supply an army to destroy the rights of the people at the polls. Hayes would not be coerced and vetoed the bills, whereas Congress yielded, losing the battle and weakening the party among the people of the North, who were still suspicious of Southern Democrats. A little bill doing away with United States troops at polling places, but not interfering with their use in states in case of domestic violence, was finally passed and approved.

Grover Cleveland esteemed Hayes highly as an individual and as a Chief Executive, and Woodrow Wilson pronounced him an upright, public-spirited man, inclined to serve his country unselfishly and in the interest of sound policy. He seems to have been much the same sort of man as Polk and Coolidge, quiet, unspectacular, determined but not imperious, well endowed with the saving grace of common sense, thoroughly and instinctively partisan but dispassionately so and on principle, knowing what he wished to do and what he could do, and doing it efficiently and conscientiously.

In 1880 the Democratic Party seemed in hopeful condition. The wrong done the party in 1876 operated in its favor; many of the best men in the country who had joined the Republicans in Lincoln's time, returned to the Democratic faith; the electoral vote of the South was assured its candidate. The opposition among Republican leaders to Hayes' reforms offered the hope that much Democratic support might come from the reform element in the Republican Party.

Against these encouraging conditions was the distrust in the North of Democratic handling of the negro question, the fear that the result of the war would be undone under Democratic rule, which fear the Democratic course in Congress had done little to allay, and the business prosperity existing throughout the country which was credited to Republican legislation. Although both parties were divided on the money question, the Republicans were thought by the business element of the country to be the sounder, or at least more susceptible of control. "The odium of disloyalty still attached to the Democratic Party in many minds, and conservatives generally tended toward its opponent.

However, the Democrats were united while dissensions existed in the Republican ranks, in which there were three fairly well-defined factions—the Blaine faction, the anti-Blaine or Grant-Conkling faction and the reform element.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE TARIFF OF 1884. GARFIELD-ARTHUR ADMINISTRATION


In 1880 tariff reform became the fundamental Democratic policy. It has been, or should have been, Democracy's leading issue ever since. Always arrayed against high tariffs, the party's action was consistent with its own record. The history of the tariff is therefore a vital part of Democratic history. It began with the first debate in the first session of Congress. Smarter under the trade restrictions England had imposed upon us, the tendency in 1788 was strongly for free trade. But revenue was necessary, the need of establishing industries here, which England's policy had forbidden, was urgent and the wisdom of encouragement to them recognized, and, moreover, the trade restrictions of other nations had to be counteracted. The Democrats (Republicans) favored as low duties as possible; the Federalists were high tariff men.

Hamilton's famous Report on Manufactures was submitted in January, 1790, and dealt scientifically and ably with every aspect of the subject. Skillfully he led from incidental protection for industries necessary in war, and thence to infant industries, and he stressed the home market for agricultural products a manufacturing population would afford. The first tariff law was a revenue measure, recognizing incidental protection and squinting at protection for protection's sake. Comparatively few articles were taxed and the average rate was only thirteen and a half per cent.

Our first real protective law was the 1816 tariff law, and it was a mild measure. Dumping of goods from Europe fraudulently invoiced, together with the depressed condition of manufacturing, induced the tariff of 1824, an earnest fight for protection having
been defeated in 1820. No strict party lines had formed on the tariff at this time. The economic conditions in each Congressional district seems to have governed the votes. The West had been convinced by the home market argument, and then a duty of twenty-five cents a bushel had been placed on grain; the Western farmer swallowed bait, line and sinker.

The 'Tariff of Abominations' of 1828 was passed by the same mixed votes as its predecessor, the South against, the Middle and Western States for, New England divided. Some protectionists opposed the measure as bad, and some anti-protectionists supported it for the same reason—hoping to injure protection with the people.

The National Republicans under Clay and Adams now stood definitely for the protective principle, but were moderate, and Clay thought it only a temporary policy. In 1831 he said in the Senate:

"Long after we shall cease to be agitated by the tariff, ages after all our manufactures shall have acquired a stability and perfection which will enable them successfully to cope with the manufactures of any other country, the public lands will remain a subject of deep and enduring interest."

