but brave and dependable. He also created military fiefs or money rents to make permanent provision for crossbowmen and archers. These measures, however, were inadequate. It would appear that Philip introduced new ideas and considered the systematic application of the Carolingian principle of imposing service on the whole population. By this step, he was adopting the English system. An English chronicle assures us that he published an ordinance modelled on the Assize of Arms of 1181.¹ We have no text of that ordinance but we can form some idea of it. Philip certainly never pretended to imitate the Assize of Arms. Henry II was sufficiently powerful to compel all the freemen of his kingdom to do military service and revive the Carolingian and the Anglo-Saxon traditions at the same time. But the King of France could address himself and, in fact, did address himself only to the abbeys dependent on him, to his communes, and the provosts of his demesnes. The “Prisée of Sergents” of 1194 proves this fact. Whenever it was necessary, Philip demanded from the ecclesiastical and lay communities, of which this “prisée” gives a list, either a certain contingent of sergeants whom they had to support or a tax in commutation of the duty: as in Normandy and England, the contingents were in multiples of five or ten and the effective unit consisted of ten men. Service was for three months. A foot sergeant demanded a pound a month for hire and, consequently, this rate was three pounds for those who preferred to pay the tax instead. This system allowed Philip to dispose of two thousand sergeants throughout the year, a number very different from the fantastic figures we find in the chroniclers. Armies and garrisons in the Middle Ages were very small.

II

ALLIES AND OPPONENTS

On several occasions we have glanced at the problem of estimating the amount of support which Louis VII and his son could depend on among the clergy, the lower classes, and

¹ XVIII, i, 270. On this Assize of Henry II, see p. 145 above. Cf. CCCXXXVI, 227 ff. Guilhermoz believes that the essential point of the ordinance of Philip Augustus was to fix the rate of revenue (undoubtedly £20) at which a noble had to arm a knight and carry a full equipment.
the nobility, within the demesne and without. We must now examine it more closely.

Conflicts between the monarchy and the clergy, frequently quite sharp during the early years of the reign of Louis VII,\(^1\) were rare during the latter half of the twelfth century. Good relations were general. Louis VII was a saintly man who gave refuge to the two fugitives Thomas Becket and Alexander III at the risk of alienating Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa. Philip, not without considerable doubts, went to fight in the Holy Land and, at the beginning of his reign, he did nothing to check the persecution and burning of the Jews.\(^2\) Reform of the Church was carried through; the principle of Canonical election had triumphed though without prejudice to the king's right of supervision.\(^3\) This is precisely expressed by the following provision of Philip's will:—

> If it happens that an episcopal see or a royal abbey is vacant, we will that the Canons of the Church or the monks of the vacant monastery shall come before the queen and the archbishop (William of Champagne) as they have been used to come before us and demand of them a free election and we will that they shall grant it without any refusal. We warn the canons and monks to elect someone who will be pleasing to God and useful to the realm.\(^4\)

The collection of the deeds of Louis VII and Philip Augustus very largely consists of letters by which the king interferes to re-establish peace and order in the churches and abbeys and particularly to defend them against lay feudation. Louis VII and his successor made important military expeditions, particularly into Auvergne, Burgundy, and Berry to punish the oppressors of the Church.\(^5\) Through special letters of protection or patronage contracts (for the joint administration of ecclesiastical lands) they became patrons of churches situated outside the demesne. The bishop of Tournai carried this to its conclusion. The bishop of Tournai, exhausted by the turbulence of the burgesses, handed over the town and forty villages surrounding it to Philip in

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\(^1\) COCLXIX, 449 ff.; COCLVIII, 79 ff.

\(^2\) CXXI, i, 58, 124; iii, 188. On his change of policy in respect of the Jews after 1198, see p. 101 above.

\(^3\) DLXXIII, 165 ff.

\(^4\) CV, n. 345.

\(^5\) CDXL, ii, 287 ff.; CXXI, i, 82 ff., ii, 343; DLXX, 101–2.
It was an extremely valuable acquisition. Tournai was to remain for more than three centuries an integral part of the royal demesne. Finally, at Court the clergy was orderly and willing to be of service providing that their goods and property were respected; it provided the monarchy with councillors, administrators, historiographers who told of the miracles performed for the king's benefit. When Philip repudiated his second wife without any adequate reason, the bishops and abbots showed a disgusting complacency when they came together in Council. They were, as Rigord himself wrote, dogs who didn't know how to bark.

The alliance of the Capetians and the clergy was of long standing. The great innovation at the end of the twelfth century was their alliance with the lower classes and particularly the burgesses.

The rural population, despised and terrorized by the nobility and slandered by minstrels, could hope for little relief or defence from the Church. The latter administered its wealth strictly, granted freedom to its serfs extremely reluctantly, and was powerless against feudal violence. The monarchy had the opportunity to root its popularity in the very heart of the country by protecting the peasants; a policy that would one day be adopted by St. Louis. During the period we are considering, it did not entirely neglect this source of prestige and profit. Its sanction had, at all periods, given a special validity to the enfranchisement of serfs in the kingdom. Louis VII declared, in a charter of 1159, "that it was a prerogative of the royal majesty to grant liberty to former serfs." He did not employ it often but he renounced his right of mortmain throughout the diocese of Orléans, characterizing it as extremely oppressive. It is very obviously in their interest, that Louis and his son established "new towns" (Villeneuves) where many serfs could establish themselves in the enjoyment of privileges which were frequently very extensive. The famous customs of Lorris granted by Louis VI were confirmed by the two kings and granted to many villages either in the royal demesne or in

1 CCLVII, 593-610; CCLX, i, 296 ff.
2 CXII, 125, § 92.
the ecclesiastical territories. The deeds of Philip Augustus in the first part of his reign have rural communities as their beneficiaries. Most frequently, he is concerned with villages that the abbeys cannot guarantee against ravaging. The king takes them under his protection and attaches them to the Crown on condition of dues or is even accepted as co-lord; he installs a provost in them. It is a characteristic symptom of troubled times. The general insecurity is to the king’s advantage for he is in a position to help the oppressed.

An alliance with the rich bourgeoisie which had been in existence for about a century offered even more direct advantages. It began to appear in the reign of Louis VII who grants or confirms charters of franchises, encourages the formation of communes in the ecclesiastical demesnes, and the idea that ecclesiastical cities with communes are royal towns is expressly attributed to him. Frequently, however, he hesitates, wavers, and supports the Church against the bourgeoisie and he had no wish to establish communes in the royal demesne. He seems to have experienced that horrified reaction that burgess independence stimulated in the Church. Philip Augustus’s attitude was much more decided. In the first twenty years of his reign there are numerous charters confirming or increasing the privileges of the enfranchised towns in his demesne or outside. The most striking fact, however, is his acceptance of communal independence. The measures which he took in favour of certain abbeys against their burgesses, or even the abolition of the Charter of Étampes in the royal demesnes are exceptional incidents; between 1182 and 1188 he established communes at Chaumont, Pontoise, Poissy, Montreuî and, outside his demesne, he re-established the commune of Sens and confirmed the communes of Soissons, Noyon, Beauvais, and Dijon. After annexing Artois, the Tournaïsia,

