powerful army and fleet, manned partly by citizens and partly by mercenaries. Her trade was directed chiefly to the north and north-west. I have said already that she had to face the competition of Greek cities in Sicily, Italy, and Gaul, and that this led to constant bloody collisions. At the beginning of the fifth century, simultaneously with the third Persian invasion of Greece, and possibly in collusion with Persia, she equipped a powerful fleet and collected a large army, and hurled them upon Sicily, hoping to seize the whole island and expel the Greeks at one blow. Fortunately for the Greeks, Sicily was in such a position that she was prepared to meet the foe. Gelon, tyrant of the city of Gela, an able and ambitious statesman, had created a powerful empire in Sicily; and Syracuse, the richest and strongest city in the island, had come under his sway shortly before the Carthaginian invasion. Making use of the resources thus obtained and of the general apprehension, he collected a great army and met the invaders near Himera. The skill of the general and the favourable conditions—the Carthaginian cavalry had been wrecked while crossing from Africa—gave victory to the Greeks. It was long before Carthage was in a position to renew her attack.

Greece had defended her freedom. Persia and Carthage, it is true, were still great powers, but Persia advanced no farther: she had to think of defence instead. Greece had escaped the fate of Asia Minor: she never became, even for a time, the province of an Eastern monarchy.
IX

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

After Plataea and Mycale the struggle with the Persians in Greece proper was at an end. Persia recognized that, as things were, she was unable to conquer Greece and cut it up into Persian satrapies. But this does not mean that war between the two nations was ended: it still dragged on, inevitably; and the only question was, what form the struggle would take, and which side would play the active or the passive part. It was possible for Persia to abandon all hope of immediate conquest, and yet to maintain her common frontier with Greece and her possessions in the Balkan peninsula, Asia Minor, and the islands.

The period of fifty years which divides the battle of Plataea from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is a period about which little is known. Herodotus ends his history with the taking of Sestos in 478 B.C.; Thucydides made it his business to describe and explain the great struggle between Sparta and Athens for primacy in Greece; and the later historians—Ephorus, Theopompus, and others—who recorded not episodes merely but the whole of Greek history, have come down to us, if they have come down at all, in mere fragments. Those fifty years were not marked out by any central incident of arresting interest, and therefore found no historian fit to rank with Herodotus or Thucydides.

It was impossible that Persia should give up the struggle. But she had suffered such shrewd blows in Greece that the ponder-
ous framework of the Persian Empire, with its immense territory and motley armies, obviously needed some respite in order to concentrate these armies and prepare for a fresh attack. But this respite Greece refused to give. She never stopped fighting, even temporarily; instead of defending herself, she became aggressive. She made it her object to push the Persians back to Asia and deprive them of immediate contact with the Aegean. This military object was at the same time a national object: what mattered most was to restore their independence to the Greek cities on the Aegean coast. We are ill informed of the way in which this policy was carried out, I have said above that we have but meagre records of the period following the Persian wars; and such information as we have refers mainly to the internal affairs of Greece and not to the struggle against Persia. These internal affairs became more complicated as Athens rose in political importance. There was increasing friction between her and her neighbours; and behind those neighbours was Sparta, ever turning a suspicious eye on the increasing wealth and importance of Athens.

The main incidents, however, of this struggle are known. It was directed originally by Sparta. Before the war Sparta had been the chief political and military power in Greece; to her, with Athens coming next, had belonged the first place in the actual conduct of the war; her army had won the battle of Plataea. But Sparta was ill suited to take the lead in a contest which was waged chiefly by sea and on the outskirts of the Greek world. Such a war demanded a more flexible and active machine than the constitution of Sparta. Her military strength was limited and could not be squandered here and there in large numbers. Her domestic affairs, her relations to the Helots and Perioeci made it necessary to retain at home a large military force, the majority, indeed, of those Spartiates who formed the nucleus of the army. This concentration of Spartan force in Greece, instead of Asia Minor and Thrace, was required also by the complicated political situation of the Peloponnese, where Sparta's
Plate XVI  GREEK POTTERY OF THE 5TH CENTURY B.C.