It is this attitude of his which has kept Henry Clay from standing side by side with Alexander Hamilton as a prophet of the modern Republican Party.

The 1832 tariff was not anti-protection, but a compromise of Clay's, diminishing the 1828 rates gradually for a series of years. The opinion was held by many that with the extinction of the national debt and the consequent diminished need of revenue free trade would come. The protective idea, which had steadily grown from 1816 to 1828, steadily declined from 1832 to 1846. The 1840 Democratic platform declared against it, and Tyler vetoed the Whig tariff bill.

The Walker tariff of 1846 marked the zenith of purely revenue tariff in our history. Walker's report to Congress was as much quoted and relied on by the low tariff advocates as Hamilton's was by the opposition. The House of Lords in England had it reprinted for its use. Like Hamilton, Walker considered the rationale of the entire subject, but as Hamilton had played up manufactures, Walker stressed navigation, commerce and agriculture. Yet he granted protection to some industries.

Walker's report reads well to-day. Some sentences seem pertinent to the tariff difficulty with France in 1927.
steel rails; everyone knew that by smuggling, by fraudulent valuation and other evasions the government and people were being defrauded. So a tariff commission was appointed which reported to Congress in January, 1866. 19

The tariff commission's report showed many evils, and made many converts to tariff reform, especially in the West and North-west. In 1870 the duties on sugar, tea and coffee were reduced, and pig iron rates lowered as well as on much other raw material. In 1872, a bill making small concessions to great demands was passed. In 1875 under the driving hand of "Pig Iron" Kelly, who had taken Stevens' place as commander of the protectionists in the House, a high tariff bill was carried, though Allison, Sherman, Fenton of New York, Oglesby of Illinois, Jones and Stewart of Nevada and Sprague of Rhode Island, all Republicans, had voted against it. This bill put rates back to the war height, sufficiently. Garfield, Fessenden, Allison, Kasson, Sumner and Raymond, as well as Morrill, could smell monopoly, and remonstrated, although voting with their party.

It was at this time there was begun what some of the soundest political economists, of either or no party, think (and all Democrats believe), to be the greatest and longest continued political folly that any great body of the American people have been guilty of—the support of the high-tariff Republican Party by the farmers of the plains of the Middle and trans-Mississippi West.

Many living in sod houses because all lumber had to be bought, they gave power to Senator Philetus Sawyer and other lumber barons owning millions of acres of timber lands, obtained from the government for practically nothing, to write high tariffs on lumber. They paid twice as much for clothes, for farm machinery, for every manufactured article they bought, than Europeans had to pay for these same American manufactured goods. For quinine for their sick they paid $4.40 import duty and 35 cents for the medicine they received. An English or continental housewife could get an American sewing machine for $25.00; the Iowa matron had to pay $65.00, and quadruple prices for household utensils, especially those made of tin. Thus was created a home-market, these American consumers paying the whole cost and receiving back maybe ten per cent in higher wages and reader sales for their farm products, the protected interest paying maybe ten per cent in wage increases and higher prices for farm products and pocketing ninety per cent, less the costs of politics in the shape of lobbies and campaign contributions.

The politicians and the state men and the more serious writers were respectful enough in their manner, but the numerous literature and dramas of the day, which so often give the truer picture of the times, made the country man the popular subject of their wit. Then became current the terms "Hayseed" and "Rube," and the American farmers, the successors of those who had "fired the shot heard round the world," were made the sport of the politics, the jest of fortune and the target of general ridicule.

From the passage of the "Pig Iron" Kelly bill until 1883 there was little tariff legislation; from 1875 to 1881 the House being Democratic, the Senate, too, in 1879-1881. But much discussion went on. The action of salt manufacturers buying out and closing up salt works; the fact that users of copper and other heavily protected material on articles could purchase them abroad, ship them back home free of duty as a home product, the European price plus the freight both ways still being less than the price charged him, worked on the public mind.