1 DIXI. 2 CIV, n. 51, 110, 129, 133, 197. 3 Typical cases of Escues in Auvergne: CIV, n. 233. See also, n. 21, 61, 100, 108, 119, 232, 248. 4 CDXX, ii, 179 ff.; CDXXXVIII, 264 ff. 5 Except Senlis (CCXXX, 3). 6 CIV, n. 10, 15, 19, 30, 40, 43, 44, 52, 73, 84, 168-9, etc. 7 L., 36, n. 5. 8 CIV, n. 38, 233, 234, 236. 9 CIV, n. 230; CLXXXVIII, chap. vi. 10 CIV, n. 35, 43, 53, 101, 210; CLXXXVIII, 119 ff., 362 ff.; CDXXI, 42 ff.; CCXXII, 90 ff.
and part of Vermadois, between 1188 and 1197, he confirmed or completed the charters of Tournai, Saint Riquier, Amiens, Hesdin, Arras, Saint Quentin, Montdidier, Bapaume, and Roye.¹ Many of the charters of these communes show us clearly the motives which are activating him.² He declares that he is acting from love of the burgesses of the town and there is no doubt of his desire to satisfy that class as he feels that it would provide a dependable support. Moreover, he drew from the communes a rent in return for his concessions.³ Above all, however, he realized that they were potential armies for his defence and imposed military duties on them. They formed a militia which undertook to be a very valuable weapon for the king. "Every time," says the charter of Tournai, "that we send for our service the sergeants of the communes, our subjects of Tournai shall send to our service 300 well equipped footmen if they are required by us or our successors; if we are moving with our host towards the Arrouaise, the whole community of Tournai must come before us."⁴ It has also been pointed out that the towns which Philip favoured with the grant of a charter and commune were almost all on the frontiers of the royal dominions. They were defensive posts and the militia provided a reserve of troops. In 1188 the commune of Mantes near to the Norman frontier checked the English and saved Paris.⁵

Paris had never had a charter as a commune and in the thirteenth century did not even possess a municipality in embryo. Roman Lutecium had become a rural borough by the beginning of the Carolingian period but, emerging from the purely agricultural era in the eleventh century, Paris assumed, during the course of the twelfth, the characteristics of a big city. Its relations with the kings Louis VII and Philip Augustus are remarkably significant and marked a stage in the development of the monarchy. We must pause over it for a moment.⁶

In spite of its dangerous proximity to the Norman frontier,

¹ CIV, n. 224, 271, 319, 408, 473; XXXI, n. 437, 441, 486, 510; CDCLVII, 602 ff.; CDLXVII, 284 ff.; IX, intro. by Giry, 22, 26 ff.
² CDXXXVIII, 290 ff.
³ OLSXXXVIII, 250, 265.
⁴ CIV, n. 224. On the Arrouaise, see OXXXVI, ii, 81.
⁵ LVII, bk. iii, line 327 ff. Cf. CDXLVIII, 139–166.
⁶ See principally DXXIX, i; OCCCIII.
it was the capital of the kingdom. Its definite predominance was assured by its industrial and commercial development. The neighbourhood of the great and rich abbeys—Saint Denis with its Lendit fair (11th June); Saint Germain des Prés which also had its fair; Saint Geneviève; Saint Victor—had created industries. The powerful corporation of Marchands de l'Eau was in permanent communication with the merchants of Rouen and through them with the sea. Foreigners came in vast numbers; Paris was a place of transit between the northern countries and the Champagne fairs on the one hand and Orléans and the South on the other. Business men and pilgrims rubbed shoulders and many settled there to be a source of the bourgeoisie together with the old population of serfs and landlords turned townsman. Already it is becoming possible to distinguish the families which, at a later date, will form the municipal aristocracy. The isle of the city comprised only a small part of the capital of Louis VII and Philip. We can still distinguish some remains of the enclosure built on the right bank after 1190 if, after crossing the little square of the Louvre, we reach the rue Étienne Marcel and return by the rue des Francs-Bourgeois and the Charlemagne college; on the left bank, where the enclosure was not built until 1209, the wall of Philip Augustus is actually visible behind the Henry IV college and in the neighbourhood of the Institut. Although the houses were low, the gardens stunted, and the cultivated or even waste plots were numerous, it seems that the population was quite equal to that of a medium-sized town of today. All the distinctive features of a capital were to be found there. The city was a religious and political centre. The official quarter, the Palais, was at its western end and was already the principal centre of the Curia Regis and the lawyers. At the other extremity, Notre Dame, the choir of which had been completed since the end of Louis's reign, raised its white mass amid a labyrinth of little streets. There, already, one could find the swarming crowd of teachers and students, French and foreign, so numerous that they could not find accommodation. On the other side of the Petit-Pont,

1 COXULXIII, 31 ff. Plan and design of Philip's enclosure in the volume of maps. It was along this wall that Philip Augustus built the first Louvre the remains of which can be found beneath the Cariatides room. It was a fortress.
RESISTANCE OF THE CAPELIANS

on the left bank, was the quarter where Latin was spoken. There were so many schools and such famous teachers that Philip Augustus granted them corporative privileges. The University of Paris was only to be recognized at a later date but already its power existed. Around the Pont aux Changes, on the right bank, was the business quarter, with its changer’s shops, luxury industries, victualling trade, markets, and its river port crowded with boats. Around the twelve gates of Paris there was a thickly populated and well cultivated suburb whose inhabitants for a distance of two leagues shared in some of the privileges and responsibilities of the Parisian burgesses. The capital was not entirely royal demesne. The Bishop of Paris, in particular, had extensive jurisdiction there. The rights of the king were entangled with those of other lords but there were complications which occurred in most towns. In this case, however, the king is clearly the principal lord just as the bishop is elsewhere. Paris is the king’s town and the author of the Montage calls the latter “King of Paris”. Philip Augustus, continuing the work of his predecessors Louis VI and VII, took considerable trouble to organize the trade of Paris, set on foot considerable schemes to improve the sanitation of the city which was very necessary. By a piece of rare good fortune, Rigord has given us some details of one of the enterprises in which we can see the king and the bourgeoisie co-operating. In 1186, he tells us, Philip had returned to his palace in Paris after a victorious expedition in Burgundy:

He was strolling in the great royal hall thinking over affairs of state and came to the Palace windows from where he often looked out on the River Seine as a diversion. The horse waggons, crossing the city and cutting up the mud, stirred up a stench which he couldn’t stand and he decided on a difficult but necessary piece of work which his predecessors had not dared to initiate because of the crushing expense. He summoned the burgesses and the provost of the city and ordered by his royal authority that all the roads and streets of the city should be paved with strong, hard stone.