1. Attic cup (red figured on black ground) from the workshop of Euphronios, the great Athenian potter and painter of the late 6th and early 5th centuries. Found at Caere in Italy. The picture, which is splendidly illustrated by the beautiful victory-song (paeon) of Bacchylides, recently found, represents the Athenian national hero Theseus. He had been challenged by the Cretan King Minos to prove that he was really the son of Poseidon. Fearless, he jumped from his ship into the sea, and supported by a sea-monster Triton met the sea-queen Amphitrite in her palace. His protectress and the patron of his city, Athens, assisted him; and he received from the queen both recognition and rich gifts. The picture is one of the most beautiful of archaic vase paintings. It is important from the historical point of view as well. It shows that, from the time of Pisistratus, Athens regarded herself as the mistress of the sea. About 500 B.C. Paris, Louvre.

2. Attic cup (red-figured) showing an aged citizen helping a young man to put on the arms of a hoplite. The expression of deep sorrow is masterly. Such were the fathers of those who fought for their country at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea. About 480 B.C. Vatican, Rome.
3. Attic cup (red-figured) in the style of Duris. Oedipus is seated on a rock meditating the riddle of human life which the Sphinx, a beautiful winged woman with a lion’s body, has asked him. A beautiful symbol of the time of the great Greek thinkers, especially the Sophists, who tried over and over again to find a logical solution of the riddle of life. About 480 B.C. Vatican, Rome.

4. Attic cup (red-figured) in the style of the painter Duris. The picture shows Jason, the first Greek sailor, who went on the ship Argo to Colchis in the Caucasus to bring back the golden fleece. He met here the dragon which guarded the fleece, entered its huge body or was swallowed by it, was rescued, and finally killed the monster. The picture shows Jason coming out of the dragon’s mouth under the protection of Athena. The fleece hangs near by on a tree. The picture demonstrates how early Athens became interested in the Greek colonies on the Black Sea and wished to be recognized as their protectress. About 480 B.C. Vatican, Rome.
leadership depended upon military superiority alone. Finally, as we have seen, Sparta was an agricultural and inland kingdom: her wealth was limited, and no war could be carried on with success at sea and on the outskirts of the Greek world without large expenditure.

All this taken together inevitably drove Sparta to resign the leading part in the further struggle against Persia. But a leader there must be, and the only possible leader was Athens. Her fleet was the best in Greece; her army was considerable, including as it did all the citizens of the state, i.e. the immense majority of all the population inhabiting Athens, the Peiraeus, and all Attica; and the fleet could easily convey detachments of the force to wherever they were needed. Besides, after the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes, her domestic affairs were in order; and indeed the citizens, busy with military enterprises, had no time to think of anything else. And lastly, the spirit of patriotism had risen high in Athens, in consequence of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea; and the fame of the Athenians, as excellent soldiers and sailors and sagacious politicians was very great. It is no wonder that Athens coveted the direction of the struggle against Persia, and obtained it.

Though Greece proper, i.e. the cities dotted about the Balkan peninsula, was not much concerned in this contest, to the islands and the cities in Asia Minor it was a matter of life and death. These parts of Greece took therefore an active part in it, combining, under the presidency of Athens, in a marine confederacy with a centre at Delos—a confederacy which gave birth to the Athenian Empire. The principles of this irrevocable alliance were—that each of the allies should take part in the war and be represented at the council of the league, and each might contribute money instead of men and ships. Under these conditions it was natural that the presidency should belong to Athens. Possessing larger forces and greater wealth than the other allies, she commanded a majority of votes in the council; she alone had men enough and energy enough to convert the money of the
allies, in case they were unwilling or unable to take an active part in the war, into ships and soldiers. On the Athenians, as directors, the chief responsibility fell; and their importance on the council was naturally in proportion to their responsibility.