Especially were the people aroused over the tariff history of quinine. The duty on the manufactured article had been increased repeatedly, and in 1878 the wholesale price had risen to $4.75 an ounce. This was called "blood money." One firm in the business offered Joseph S. Moore, a powerful tariff reformer, publisher who wrote under the name of the "Parsee Merchant," $100,000 to desist from his attacks. Ten bills to remove the duty were introduced in Congress and one passed. The price of quinine fell rapidly to $1.25, finally to 35 cents, and although some of the manufacturers closed their mills, they later resumed and prospered under free trade in quinine.

Yet the high protective tariff gave the real wealth, especially the value of a combination of interests, a mutual interchange of support and the superior influence of an organized effort exerted by astute men in actual contact with Congress in Washington over disorganized opposition scattered all over the country. The tariff more than all things else bred lobbies, and the use of money in politics.

The Democrats had in 1872 swallowed a straddle on the tariff question along with Greeley's nomination, but in 1876 the platform flatly declared that all custom-house taxation should be for revenue only. But general reform, not the tariff, was made the main issue. Yet the party in Congress was divided and a resolution introduced, for the bills of Texas in favor of a revision of the tariff to make it purely and solely for revenue only was defeated.

The tariff reformers in the Democratic Party were led by Mills and William R. Morrison, the protection Democrats by Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania. These were three able men. Randall was a wonderful man, of distinguished and attractive appear-
ance, with a personality which won friends and held them as with hooks of steel. He was a most accomplished parliamentarian, bold, skillful and of unlimited endurance. He was a leader that led, and as Speaker during the contested election showed his strength. Randall was a protectionist on principle, representing a really Republican district in Pennsylvania, and hoped to convert his party to the protective principle. He lost the battle and John G. Carlisle defeated him for Speaker in the Forty-eighth Congress. A powerful element sprang up about 1880 openly espousing high tariff for protection rather than revenue, in other words distinctly subordinating, for the first time in our history, the revenue to the protective feature in tariff legislation.

The Thirteenth Democratic National Convention met in Cincinnati, June 22, 1880, after the other conventions had been held. The call had been addressed to "all Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations and differences" and had requested expression of opinion by state conventions as to the desirability of continuing the two-thirds rule. Called to order by Chairman Barnum, its temporary president was George Hoadley of Ohio, its permanent presiding officer J. W. Stevenson of Kentucky.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted without any mention of any special rule, and no report was made of state action on the two-thirds rule as Congressmen expressed themselves. It can be learned, however, that the rule was approved by conventions of Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia, whose delegates formed a majority of the convention, and it does not appear that any state refused its assent. A statement and plea for representation in conventions from the District of Columbia and the territories were heard, and their delegations were given seats but no vote; they were, however, given representation on the national committee.

The contesting delegations from Massachusetts, the Fanueil Hall and the Mechanics' Hall, adjusted their differences and both were given seats. Two delegations, sent by different conventions, appeared from New York. "Honest" John Kelly headed the contesting Tammany delegation. The credentials committee advised admission of the regulars, a minority report urged giving the regulars fifty and the contestants twenty of New York's seventy votes.

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Tammany two years previously had bolted the state ticket, and Cornel, Republican, defeated Robinson, Democrat, for Governor. The breach healed, Kelly had called a state convention in 1880, nominated Presidential electors, and elected delegates to the national convention, paying no attention to the regular Democratic state convention. Another fact stated and not denied was that Kelly's delegation frankly admitted to the credentials committee that if Tilden was nominated they would not support him. Kelly's frankness certainly vindicated his deserving of his title "Honest John." The Tammany men were denied seats by a vote of 457 to 205, New York not voting.

The precedent established in 1856 of adopting a platform before nomination of candidates was departed from; speeches were limited to ten minutes' duration.