1 COXL, 154 ff.; COXLI, 220 ff.; DXL, 26 ff.
2 Well brought out by Monod: CDLXXI, 81 ff.
3 COXLIII, 13 ff., 15 ff.; COXLI, 2 ff.
4 CIV, n. 31, 74, 426, etc.
5 CXII, 53-4, § 37; cf. William the Breton, ibid., 184, § 33. Only the roads leading to the gates were paved.
Evidently on this occasion Philip Augustus made the aristocracy responsible for raising a special tax and administering its receipts; from the beginning of his reign he had understood how to appreciate and make use of those Parisians who had made their fortunes in finance, commerce, or luxury industries like Theobald the Rich and Ébrouin the Changer who figure in the will of 1190. We have already said that while he was in the Holy Land, six Paris burgesses were ordered to assist in the administration not only of the capital but of the whole kingdom; it is "all my subjects of Paris" on whom he calls to guard his treasure for his son if he should die. During his absence, the six burgesses have the key to it and receive the taxes brought to Paris. Thus we find that the tradition of entrusting major financial responsibilities to the burgesses of Paris is already established.

Thus the monarchy had a new force at its disposal. It was a welcome reinforcement for it could not hope to find the baronage anything but a precarious and hesitating ally.

It had mastered only the small and middle nobility enfeoffed in the Île de France, Beauvaisis, or Orléans and the other districts where the king held his own demesne. It provided Philip, as we have seen, with his chief officials and many of his advisers. Even now they were supplying knights, lawyers, and diplomats, who foreshadowed the legal authorities of the later thirteenth century. But what means could Louis VII or Philip Augustus employ to enforce obedience from their most important vassals?

Here we have reached the kernel of the subject of this work. We have seen that the king, by virtue of his consecration, enjoyed an external prestige of a feudal character reinforced by memories of the Bible, Antiquity, or Carolingian times but that noble society had scarcely any cohesion apart from the bond between lord and vassal. The fundamental truth which, we hope, will emerge from this book is that Philip Augustus and, up to a certain point, Saint Louis had accepted the ideas of their barons on the subject and that their position as supreme suzerain, more and more clearly defined and

1 In 1214, he gave the Hanse a responsibility of this kind: XXXI, n. 1476; CCLXI, 12.
2 See particularly the list of negotiations in CCC, i, 238; iii, 97; iv, first part, 33, etc.
applied, was the source of at least as much profit as their status as a consecrated king.

Philip, more definitely than any of his predecessors, established the principle that the feudal hierarchy culminates in the king who is nobody's vassal. In 1185, when he took possession of the County of Amiens a fief of the Church of Amiens, he bought from the church the right not to do homage to any one. He owed homage to the Lord of Orville for the castle of Beauquesne: in 1192 the fief was transformed into a manor which did not render homage. In 1198 he bought in from the Bishop of Thérouanne the homage due for the fief of Hesdin.1 We may still ask whether he had succeeded in exercising all the rights of supreme suzerain, exacting homage and the services of Court, host, and aid which his vassals owed him. In fact, what did he achieve? We can guess the answer. Many centuries were necessary for the disappearance of the independence of the nobility and feudal anarchy. It would be interesting to collect here all the precise facts that we know for the end of the twelfth century. We shall have to be satisfied with some indicative examples.

It is remarkable that neither Henry II nor his sons Henry the Younger nor Richard Cœur de Lion cast off the homage which they owed to Louis VII and Philip Augustus for Normandy and Aquitaine; it would have been wise to deprive the Capetians of their constitutional means of aggression. In fact, the vassal, more powerful than the suzerain, fulfilled none of the obligations created by homage. However, the vassalages of the English princes had not been a pure fiction. Henry II appears often to have been restrained by respect for the feudal bond. On the other hand Philip Augustus accepted the homage of Richard (in 1188) and John (in 1189) to weaken their father and at a later date John's homage against his brother Richard (1198). In the same way, he used his position as supreme suzerain to maintain centres of dissension in the Angevin Empire. The old Eleanor was so convinced of the danger of Capetian suzerainty that in 1199 after the death of Richard she hastened to do homage to Philip Augustus for Aquitaine and subsequently invest

1 CIV, n. 139, 422, 445. Another example of 1204: XXXI, n. 879. The relief for the churches consisted in the abandonment of the right of hospitality.

2 CDXXXIII, 80 ff., 204 ff.
John Lackland with it, who, as a result, was no longer the direct vassal of his enemy for this fief.¹

The Plantagenets against whom Louis VII and Philip Augustus had to maintain the independence even of their crown were not the only powerful vassals whom the king had to mistrust. Between the royal demesne and the Empire the great noble houses had an uncertain and frequently hostile attitude.

The principal baron of the area, the Count of Flanders, reigned over a warlike chivalry and rich and populous cities where the wool of the English sheep was woven.² He was a liege subject of the King of France but, for imperial Flanders, he was also a vassal of the Emperor. Finally, he held certain money rents in fief of the English king to whom he was bound by a pact of military service. The Flemings were usually considered hostile to France.³ We must add that Flanders included in its economic and often in its political orbit two principalities beyond the borders of Capetian France: Hainault and Brabant. A count of Flanders might seek to live in peace under the guarantees of the English alliance; or he might be anxious to intervene in French affairs and play the role of tutor to the monarchy as Baldwin V had done at the time of Philip I or finally he might be tempted to adopt a policy of aggrandizement and annexation. Between the three ideas, all more or less dangerous for the Capetians, the policy of the counts oscillated during the reigns of Louis VII and Philip Augustus. The Count Thierry of Alsace found it possible to be a liege subject of Louis VII and a pensioner of the King of England, to obey Louis's summons to the host and provide sergeants for Henry II.⁴ His son Philip of Alsace (1169–1191) was too vain and impulsive to walk the tight rope in this way. As we have seen, he took it into his head to become regent to the young Philip Augustus. As a means of ensuring his tractability, he arranged for him to marry his niece Isabella, a daughter of the Count of Hainault (1180). He died childless and promised to break up his possessions. After his death, Artois was to go to Isabella and her heirs and, consequently,

¹ CDIX, i, 293, 307, 315, iii, 32–3; CDLXXXIX, 22–3 CDXXXIII, 86.
² DXIII, i, bk. ii.
³ LVII, 45, line 132. Texts quoted in CDXLI, iii, 161, n. 1.
⁴ CDXXXIII, 17 ff.; CCLXXXIV, i, 64 ff.
to the Capetian dynasty while his sister and her husband, the Count of Hainault, would take over Flanders.\footnote{LI, 129-130; GXXI, i, 42 ff., and app. iv; DAVII, iii, 3 ff., 17. On the boundaries of Artois, see CDII, 192 ff.} It was not long, however, before he was quarrelling with Philip Augustus and on two occasions he made a desperate attack on him in an attempt to build up an Anglo-Flemish-German coalition against the Capetians like that which, thirty years later, was to be defeated at Bouvines.\footnote{GXXI, i, 95 ff.; COCLXXXIV, i, 103 ff.}

Even in the intervals of reconciliation, Philip Augustus could expect nothing from such a vassal who in 1186, when war between the kings of England and France was in preparation, was providing both sides with troops.\footnote{COCLXXXIV, i, 125.}

