congress aped Chatham's in the House of Lords in 1776. He was arrested for making such a speech in Ohio and sentenced to close confinement until the close of the war. Lincoln avoided a delicate situation by a piece of humor at which both North and South laughed; he commuted his punishment to being sent into the Southern lines. Vallandigham was back in 1864 and at the Democratic national convention. If the Republicans convined at his presence in the Union they did a wise thing politically, for Vallandigham succeeded in putting into the Democratic platform a plank which insured defeat.

The Union meetings in the gloomy year of 1863, so popular and numerous, were participated in by Democrats and often addressed by noted Democrats, and aided greatly in the popular financing of the war by bond sales. Even Charles Sumner testified to the fact that the Democrats were loyal to the government and insisting on the most ardent support of the war.

Lincoln had averted without repudiating Burnside's illegal punishment of Vallandigham, but he promptly stopped that General's attempted suppression of the Chicago Times, an attack on the freedom of the press which aroused furious opposition from men of all parties in the West.

The draft riots in New York in 1863 have been attempted to be shown as evidence of Democratic disloyalty. Politics had little or nothing to do with them. Mechanics and laboring men generally without regard to party resented the enrollment act and the method of its enforcement in New York especially. The exemption to be purchased for $300 was most unjust, the working men declared, and made the war a “Rich man's war and a Poor man's fight,” and the belief that the war was being waged for abolition more than for Union aroused anger against the negroes.
The Information ecosystem is dynamic and complex, with a wide range of actors and stakeholders. It is essential for all participants to understand their roles and responsibilities in order to ensure the integrity and security of digital information. In this climate of innovation, it is crucial for governments to work closely with industry and civil society to create a framework that is both robust and adaptable. By doing so, we can create a more secure, resilient, and open digital environment for all.

Theorists and practitioners alike agree that the development of a robust information ecosystem is essential for a Just Digital World. We must work together to ensure that our digital systems are secure, transparent, and accessible to all. This requires a multi-stakeholder approach, with input from governments, industry, civil society, and the public at large. By collaborating and sharing knowledge, we can create a safer, more equitable digital world for all.
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