J. E. McBrath proposed Stephen J. Field, a man and judge as upright as Lord Chief Justice Hale, "more able than Lord Chancellor Brougham and as logical as Chief Justice Marshall"; George Gray named Thomas F. Bayard, "a veteran statesman known and admired wherever the English language was spoken, with judgment clear as sunlight and so honest in thought and deed that the people knew him by heart"; Samuel S. Marshall named William R. Morris, "of patriotism proven in war, of strong common sense, of fixed and unswerving principles and unerring judgment"; Daniel Voorhees named Thomas A. Hendricks, "commanded by the Senate and Governor, faithful, wise, conservative"; John McSweeney named Allen G. Thurman, the "Great Senator, great in genius, correct in judgment, whose name bespoke public integrity and honor and was a platform in itself"; Daniel Dougerty named Winfield S. Hancock, "the Superb Soldier, the wise and constitutional Miller, Governor of Louisiana and Texas, the soldier statesman of stainless record." Many seconding speeches were made, the Confederate soldiers, Hampton, Daniel and others, championing the cause of the Union General.

When the speeches were over, it was proposed that as the party was united in opinion there was no occasion for waiting the platform before nominating candidates, balloting began; the test came on a motion to adjourn, which was defeated 395 to 317. The total number of delegates being 738, 492 was announced as necessary to a choice.

The first ballot was, Hancock, 171, Bayard, 153, Payne, 81, Thurman, 68, Field, 55, Morrison, 62, Hendricks, 60, Tilden, 38, scattering or not voting, 49. Hancock and Bayard divided the
South and East, the unit rule having been disregarded, nearly every state, including Virginia and Mississippi, splitting its vote; Thurman and Hendricks were supported by the West, Morrison by Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin; Payne received New York's 70 votes. Before the voting began next morning, Peckham read a letter from Tilden requesting, on the score of health and strength, that his name be not voted on. The second ballot seemed to show that the contest was between Hancock and Bayard, with Field a good third, until New York threw its vote to Randall. But Pennsylvania changing and giving its full vote to Hancock turned the tide. New York changed, too, followed by other states, and the announced result was Hancock, 705, Hendricks, 36 (Indiana's vote). Randall and others made speeches, including Kelly, who pledged his party's support to the ticket and extended the hand of fellowship to the other Democratic faction in New York, which was cordially accepted by Fellows.

William H. English was named for Vice-President by acclamation. Henry Watterson, chairman of the resolutions committee, presented the platform, which was unanimously and enthusiastically adopted.

William H. Barnum was reelected national chairman, and J. Sterling Morton was made committee man from Nebraska.

The Republican convention held in Chicago, June 2, 1880, is famous in Republican annals. The "Immortal 300," led by Roscoe Conkling and reinforced by from 4 to 13 others on various ballots, voted for General Grant on every one of the thirty-six ballots. Blaine was a fairly close second, with John Sherman trailing third. A deadlock lasted thirty-five ballots, when Garfield was nominated as the way out of a dilemma. Chester A. Arthur was named as the choice of the Grant-Conkling element and was nominated for second place on the first ballot. Arthur and Correll had been dismissed from the New York custom-house by Hayes; one was now Governor of New York, the other soon to be President.

The Greeley Party met in convention at Chicago June 9th and nominated James B. Weaver of Iowa on the first ballot, by change of votes when his strength was demonstrated. Benjamin F. Butler received 95 votes. B. J. Chambers of Texas was named for second place. This party was greatly reinforced by members of the Farmers' Grange, which had been active and powerful in some of the Western and Northwestern States. Its name indicates the main principles of this party.

The Prohibition convention of 1880 attracted little attention from the newspapers and published no report. It met in Cleveland June 17th, and nominated Neal Dow of Maine and A. M. Thompson of Ohio on a platform practically the same as the Prohibition platform of 1876.


Democratic Platform, 1880
Opposed centralization in government.
No summary laws.
Separation of church and state.
Common schools.
Home rule.
Honest gold and silver money and paper convertible on demand.
Tariff for revenue only.
Civil service reform.
Free ballot, free ships and no discrimination in favor of corporations or monopolies.
Chinese exclusion.
Public money and credit for public purposes only.
Public lands only to actual settlers.
Protection to labor from "communist and communes."
Condemned administration for federal interference at elections and veto of laws remedying it.
Execrated the grand fraud of 1876-77 and the reward of perpetration of it by government places.
Praised patriotic submission of Democrats to award, and course of Democrats in Congress, especially in saving $40,000,000 a year.