Philip of Alsace departed for the Holy Land with Philip Augustus and died before Acre in 1191. Baldwin of Hainault reunited the crowns of Hainault and Flanders; in the absence of the king, the regents of the kingdom had no wish to provoke the intervention of the Emperor and they were content to safeguard Artois and Vermandois. Baldwin, who had been antagonized by his son-in-law’s temper, was a faithful vassal\footnote{COCLXXXVI, chap. iii, p. 359 ff.} but his son Baldwin IX returned to the English alliance in the hope of conquering Tournai and recovering Artois. Heavily subsidized by Richard Cœur de Lion he entered on a campaign in July, 1197. Philip Augustus had followed the feudal rules and several times made vain offers to the count to do justice by him in his Court. On this occasion, for the first time, we hear an offer of “judgment by peers.”\footnote{COCLXXXVIII, i, 439.} “Filled with a terrible fury” against a rebellious vassal, he invaded Flanders in so imprudent a manner that he was all but captured. Baldwin was still subject to scruples and did not dare to take his suzerain prisoner but he only accepted a truce. The death of Richard Cœur de Lion and John Lackland’s reputation for duplicity finally decided him to make peace on the 2nd January, 1200, on conditions in general very advantageous for him. Philip Augustus had to abandon part of his demesne and direct suzerainities which he had received from his marriage with Isabella, particularly the towns of Aire and Saint Omer; the Count of Flanders
continued to receive a pension from the King of England and so did his relations and his Chancellor.\textsuperscript{1} It was necessary to wait for fifteen years and the great crisis of Bouvines before Flanders ceased to be a danger.

The house of Blois-Champagne, like that of Flanders, had direct contact with the Empire. Louis VII had bound it to the Crown by marriages and honours; of the four children of Theobald II (ob. 1152), the eldest, Henry the Liberal, Count of Champagne, married a daughter of the king; Theobald, Count of Blois, also became the son-in-law of Louis VII and was Seneschal of France (from 1154 to 1191); William became Archbishop of Rheims in 1176 and was regent during the third Crusade; finally, Adela married Louis VII himself and was the mother of Philip Augustus. Louis VII thus held in his hands a warp which the crown almost succeeded in weaving. The house of Champagne sought either to dominate the monarchy or to free themselves from it. The Seneschal Theobald in 1159 allied himself with the King of England and invaded the royal demesne. Henry the Liberal made responsible for negotiations with Barbarossa betrayed Louis just as badly; he saw in the occasion an opportunity to change his suzerain and gain the same independence as the imperial princes of the other side of the Rhine and only failed by very little in making Champagne an Imperial fief as the result of agreements made by the Count in the king’s name but without his knowledge.\textsuperscript{2} The young Philip Augustus had violent conflicts with the house of Champagne who sided with their rival Philip of Alsace to make war on him. Richard Cœur de Lion on several occasions numbered a Count of Blois among his allies. Philip Augustus mastered this house only on the death of the young Count Theobald III: his widow Blanche of Navarre came and put herself under royal protection, gave up her castles to the king, and, henceforward, he was able to draw from Champagne important resources in men and money. This submission, however, which was one of the great events of the reign, did not take place till 1201.\textsuperscript{3}

In the Duchy of Burgundy a family of Capetian origin

\textsuperscript{1} XXXI, n. 570, 591; CXXXI, iii, 5 ff. 147 ff., iv, first part, 12 ff., 34 ff., 83-4; CXXXI, i, 138 ff.
\textsuperscript{2} Luchaire has dealt with these negotiations well: CXLVI, 36 ff.
\textsuperscript{3} CXXXIII, 172 ff.; CXXXI, i, 26 ff.; iii, 186-7; iv, 1st part, 74-5; CXLVII, 1st part, 101 ff.; DX VII, 88-9.
reigned. They were inadequately endowed with personal demesne and money and were often reduced to doubtful expedients and plundering. The land primarily belonged to the bishops who were directly subject to the king and powerful abbeys protected by the Capetians.\footnote{DXIII, ii and iii, particularly chapter xix; CDXL, ii, 286-8.} In 1186 Philip, acting on a judgment of his Court, reduced the Duke Hugh to compensating the victims of his brigandage; Hugh had asked in vain for the protection of the king of the Romans; he subsequently remained a faithful vassal providing host service as called upon.\footnote{CXL I, 103 ff.} A powerful neighbouring lordship, that of Nevers-Auxerre, was likewise forced, on the occasion of discord with the churches, to recognize the royal supremacy of Louis VII.\footnote{CXXV, i, chap. ix ff.; CCLV, 4; CDXL, i, 208, 279, ii, 98, 293.} Philip succeeded in subduing them by installing his cousin Pierre de Courtenay (1184) and then Hervé de Donzy (1199) as successive counts by the use of marriages; from this modest piece of brokerage the crown earned the lordship of Montargis which commanded the route from Paris to Bourges, the control of the castle of Gien which protected Orléans, and the liege homage of all the men of Hervé de Donzy.\footnote{XXXI, n. 100 and 568; CXL I, 110 ff., 236; iii, 479; iv, 1st part, 22 ff.}

To the south of the royal demesne, there was no great lordship in Berry; Auvergne was divided between a count and a dauphin of Auvergne. These two holdings were claimed by the King of England as Duke of Aquitaine and their lords changed allegiance according to their immediate advantage. Louis VII and Philip Augustus established their authority there only slowly.\footnote{CDXL, ii, 292 ff.; CXL I, 88, 253 ff.; iii, 110, 145-6, 187; iv, 1st part, 20 ff.}

The dynasty of the counts of Toulouse and the feudal nobility of Languedoc which had been, for a long time, completely isolated entered into fairly consistent relations with the Capetians after the Second Crusade. Relations between the men of the North and South were cemented in the Holy Land. Raymond V, Count of Toulouse, married the sister of Louis VII (1154) and, in the same year, Louis VII, who had set out on pilgrimage to St. James of Compostella,
made a visit to Languedoc. The southern nobility, anxious about the ambitions of the Plantagenets, preferred the more distant suzerainty of Louis VII and the pious king established a real popularity for himself in the South \(^1\) but it was of no value to Louis or his son. The fickle Raymond V whom Louis had saved from an English invasion in 1159 acknowledged himself a liege vassal of Henry II in 1178 and Raymond VI, who had married an English princess, did homage to John Lackland in 1200.\(^2\)

### III

**ATTITUDE OF THE EMPERORS AND THE POPES**

Beyond their own frontiers, Louis VII and Philip Augustus had no allies of any importance. Of the marriages which had allied them to foreign houses, only one, that between Philip Augustus and Isabella of Hainault, was any profit to the crown. As for the two powers with claims to world domain, the Empire and the Papacy, each of them was pursuing an ideal which could not be in accordance with the particular ideas of the kings of France.