By the action of this confederation the Aegean was gradually cleared of the Persians. The Hellespont and the Sea of Marmora joined the alliance, or, in other words, became Athenian waters; the most important points were garrisoned by colonies of Athenian citizens; and by degrees the Persians were squeezed out of the southern Aegean also. The chief actors in this systematic warfare against Persia were new. Aristides, a general at the battle of Plataea and founder of the Confederacy of Delos, had left the scene. So had Themistocles, the hero of Salamis and the creator of the Athenian fleet. His last achievement was to fortify Athens and the harbour of Piraeus with walls. With her land and sea bases thus fortified Athens could carry on freely her activity at sea, and could be indifferent to the possibility of attacks by land against her capital and harbour. Later, like most statesmen of the Athenian democracy, Themistocles was prosecuted and exiled. His remaining days he spent in Persia.

The chief figure at Athens now was Cimon. He led the aristocratic party and supported the 'balance of power' in Greece, that is, a policy of peace and agreement with Sparta and the other Greek states. Thus he was peculiarly well fitted to direct the foreign policy of Athens, as things then were. Like his father, Miltiades, and like Themistocles, he had great ability. His chief exploit was his victory over the Persians at the river Eurymedon c. 468 B.C., which decided the mastery of the southern waters. After this defeat the Persians had no marine base except the coasts of Palestine, Syria, Phoenicia, and Egypt.

This battle completed a series of operations against Persia, which were closely connected with the invasion of Greece. The Greeks realized clearly that the danger of a fresh invasion was not to be feared in the immediate future. But this did not imply that the struggle was over. Persia was still a strong marine power.
Plate XVII  GREEK POTTERY OF THE 5th
AND 4th CENTURIES B.C.

1. Red-figured wine-vessel (krater) found at Canusium in Italy. The leading idea is the triumph of Europe over Asia. The most important part (our figure) represents the preparations of Darius for his eventful expedition into Greece. Darius is consulting his council, one of the Persian nobles is speaking. Below, the treasurer collects the war-tax from the tax-payers. In the upper row to the left the divine protectors of Greece (Athena, Hera, Zeus, Nike, Apollo, Artemis), to the right the personification of Asia led into war by the goddess 'Apate'—Deceit, Illusion. It is the first act of the great historical drama treated by Aeschylus in his 'Persians' and by Herodotus in his 'Histories'. Italiote Greek work of the 4th century B.C. Naples Museum. After Furtwängler-Reichhold.
2. Red-figured amphora (vessel with two handles). The picture shows the Lydian King Croesus on the pyre after his army was defeated by the Persian King Cyrus. The story was famous in Greece and was used by Herodotus to show how unstable fortune is and how quietly a 'wise' man takes the inevitable. Attic work of about 500 B.C. Paris, Louvre. After Furtwängler-Reichhold.

3. Red-figured cup. Achilles is represented slaying the Amazon Queen Penthesilea, with whom, according to the epic poets, he was in love. To the right, one of the Greeks; to the left, one of the Amazons in Oriental costume. Attic work of about 450 B.C. Munich Museum. After Furtwängler-Reichhold.
with outlets to the Mediterranean, and sooner or later she might return to a policy of attack with increased experience and increased knowledge. But no Greeks except the Athenians realized this danger. The rest felt themselves free from immediate menace, and thought it unnecessary to preserve, with an eye to the future, the naval organization which they had created for the contest with Persia. Thus a process of decomposition began in the confederation. The allies resented the supremacy of Athens and aimed at complete political independence.

There were now two alternatives before Athens—either to renounce the mastery of the Aegean and revert to the state of things before the Persian wars, or to convert the confederation into an Athenian Empire; in other words, to rule the allies instead of presiding over them, a result which could only be secured by force. She was induced to take the second of these courses, partly by her conviction that the struggle with Persia was not yet over, and partly by other considerations. Athens had become a great city: a large part of the Aegean trade was concentrated there; and she had become an important centre of industry. The population had greatly increased: to the citizens were added a multitude of aliens (metoei) who did not possess the franchise but settled in the city in order to carry on trade and industry; the number of slaves also had risen greatly. The loss of mastery over the sea would certainly have arrested this development; and also it might have forced on Athens a return to the conditions that existed before the Persian wars; and such a return would inevitably have brought with it serious internal convulsions. Hence she chose the second course and proceeded to convert the confederation into an empire, in which the citizens of Athens ruled over the citizens of other states, and the contributions of the allies became tribute instead.