Republican Platform, 1880
Reviewed at length with pride Republican twenty-year record.
Advised federal aid to education and non-sectarian public schools.
Custom duties levied for revenue should not discriminate as to favor American labor.
No further public grant to corporations.
Polygamy must be abolished.
Development of waterways and harbors but no further subsidies to private enterprises.
Chinese immigration must be restrained and limited.
Hayes and his administration highly praised, and the Democratic Party severely censured.
The Solid South viewed with alarm as a grave danger.
A clause endorsing civil service reform was added after platform had been adopted.

The campaign was hard-fought. The Republicans waved the bloody shirt and gave it a new angle by stressing the danger of the Solid South, which by a combination with a few Northern states would control the government, undo the result of the war, pay Rebel claims and pension Confederate soldiers, and what not. Hancock silenced the latter charges in a letter stating that.
not one dollar would be spent for any such purposes. The "Fraud of 1876" was a Democratic slogan.

The tariff was made an issue in manufacturing sections, and in discussing it Hancock used the unfortunate expression "The tariff is a local question." This was ridiculed with Republican might and main all over the country, and it weakened the Democratic cause, although John Sherman right then was saying that the tariff was a conflict of purely selfish and local interests and in 1890 said that tariff legislation was an "affair of sections. Hancock's record was indeed stainless as was his character and the main credit of the victory at Gettysburg was ascribed to him: "The Democrats made much of this and contrasted it with Garfield's connection with the Credit Mobilier, his $5,000 fee in the De Golyer paving contracts while chairman of the appropriations committee, and his voting for the salary grant bill. The conclusion generally arrived at (and justly) was that he had only been indiscreet, and the Independents gave him earnest support. Combinations between the Democrats and Greebacks in some states hurt Democracy on the whole. The tariff, the money question and distrust of Southern control were the deciding issues in the campaign.

But the money question in another way figured decisively. Indiana especially and other doubtful states were said to have been "plastered with $200 bills," these bills beingjestingly referred to by Vice-President Arthur at a post-election banquet as "political documents." Rhode says money was used in this campaign as never before; manufacturers, financial interests and officiholders were assessed heavily.

The charge was made that Tammany's non-support of Hancock lost the Democracy New York. This does not seem justified, Hancock receiving 12,000 more votes in that state than Tilden four years before.

The electoral vote was, Garfield, 214, Hancock, 156. New York would have turned the scale. The popular vote was, Garfield 4,454,416, Hancock, 4,444,992, Weaver, 308,575, Dow, 10,305. Thus Garfield was a minority President by over 300,000 votes.

The politics of the Garfield-Arthur administration belong mostly to Republican history, though having in the inauguration to do with Democratic success in 1884. The quarrel between Garfield and Conkling; the death of Garfield before his first Congress met, the unexpected course pursued by Arthur when he became President, the enmity between Blaine and Conkling, are matters of first importance in Republican annals.

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Conkling, able, brilliant, masterful, successful in private as well as public life, was vain and arrogant to a degree. He and Blaine had quarreled years before and he was credited with blocking the latter's nomination in 1876 and, 1880. He never forgave Blaine's bitter thrust in the Senate, when, stating that Conkling had been likened to Henry Winter Davis, Blaine said: "The resemblance is great. It is striking. Hyperion to a satyr. Trees to Hercules. Mud to marble. Dunhill to diamond, a singing cat to a Bengal tiger, a whining puppy to a roaring lion."

More quiet and deadly was Conkling's encounter with Lamar, whom, with other Democrats, he charged with an act of bad faith in some Senate proceeding. Lamar said that he repelled the intimation of bad faith with all the unmitigated contempt he felt for the author of it. Conkling blusteringly stated that if he understood the Senator aright and if the Senator imputed, or if the Senate intended to impute a falsehood to him, only the rules of the Senate prevented him from denouncing the Senator as a blackguard, coward and liar. Lamar's reply was cold and clear: "The Senator from New York heard me distinctly. I beg pardon of the Senate for the unparliamentary language. It was very harsh; it was very severe; it was such as no good man would deserve and no brave man would wear."