The pontifical schism of 1159 and the new conflict between the Empire and the Holy See embarrassed Louis VII greatly, and embittered his relations with Frederick Barbarossa. The Pope Alexandra III was recognized by Louis VII and Henry II while Barbarossa supported his contemporary Victor IV.\(^3\) He refused to negotiate with petty kings and sought to impose Victor IV on the Christian world. From 1162 to 1165, Alexander III, forced to flee from Italy and unable to demand asylum from the persecutor of Thomas Becket, lived in France. He established himself at Sens in the royal demesne. It has been suggested from a study of his correspondence \(^4\) that he sought to rule for Louis VII and that it was for France a period of "theocratic government". It is an assertion, however, which is very much exaggerated. The envoys of Saint Louis in the papal presence in 1247 were to declare that, during his stay in France, Alexander did not

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\(^1\) **CXXLVI**, iv, note 53, pp. 290–1; **CXLX**, ii, 295 ff.  
\(^2\) **CXLX**, iv, 1st part, 54–5; **CXXXIII**, 136 ff.  
\(^3\) **CCLXVIII**, 106 ff.  
\(^4\) **IV**, 774 ff.
present to a single benefice. But the alliance of Louis VII and Alexander III inevitably gained him the enmity of the powerful emperor and made the efforts of his ministers to win Imperial support against Henry II ineffective. At the beginning of Philip's reign an inhabitant of the border country, Sigebert de Géminoux, thought that the Germans wanted war with France. "See," he wrote in 1182, "how frequently the Germans seek opportunities of attacking the French; it is not justice but the spirit of violence, not equity but a desire to dominate and a thirst for pillage which calls them to arms." The conflict between the Emperor and Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and leader of the Guelf faction, and the sentence of exile passed on Henry the Lion in 1180 brought the Emperor and the King of England into hostility, for the latter was Henry's father-in-law. Thus an Anglo-German alliance was avoided on the first occasion but Henry VI, the successor of Barbarossa, disturbed Philip Augustus again. He was a visionary, a megalomaniac, greedy for prestige. At first he was at enmity with Richard Cœur de Lion, another man of great ambitions, who had offended him by his display of power in Sicily at the time of the Third Crusade. Then, during Richard's captivity in Germany, he became reconciled with him and received his homage. Philip Augustus was distrustful and carefully followed the development of their relations. He had agents at the Imperial Court; he kept in his pay the Seneschal Marquard d'Annweiler and it was undoubtedly he who killed the project for an Anglo-German alliance. Henry VI died prematurely. A German historian had said in regretful tones that he would have been able to destroy the Capetian dynasty. Doubtless true but Henry VI had no desire to do so. The dream of his life had been to bring all the princes of Western Europe to recognize themselves as his vassals and to lead them to the Crusade under his banner.

The Crusade was, naturally, the dominating idea also of the Holy See. In 1189–1190, the Pope Celestine III saw the

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2 CCCI, i, 17 ff.
3 On the relations of Philip Augustus and the emperors, see DXIV; CCXVII, 65 ff.; CCCI, i, 245 ff., and passim.
4 Published in CCCI, i, app. xiii, p. 99.
5 DXXIII, passim; CCCI, iii, 104 ff., 146–7, 165–6.
Emperor Barbarossa and the kings of France and England set off at last for the Holy Land. It was the culmination of a patient diplomacy but the Crusade failed and it immediately became a question of beginning it again. Subsequently, as before, the legates of the Pope were ceaselessly occupied in bringing about a reconciliation between the kings of France and England and they succeeded in getting treaties signed, but they held a position of neutrality between the two parties and neither of the two kings would have allowed the Pope to declare his rival in the right. During the twenty years between the death of Alexander III and the accession of Innocent III, the Papacy was neither very strong nor very respected. The Curia was regarded as poor, easily corrupted, and frequently uncertain of its own intentions.

Everything was changed in Germany and in the direction of the Christian world after the death of the Emperor Henry VI (September, 1197) and the accession of Pope Innocent III (January–February, 1198). The new pontiff was an Italian of high birth, according to the standards of his age and, judged by his ability, a great theologian and lawyer, trained by the masters of Paris and Bologna in the sciences and dialectics. During his reign, the Papacy attained the height of its power.\(^1\) The whole of Christianity was the object of his jealous and imperious attention and Rome became the diplomatic centre where the threads of world policy were tied and undone. The Carolingian idea of the single power to which the whole Christian world should be subject, foreshadowed, in the twelfth century, by the Staufen, was now to be upheld not by the Empire but by the Holy See even more clearly now than in the time of Gregory VII; for Innocent III based himself on the famous Decree of Gratian which had been drawn up in his beloved University of Bologna and considered that “God entrusted to Peter not only the government of the Universal Church but of the whole world”. This was precisely the moment when the death of Henry VI plunged Germany into unbridled anarchy.

In spite of his protestations of affection for France and the Capetian monarchy, Innocent III was to be for Philip Augustus an opponent to be feared for he was extremely intelligent, a profound thinker, little subject to sentimental

\(^1\) \textit{CXXXII}, particularly i, 26 ff.; \textit{CXXI}, iii, 166 ff.
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arguments, naturally using heinous methods, and rarely deceiving himself.\(^1\) His theory that the Holy See must be the only judge of the major sins brought him into conflict, from the first, with Philip on several occasions. The king had repudiated and imprisoned his second wife, Isambour of Denmark,\(^2\) after asking for a divorce from a Council of French bishops which had been a farce. In spite of Isambour's appeal to the Court of Rome, he had married a German, Agnès de Méran (1196). From his accession, Innocent commanded Philip to take back his legal wife and send away "the intruder". Agnès was undoubtedly the only person for whom the harsh Philip had any affection and he refused to leave her. Innocent III put part of France and "the lands which render obedience to the king" under interdict on 18th January, 1200.\(^3\) In the dioceses of Paris, Senlis, Soissons, Amiens, and Arras the interdict was observed and the churches closed. Philip, in exasperation, drove out the bishops and canons who had obeyed the Pope. The Gallican Church and religious life in France received such a shock as a result that the two rivals grew anxious and became milder.

The king consented to separate from Agnès and the Interdict was raised (September, 1200), but when the Council of Soissons, under the presidency of two legates, summoned Philip and Isambour to appear and sought to judge the fundamental issues, Philip seized Isambour under the eyes of the astonished cardinals and imprisoned her more straitly than ever (May, 1201). Innocent III kept his anger in check for the moment and, after the death of Agnès, even consented to legitimize the children she had had by Philip Augustus (2nd November, 1201).\(^4\) These relations with Rome which caused very violent controversy among contemporaries became even more interesting when chronologically set in the matrix of general policy. Innocent, as his letters clearly show, would willingly have given up Isambour's cause on condition of compensation. He grew angry or gave way according to circumstances. The two objects on which he

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\(^1\) I have had occasion to show it: DXV, 52, 45–6, 105.

\(^2\) Also called Ingelburge, Eremburge, Hildeburge, etc. (CXXI, iii, app. iv, pp. 286–7.) Isambour is the name she gives herself and she is given in Philip Augustus's will and is the one that should be used.

\(^3\) CCCXXXVII, 110–125.

was obstinately set were the Crusade, made difficult by the Anglo-French war, and the triumph of the Guelph faction in Germany. At the bottom of his heart, he was little concerned whether Philip had Isambour or Agnès at his side or whether he possessed the Norman Vexin or not.