This decision affected the whole policy of Athens, both at home and abroad. The leaders of the democratic party—first Ephialtes and then Pericles—became assertors of the imperialistic ideas and aspirations cherished by the citizens. The activity
of Ephialtes was short-lived: soon after his first public appearance he was mysteriously murdered. But Pericles guided Athenian policy for many years, and always found support in the popular assembly. He was a strict and consistent champion of the view that Athens should be at once a democracy and a great imperial power; he was an excellent orator, and a wary and sagacious statesman. It is with good reason that the time between the banishment of Cimon in 461 B.C. and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is generally called the Age of Pericles.

The decision was taken, and Athens became the centre of a great empire, a democracy herself, but with a number of states dependent on her and ruled by her in all matters except those of purely local interest, and thereby deprived of their political
independence. This decision altered the policy of Athens towards her nearest neighbours and towards Sparta, and also affected her relation to the Persian monarchy; and in both cases the new policy was due to economic causes and mainly to commercial considerations.

Between the seventh and fifth centuries B.C. Greece created her own flourishing manufactures, developed and improved her production of wine and oil, and found for her wares a number of markets, where they were appreciated more and more and found increasing sales. The chief markets were Italy, Gaul, and Spain in the west, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Black Sea coast in the north and north-east. In the east also, Athenian vases and the large quantities of Greek, especially Athenian, silver coins found all over the Persian Empire from Afghanistan to Egypt attest almost uninterrupted commercial relations with the Greek world in the fifth century. The Phoenicians, driven out of the Aegean, were still masters of the lucrative trade with Egypt (though the Greeks tried to compete with them there as early as the seventh century B.C.), and tried hard to oust the Greeks from all the western trade. It is therefore no wonder that the imperial fleet of Athens aimed its first blows at the Phoenicians, attacking them in Cyprus and Egypt, the main centres of their trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Success in the struggle for these markets would have enabled Greece to attack Phoenicia itself. But both these Athenian expeditions ended in failure. When endeavouring to support the Egyptian revolt against Persia (460-454 B.C.), they lost a considerable detachment of soldiers and a powerful squadron of ships; in Cyprus, having recalled Cimon from banishment to lead their army, they won a battle (450 B.C.) but reaped no considerable advantage from it. Cimon died of disease during the campaign. They were forced to make peace with Persia and leave the question of Phoenicia to be settled by future generations.

Athens was unsuccessful against Persia, because she was at the same time drawn into strife with her nearest neighbours
and with Sparta. Her empire was by no means consolidated at this time, and she was forced, as we shall see later, to fight against her own allies or subjects. In this case the war with Aegina, Corinth, and Boeotia was due to the same economic and commercial motives which had embroiled her with Persia. Aegina was an old enemy and a rival. Corinth with her western colonies excluded Athens from the Etruscan sea, the West, and the great grain-markets of Italy and Sicily. The economic expansion of Athens had to be directed at the undeveloped countries on the Adriatic Sea. But for Athens, with the growth of her manufactures and the conversion of her fields into vineyards and olive groves, the import of raw materials and foodstuffs was a question of life and death. Italy and Sicily could supply both her needs more fully than any country except Egypt. The northern markets, still only in process of development, could not produce enough to satisfy the needs of the great Athenian Empire, increased as it was by the accession of the Ionian cities.

Repeating the policy which they had employed against Phoenicia, the Athenians did not attack Corinth directly, but tried to weaken her by seizing Aegina and forcing her into the alliance, by depriving Megara, the neighbour of Corinth and Athens, of all commercial importance, and by establishing her own ascendancy in Boeotia. This attempt to extend her influence in Greece proper naturally involved collision with Sparta, to whom (and to all Peloponnesians) the neutrality of the Isthmus was of vital importance, because they depended largely on the import of corn and raw material from Italy and Sicily. The struggle dragged on from 459 to 447 B.C., and Athens in the end was unsuccessful. Aegina, indeed, became part of the Athenian Empire; but she was unable either to cut off Megara from the sea or to strengthen her own position in Boeotia. Again she was obliged to end the war by an unprofitable peace which was concluded, first for five years, and then, in 446, extended to thirty. Sparta consented to make peace, though the question of Athenian ascendancy in central Greece was by no
means settled. But she could not help herself: she was weakened by a long struggle against the Helots, from 464 to 459 B.C., and by repeated complications with Elis and Arcadia, members of the Spartan military league, and with Argos, her stubborn enemy.