The incident created a great sensation all over the country and a duel or violent personal encounter was looked for, as both men were known to be high spirited and fearless. But it passed off without further action. Conkling soon resigned from the Senate and failed to be re-elected.

Garfield within four months after his inauguration was assassinated. Arthur, to the surprise of many, was from the beginning of his Presidency an able, conservative and independent executive. Conkling, his erstwhile leader, treated with due and proper honor and respect, and no more; in his cabinet and other appointments he showed that the New York spoilsman whom fate made President could fully rise to his great duties and station. The civil service law, which he had advocated in two messages, was passed during his administration and has been called the Magna Charta of civil service reform. Its author, however, was Senator Pendleton, Democrat of Ohio. It was under this law that Cleveland made his large additions to the classified service.

Tariff revision "by its friends" was undertaken during Arthur's administration. The bill to create a tariff commission passed the House 151 to 83, the Senate 35 to 19, many Democrats op-
posing it. Their opposition was justified when the names of the commissioners were known. The chairman was John L. Hayas, the lobbyist extraordinary, head of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers; among its other members were one iron manufacturer, one wool grower, one sugar producer, and every member was considered a protectionist. Some think the appointments made to this commission the greatest blot on Arthur's record. Yet the commission recommended a substantial reduction all along the line and presented a scheme of reduction averaging twenty or possibly twenty-five per cent.

The Republican Congress, knowing that the newly elected House was Democratic, made hay while the Republican sun was shining and passed a bill making no material reduction, and violative of the principles laid down by the commission and recognized as just by all. This was the "Mongrel Tariff" and so partisan had been the methods pursued in its enactment that Senators Bayard and Beck refused to serve on the conference committee and, eight other Democrats following their example, the Senate conference committee was made up of Republicans and Mahone, Readjuster, with the result that Mahone got the tariff on iron ore raised even higher than the bill placed it. But as it was from a tariff reformer's viewpoint, McKinley refused to sign the conference report or vote for the bill because it reduced wool duties, and Randall voted for it.

Sherman, who managed the bill in the Senate, was greatly aided by a new Senator, Nelson W. Aldrich, whose remarkable capacity along certain lines was recognized immediately. Bayard, and Beck of Kentucky, fought the bill ably but vainly. In the House "pig iron" Kelly was supported by Thomas B. Reed, Dudley Randall, and William McKinley, while John G. Carlisle, Morrison, Tucker of Virginia and Randall opposed them. Randall intended to be a candidate for Speaker when the Democratic House came in and did not now run counter to the views of a majority of the party. A powerful lobby supported the high protectionists, a high-pressure army.

The Senate of the Forty-seventh Congress was composed of 37 Democrats, and 37 Republicans with David Davis, Independent, and General Mahone, Readjuster. The House stood 135 Democrats, 147 Republicans, 9 Nationals and 2 Readjusters. The Readjuster movement in Virginia, a combination of dissatisfied Democrats with Republicans, gave the Democrats much alarm in 1880, and the Republicans thought the Solid South was broken, but although the Readjusters gained control of Virginia and sent

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Mahone and Riddleberger to the Senate, the movement did not, as feared, spread to other States and was of brief duration in Virginia.

The Forty-eighth Congress had a House containing 196 Democrats, 118 Republicans, 6 Readjusters, and 5 unattached, the Senate being Republican by 4 majority. The contest for the speakership practically settled the Democratic position on the tariff. Randall had long been a powerful leader, but differing with the mass of his party on protection. His leadership was now contested by John G. Carlisle. who had entered the House from Kentucky in 1877. With an intellect as clear and capacious as James Madison's, Carlisle was one of the ablest statesmen America has ever produced; free from the arts of the politician and the sophist, he threw the white light of understanding on every subject he discussed. His tariff speeches attracted the country's attention and finally fixed his party's definite position. Despite Randall's powerful personality, reputation and real ability and against the powerful interests in and out of the Democratic Party which were exerted for him, Carlisle was elected Speaker. One of his first acts was to appoint the veteran low-tariff champion, William R. Morrison, chairman of the ways and means committee. The Morrison bill proposed a horizontal reduction of twenty per cent, less than the reduction proposed by the tariff commission, and its duty was lower than the Morrill tariff of 1861 which the Republicans had promised at every instance to restore so soon as the war was over. Randall opposed the bill and defeated it in a House having a Democratic majority of 78, 41 Democratic voting nay—12 from Pennsylvania, 10 from Ohio, 6 from New York, 4 from the South. Iron, steel, wool and sugar were strong in both parties.