From August, 1198, we find him telling Philip Augustus and Richard Cœur de Lion to make peace or, at least, a five years' truce for the recovery of the Holy Land. His legate, refusing to be put off by the brutality of Richard, succeeded in persuading him and it was thanks to his efforts that the truce of 1199 was concluded at a moment when Philip Augustus was at his last resources. But, in the conflict between Guelph and Ghibelline, Innocent III was following a policy contrary to French interests. He had undertaken to be the guardian of Frederick II, the young son of Henry VI, but he only helped Sicily, and, through fear of seeing the power of the Hohenstaufen built up again, he sought the election of an emperor from the Guelfs. He announced his support, therefore, for Otto, Duke of Brunswick, a son of Henry the Lion, who was crowned emperor on the 12th July, 1198, while Philip Augustus on the 29th June made an alliance with Otto's rival, Philip of Swabia, the brother of Henry VI. Otto was through his mother a grandson of Henry II Plantagenet; he had been brought up in England, and his uncle, Richard Cœur de Lion, had given him the title of Duke of Aquitaine and entrusted to him the administration of Poitou. Otto was to be one of the most serious enemies of Philip Augustus. The fate of the Capetian monarchy on several occasions was determined, or all but determined, by the combinations of Pope Innocent III.

IV

CONFLICTS WITH HENRY II AND RICHARD CŒUR DE LION

In general, it was with inadequate resources and no external alliances that Louis VII and his son for half a century resisted

1 CCXI, iii, 194 ff.
2 CCXI, iii, 171 ff., 206; iv, 1st part, 66 ff., 80 ff.
the powerful kings Henry II and Richard Cœur de Lion.\textsuperscript{1} They owed their success primarily to their position as suzerain. Henry II who had a fairly noble character always retained some respect for the feudal bond. He had forced Eleanor’s first husband to hand the Duchy of Aquitaine over to him, but when he sought to establish his suzerainty over Languedoc in 1159 and take possession of Toulouse, he did not dare to attack his lord and retired when Louis took possession of the town to defend it. Later, when Louis VII left the throne to a youth of 15 years of age, Henry II showed himself a magnanimous vassal and did not try to take advantage of the cabals and discords of the Court of France but played the role of a conciliator. Philip Augustus, on arrival at man’s estate, did not consider it useful to remember the fact, and, once he was in a position to take the offensive, he found his position of suzerain merely a justification for his attack. By the use he made of legal claims he weakened his opponent and forced his other vassals to help fulfil his aims. One of Henry’s sons, Geoffrey of Brittany, had died without an heir of age; another, Richard, had taken possession of the County of Poitou. In vain Philip demanded the wardship of Brittany and Richard’s homage. On several occasions he summoned Henry II to his Court for a judgment of their differences, but the chief of the Angevin Empire could not consent to appear and the King of France was able to break off relations with a rebel as was customary (1187). Throughout his reign he coolly sought serviceable weapons against his opponents in the feudal law.

On the other hand Henry II was weakened by his quarrel with the English church, the insubordination of a section of his baronage, the difficulty of maintaining his authority throughout a vast Empire, and, finally, by complications and discord in his family. His daughter Mathilda had married Henry the Lion, leader of the Guelf party, and, as we have seen, the proscription of Henry the Lion led to a quarrel between Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa. It was, however, the hatred of his wife Eleanor and his sons, Henry the Younger, Richard, and Geoffrey of Brittany, which poisoned Henry’s life and destroyed his courage and ambition. His son John,

\textsuperscript{1} For all that follows, see **CCXI**, i–iv, 1st part; **CCCLVIII**; **CDLXXXVIII**, vol. i, chap. x, and vol. ii; **CDXCVI**, books ii and iii; **DXLII**, 199 ff.
the last born, in whom he trusted blindly, finished by also betraying him.

About 1193 wars between Capetians and Plantagenets were frequent, but there was no apparent intention on either side to destroy and supplant their opponent. They fought for the suzerainty of Berry, Auvergne, and the County of Toulouse, which opened the way to the Mediterranean and the south, and, above all, for possession of the Norman Vexin at the gates of Paris. Louis VII was not able to take advantage of his opportunities even of the general revolt of 1173 which threatened the whole Angevin Empire but, from his twentieth year onwards, Philip Augustus was an opponent to be watched. He roused the treacherous ambitions of Henry's sons and the appetites of the Poitevin barons. In 1189 the founder of the Plantagenet dynasty, ill, deserted, and enclosed by the deadly animosity of his son Richard and Philip Augustus, submitted and accepted peace. He died two days later and thus the King of France obtained part of Berry and Auvergne.

Philip Augustus and the new King of England departed, on good terms, for the Holy Land to conquer the kingdom of Jerusalem from Saladin. But Philip whose status as suzerain and organizing ability should have assured the leading position in Syria found himself constantly thwarted and humiliated by his arrogant vassal. The death of the Count of Flanders which gave him hopes of increasing his demesne caused him to decide to return to France (July, 1191). When he learnt that Richard, also returning from the Holy Land, had been made prisoner by Duke Leopold of Austria he wished to take advantage of his opportunity and his mind conceived the idea, which obsessed him for twenty years, of disinherit the Plantagenets for the benefit of his own dynasty. In 1198 he married Isambour, sister of the King of Denmark, to provide himself at the same time with the claim on the Crown of England, which Canute the Great had substantiated in an earlier period, and the support of the Danish fleet for the conquest. The same year he formally announced to the Emperor Henry VI that he was renouncing Richard's homage and challenging him for disloyalty.

For fear of involving himself with the emperor he adopted a more modest project and undertook the conquest of

1 DCGVIII, 296 ff.
Normandy. But, on 4th February, 1194, Richard was freed. He was a warrior whose reputation was high and resources abundant. For five years the kings waged a fierce war which was interrupted only by truces or a precarious peace. In spite of all his courage Philip Augustus would have been destroyed if Pope Innocent III had not imposed a truce on the belligerents, who had forgotten the Holy Land, in 1199 and if Richard had not been killed a few weeks after at the siege of a castle in Limousin.

Philip Augustus hoped again for the dismemberment of the Angevin Empire. The barons of Brittany, Anjou, Touraine, and Maine supported, against John Lackland, the claims of the young Arthur, the son of Geoffrey of Brittany, who had been brought up at the Court of the King of France. But John was recognized as king in England and duke in Normandy; he was pushed and directed by his untiring mother, the old Queen Eleanor; he was well provided with money and servants. We have seen above how, at this time, Innocent III was preparing to lay the kingdom of France under Interdict. Philip decided to await a better occasion and a peace was concluded at Goulet near Gaillon on 22nd May, 1200.\footnote{XXXI, n. 604 ff.} John abandoned the district of Évreux, a part of the Norman Vexin, and Berry. His niece Blanche of Castile was to marry Louis, heir to the French crown. John did homage to Philip Augustus and paid the enormous relief of 20,000 marks sterling. This undoubtedly constituted a very large part of the war treasury which Philip Augustus was soon to use to disinherit John.
CHAPTER V

THE VICTORY OF THE CAPETIANS

I

PHILIP AUGUSTUS AND JOHN LACKLAND

The fundamental cause of the victory of the Capetians over the Plantagenets was the personal superiority of the kings of France, Philip Augustus, Louis VIII, and Saint Louis compared with John Lackland and Henry III.