Unsuccessful in her grand imperialistic schemes, Athens was now obliged to deal with the affairs of her confederacy, in other words, of her new dominions, and to consolidate her position in those parts of the world where her supremacy was as yet undisputed—in Thrace and on the Black Sea coast. The wish to impress the dependent cities and extend the bounds of the empire explains the cruise undertaken by Pericles. In command of a great fleet he visited the coast of the Black Sea and the Crimea, where a number of military colonies were planted, probably by Pericles himself, and many Greek cities were annexed to the empire. While Athens was fighting Persia and her Greek neighbours, the process was going on which converted the maritime confederation into the Athenian Empire. In 454 B.C. the treasury of the league was transferred from Delos to Athens; most of the allies, except Samos, Lesbos, and Chios, became dependent and paid tribute; and they were all obliged at this time to refer most of their suits at law to the decision of the Athenian courts. All this was exceedingly displeasing to the 'allies', as the subjects of the Athenian Empire were still officially called; and they resented the constant interference of Athens in the internal affairs of cities which still considered themselves independent. Thus Athens had constantly to deal with 'revolts' among the allies. Some of these, e.g. the revolt of free Samos, which refused to remain a member of the league, and the revolt of Byzantium, were very formidable and were quelled with great severity.

The internal life of Athens was influenced by her ambitious foreign policy. The consistent development of that policy was guided mainly by the lower classes—by the citizens engaged in navigation, trade, and manufacture. They were the masters, and all public institutions were re-fashioned, to suit them, in the
spirit of extreme democracy. The political centre of gravity was now transferred from the Council of Five Hundred to the popular assembly, in which the law required that all important business should be decided, such as questions of foreign policy, of war, and of food-supplies. Once in each prytany (a period of thirty-six days) the public assembly reviewed the proceedings of the magistrates, with power to suspend and bring them to trial, in case of any irregularity. Under these conditions the magistrates confined themselves to executing the decisions of the assembly; and the council merely discussed beforehand the business which the assembly had subsequently to decide. Every member of the assembly had the right to speak and even to initiate legislation. But the latter right was hedged about with certain safeguards. Agenda of the assembly was prepared by the Council, and the motions had to be approved by it, although the people could amend the proposed text. However, any citizen could attack a decree in the courts for constitutional reasons.

The board of ten generals (strategi) acquired great importance at the same time and formed a kind of cabinet. This was a survival from the troubled times of the Persian wars. All foreign and domestic policy was concentrated in their hands. If their policy was successful, they might be re-elected an indefinite number of times; in case of failure, they were sometimes tried and sentenced to exile or death. Their high position was quite natural in a state where the centre of gravity lay in foreign and military affairs, and in the ruling of an empire. There was also an army of executive officials, all appointed annually by lot, and serving partly in Athens and partly abroad. Their chief business was the finance of the empire.

There was a third body which played an important part in public life. This was the Heliaea or judicial assembly in which citizens were paid for their duties. This body monopolized by degrees all the forensic business of Athens. It consisted of 6,000 members, 600 taken by lot from each tribe. They were divided into committees of 500, but the number was sometimes greater
than this, sometimes less. The jurors swore to give their verdict in accordance with the laws, and, in cases where the law could be interpreted in more than one way, according to their conscience. The number of suits, especially when swollen by business of the empire, was very large and took long to decide. The magistrates merely prepared the case and took no part in the decision. Advocates and defenders were not admitted to the court: each party had to appear in person. The verdict was determined by a simple majority.

Such was the final form of democracy. Neither in foreign nor in domestic affairs did it lead to any specially brilliant consequences. To it, in considerable measure, Athens owed her failure in the struggle with Sparta, and her fall.