This Democratic House passed with cheers the bill restoring General Grant to his rank as General and retiring him with full pay, the signing of his commission being the second act of Cleveland as President.

Arthur's administration was responsible for the suspension for ten years of Chinese immigration, the prosecution of the Star Route mail frauds and the two-cent postage law. He vetoed, but it was passed over the veto, what was called the "worst river and harbor bill" ever passed, which veto cost him Massachusetts' support in the following Republican convention. His course in making appointments did not please the Grant-Conkling-Platt crowd any more than his general course pleased Blaine and his friends. But the people were pleased, the busi-
ness element regarded him favorably while with the Independents, he became quite a favorite. The close analogy between the men Fillmore and Arthur, their political characters, careers and fortunes, has been noted.

It seems evident that by 1884, due to the lasting political effects of the war, reinforced by the fairly satisfactory administrations of Hayes and Arthur, the United States had become normally Republican in politics. To win the Democrats had to draw heavily from the liberal and independent elements ordinarily Republican. The Democratic Party was distinctly the minority party despite the Solid South. Yet it was the minority party only because the negro vote of the whole country was practically as solidly Republican as was the South Democratic.

Still it was a powerful organization, strong in nearly every state, with many of the best and ablest men in the country among its leaders, and fully capable of victory. Its opponent was vulnerable, very vulnerable, despite its overwhelming strength. Both in and out of Congress party lines were wavering, extensive changes of party association were possible; the years 1880-4 was a period of flux, and the times ripe for a great leader in the Democratic Party. Such a man appeared, one of the greatest of Democratic leaders.

CHAPTER XXIV
HONESTY IN POLITICS AND IN GOVERNMENT UNDER CLEVELAND
1885-1889

Fourteenth Democratic National Convention—Summary Opposition to Cleveland.—The Unit Rule.—General Bragg’s Speech.—Other Conventions.—Blaine’s Nomination.—Platform.—A Bitter Campaign—Characters and Records of Cleveland and Blaine.—Tell the Truth.—The Millionaires’ Dinner.—The Veto.—The Parties in Congress.—The Cabinet.—Hayward—Whitney and the Navy.—Lamar and Recovery of Public Lands.—Civil Service Reform.—Innocent Denouement.—The Tariff.—Peculiar Message of 1887.—The Money Question.—Pension Veto.—The Sherman Silver.—Labor Troubles and Conspiracies.—Attacks on Cleveland.—Attacks on Other Presidents.—Cleveland and the Democratic Party.

The Fourteenth Democratic National Convention met at Chicago July 8, 1884, about one month after the Republicans had nominated Blaine. The call had been addressed to “all Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations.” Called to order by Chairman W. H. Barnum, Governor Richard H. Hubbard of Texas was made temporary chairman, William F. Vilas of Wisconsin permanent president.

The New York opposition to Grover Cleveland was aggressive from the first. When the routine motion to adopt the rules of the preceding convention came up, Grady of the Tammany forces, by whose reflection to the New York Senate Governor Cleveland had opposed, moved an amendment annulling the unit rule, the New York delegation, roughly estimated at 50, pro, 22, anti-Cleveland, having been put under that rule by the state convention. Grady contended that the State convention could only instruct the delegates from the state at large, the district delegates being free to vote the sentiment of their districts. Bourke Cockran and Kelly supported his arguments while Fellows, supported by Bragg and Doolittle of Wisconsin, opposed. Their position was that by Democratic principles the state was the unit. The amendment was lost by a vote of 463 to 329. The vote seems to have been considerably influenced by the predilections of the delegates for or against Cleveland; Mississippi voted solidly aye, Louisiana nay, and several states tied.