During this period, Philip Augustus, cured of the neurasthenia which he had contracted in the East, freed from his terrible enemy Richard Cœur de Lion, and full of confidence in the future, achieved his greatest activity. It was during this period that the author of the Chronicle of Tours was able to depict him as “a fine man, well proportioned in stature, with a smiling countenance, bald, a rubicund complexion, inclined to eat and drink well, sensual... farsighted, obstinate, rapid and prudent in judgment, fond of taking the advice of lesser people”.¹ Others tell us that his dress was simple, that he spoke with studied brevity, and knew how to make himself feared.² His energy, stubborn in the accomplishment of his plans, was moderated only by his supple spirit and a political wisdom that rarely made a mistake. The springs of his will were bent to an immense ambition. It was the period when poets and historians were giving the widest expansion to Carolingian legend and the Capetian dynasty, as a result of Philip’s marriage to Isabella of Hainault who claimed to be descended from Charles of Lorraine, was seeking to find its connections with Charlemagne’s line. In the last years of the twelfth century, Giles of Paris composed his Carolinus for Louis of France the son of Philip and Isabella and suggested his great ancestor as his model.³ The positive and practical spirit of Philip

¹ XXV, 304.
² See the evidences brought together in CCXIV, iv, 2nd part, 577 ff.
³ DXXV, p. xxviii, 12-18.
Augustus was not proof against the mirage-visions of a world Empire. His contemporary Gerald of Cambrie puts these words in his mouth, "Will God never be willing to give to me or another king of France the glory of restoring to the kingdom of France its ancient estate and the grandeur which it had in the time of Charles?" 1 Another says that Philip "thought one man enough to govern the whole world." 2 It is highly unlikely that he thought of taking the Imperial Crown from Otto of Brunswick 3 but he was obsessed by the dream of uniting the Crowns of England and France.

Against him, to defend the Crown and the French fiefs of the Plantagenets, was a semi-madman. It is our opinion that John Lackland was subject to a mental disease well known to-day and described by modern psychiatrists as the periodical psychosis. It is surprising that modern historians have been able to estimate his character so wrongly and suggest for instance that he was a villain whose wickedness was cold and deliberate, who never allowed passion to guide him, and must, therefore, be regarded as all the more unpardonable. On the contrary John was unstable and irresponsible. He carried as well a heavy burden of unwelcome legacies from his father's family; among his Angevin ancestors were fools and madmen and the life of Fulk IV the Surly presents singular analogies to his.

John had fits of furious anger during which "his eyes darted flame and his face went livid." 4 It was a weakness common to his times. He got this nervous weakness from his father Henry II and shared it with his brother Richard. Even more characteristic was his truly morbid incapacity to finish what he started and, at the beginning of his life, to stay on the side he had chosen. He betrayed everybody who tried to win his support—his father, his brother Richard, his allies, friends, and barons even when it was to his own interest to remain faithful to them. 5 With this instability went a boastful levity and a cynical frivolity which roused the indignation of the Churchmen. He was not even capable

1 XLIX, 294.
2 LXI, 426.
3 According to English chroniclers (XLVII, 545; XCVII, 88), some German princes thought of electing him.
4 CIX, 408.
5 See CDLXXXIX, passim.
of maintaining a decent attitude during such a ceremony as his ducal coronation at Rouen. His career in war and politics, however, provides us with the clearest information on his mental constitution. During the wars which Philip Augustus and his son waged against him, his conduct presents amazing alternations of the excitement and depression of disease. Gervais of Canterbury has clearly defined them; he shows him at the beginning of his reign taking vigorous action, then making himself a subject of laughter and gaining the name of "Soft Sword"; recovering himself and leading a victorious campaign to become once again, on receipt of the first bad news, feeble and cowardly; ultimately he earns a reputation for cruelty that none of his predecessors possessed to the same degree.¹ Even his enemies recognized his irresponsibility. William the Breton, the Chaplain of Philip Augustus, speaks of "the acts of fury which this unfortunate man could not prevent himself committing".² He was regarded as possessed of a devil. The Englishman Roger of Wendover tells of the lazy life which John led while Philip was taking Normandy from him. John, he says, showed a smiling face as if everything was going well for him: one considered him "sent mad by witchcraft and sorcery".³

We know that in the Middle Ages the mad were often believed to be possessed. All the symptoms we have enumerated are those of the periodic psychosis or cyclothymia. Philip Augustus had a madman as his rival.

II

THE DISINHERITANCE OF JOHN LACKLAND

The size and character of this book prevents us from dealing in detail with the description of the phases of the fall of the Angevin Empire but we must insist on the fact that, in origin, it was a feudal conflict. It was the appeal of the Poitevin barons which gave Philip Augustus the opportunity to summon the King of England to appear before his Court and a legal title to take away from him any of his French fiefs that he could conquer.

¹ XLVII, 92–5.
³ CRX, ii, 482.
Now that Philip Augustus was in occupation of Berry, the Kings of England could rely on their communications between the northern part of the Angevin Empire and Aquitaine only when they could place implicit trust in the lords of La Marche, Angoumois, and Limousin. Henry II and Richard Coeur de Lion had been constantly at war with the counts of Angoulême and the viscounts of Limoges and had seized the County of La Marche which the House of Angoulême demanded should be returned. As an occasional ally they had a Poitevin house which had been made famous by the Crusades, the Lusignans, who also claimed the County of La Marche. The old Queen Eleanor and John Lackland recognized the claims of Hugh de Lusignan. Audemar, Viscount of Limoges, on the other hand, had gained support from Philip Augustus. In April, 1199, the three of them had signed a pact. "I have come to the lord the king," declares Audemar, "and I have come to an agreement with him on such terms that I will help him every day to the best of my ability, and I will not willingly desert him." Philip Augustus, for his part, promised to him "right by judgment of his court for the County of La Marche". Poitevin fickleness, however, had justifiably become proverbial. The houses of Angoulême and Lusignan were reconciled; Hugh the Brown of Lusignan, Count of La Marche, and Isabel, only daughter and heiress of the Count of Angoulême, exchanged promises of marriage "by personal vow", which was preparatory to the nuptial benediction. Thus, at a later date, the House of Lusignan would reunite Angoumois and La Marche. John's advisers saw the danger and won over the changeable Count of Angoulême. Suddenly, taking advantage of the absence of Hugh the Brown and with the connivance of Audemar, John Lackland married the young Isabel on the 30th August, 1200; his father-in-law, as reward, was to receive the County of La Marche. In this way John secured the expected succession to the lordships which the Lusignans were reckoning to acquire. It was a good stroke of business but it should have been completed and guaranteed by satisfying the Lusignans with

1 LXXI, i, 201, n. 492-494; XXXI, p. 502.
2 CLXXXIV, 4-12; DLIII, 208 ff.; DLXV, ii, 366, 376 ff.; CXXI, iv, 1st part, 5, 49 ff.
generous damages. They waited for them until Easter next year in vain and then, after addressing an appeal to the supreme suzerain, the King of France, they began to make war on John who confiscated their territories. Surround- 
by young nobles who stimulated his vanity, John antagonized 
a section of the Poitevin baronage by his provocative actions. 
Philip Augustus, on the other hand, showed himself very 
prudent and maintained the unshakeable position his title 
as suzerain gave him. John did not follow his example or obey 
his summonses. 1 We cannot follow the details of this extremely 
interesting procedure here 2 but this is the summary drawn 
up by Philip Augustus for the use of the Holy See. We 
know this version, representing the point of view of the 
French Court, from the following letter which Innocent III 
sent to John Lackland.

As you have taken away, without justice or reason, the castles 
and lands of men who consider them as his fief, Philip, as higher 
suzerain, driven by the complaints of the victims, has demanded, 
not once but many times, that you make reparation; you have 
promised but have done nothing and you have crushed the prostrate 
further. He has borne with you more than a year awaiting the 
satisfaction he has asked for. With the advice of his barons and 
subjects he has fixed a certain term for you to appear in his presence 
to do as the law demands without any withdrawal; although you are 
his liege subject, you have not appeared on the appointed day or sent 
any representative but have treated his summons with nothing but 
contempt. As a result, he has met you in person and warned you 
in his own words 3 for he does not wish to make war if you show 
yourself what you should be towards him. You have been unwilling 
to satisfy him. Then, although on the advice of his barons and 
subjects he had challenged you and started war against you, he has, 
evertheless, sent four of his knights to find out whether you are 
willng to repair your faults against him; in case of refusal, he wants 
you to know that he will henceforward make alliance with all men 
wherever he can. 4

1 DXXII, 212 ff.; CXXI, iv, 1st part, 73 ff., 92 ff.
2 It is known to us chiefly through William the Breton, Philip Augustus's 
chaplain: LVII, 155 ff. (bk. vi, line 104 ff.).
3 If we refer to other sources, some of which have the authority of first-hand 
information, it makes it quite apparent that, to maintain his role of a 
conclator, Philip Augustus colours the truth here. He must be speaking 
here of the conversation of 25th March, 1202; actually the two kings did 
not meet, and the conference was held between arbitrators; we know this 
from two of the people concerned and letters patent of John, dated 11th May 
(DXX, 8, n. 4). John was invited to give satisfaction or even give up the 
fiefs; on refusing he was summoned to appear before the Court of France 
on the 28th April.
Cf. DXXII, 218 ff.
In these assertions of Philip Augustus, which are not entirely accurate or sincere, there is not, explicitly, the question of a judgment. Modern historians have thought that no sentence had been pronounced by the Court of France. However, the challenge, mentioned in Innocent’s letter, was the formal break which followed the condemnation of a guilty feudatory and, from the legal point of view, we can be certain that John had been condemned by the barons composing the Court of France on the 28th April, 1202. It is our opinion, however, that there was no formal sentence. In any case, it was clearly not written; the barons assented by acclamations to the proposals of the king of despoiling a rebel vassal.

An extremely well informed English chronicler has preserved a verbal tradition which is possibly expressed in too legalistic a form but provides us with the grounds and the basis of the decision taken. It tells us that:

The Court of France had met and judged that the King of England should be deprived of all the lands which he and his ancestors had held of the King of France up to that time because, for a long time, they had neglected to do the services due for those lands and, on practically no occasion, were they willing to comply with their lord’s summons.

Thus Philip had won a very easy acceptance by his barons of a confiscation based not on facts particularly relating to Poitou but on the refusal of a vassal’s obedience from John and his ancestors. It was the best way to introduce, without any possible controversy, the question of the sief which was the chief object of Capetian ambition, Normandy.

In fact, for the moment, Philip’s idea was to hold all that he could conquer of Normandy (he could not believe at that moment that the entire occupation would be possible) and to confer the other siefs of the Plantagenets on Arthur who was affianced to his daughter, Marie of France. Arthur,

1 CDLXXXVII, 53 ff.; CDLXXXIX, 83-4; CCCXLVI, 246 ff.
2 XVII, 135-6. Cf. DIX, 7 ff. It will be noticed that this text agrees with the only official act issued from the Capetian Chancery in which the condemnation of John is specifically mentioned. I am speaking of the mandate of Louis VIII in 1224, ordering the burgesses of Limoges to help him in the war he was about to undertake “to gain his rights” (DXXVI, p. 516). The king says: “Know all of you that John, late King of England, by the common and unanimous judgment of the peers and other barons of France lost in law (abjudicatus), for ever, all the land which he held on this side of the English sea of our late dear father, Philip King of France, and that since then those possessions have belonged of right to our said father.”
betraying the homage he had offered John, did homage to
the King of France for Brittany, Anjou, Maine, Touraine,
and Poitou (July, 1202),¹ and was entrusted with a campaign
in Poitou while Philip began the conquest of Normandy.
The coalition failed, however; by a stroke of good fortune,
John captured Arthur and the Lusignans (1st August, 1202).
Arthur was put in prison and, from the moment when he
was taken to the Tower of Rouen, nobody knows what
happened to him. About 1206, Philip and his court gave up
hope that he was still living. Some years later, about 1210,
the truth was revealed in detail thanks to the confession of
William de Briouse, one of John’s accomplices and the
 guardian of the young captive. On 3rd April, 1208, John had
killed his nephew with his own hand because he was afraid
of seeing him escape and become a strong claimant for the
English throne. Subsequently, in 1216, when Louis of France
invaded England at the invitation of the barons in rebellion
against John, his agents tried to gain credence for the story
that John Lackland had been “condemned to death by his
peers in the Court of the King of France” as Arthur’s
murderer. It has been fully shown that this was a shameless
lie.² The sentence of confiscation and the severance of the
feudal bond between the two kings, pronounced on the
28th April, 1202, a year before the secret tragedy of Rouen,
had been sufficient justification for the conquests of Philip
Augustus. Feudal law allowed Philip to gain a sentence of
disinheritance against his vassal; the feudal spirit which
inspired both French and English nobility guaranteed his
victory.

It was just at the moment when he invaded Normandy
that many of his barons were setting off for the East; but
the fourth Crusade, while robbing the king of many warriors,
relieved him also of many disquieting vassals who might have
thwarted his ambition, in particular Baldwin, Count of
Flanders, who was to become Emperor of Constantinople.
Those who remained showed themselves loyal. The Duke
of Burgundy and Renaud of Dammartin, Count of Boulogne,
then at the height of his favour, assisted Philip to conquer

¹ LXXII, i, 230, n. 647.
² On all these facts see CLXV, DXX, DXXXII; Cartellieri (CCX, iv, 1st part)
has adopted Guilhemoz’s views (CCXXV). Powicke who formerly defended
them has ceased to support them (C.M.H., vol. vi, 1928, pp. 240, 315, 320).
the Loire lands. When Innocent III sent a legate to France to stop the hostilities which were on the point of breaking out, Philip called his magnates together on several occasions; the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Boulogne, the countesses of Champagne, Blois, and St. Quentin, the counts of Sancerre, Nevers, Beaumont, Soissons, the Lord of Coucy, and Guy de Dampierre all promised him solemnly that they would not allow the Pope to force them into an alliance or a truce with the King of England and Philip thereupon replied to the Pope that a feudal matter was no business of the Holy See. The ecclesiastical barons, holders of the royal bishoprics, declared in turn that the king's cause seemed just to them. John Lackland, on the other hand, was deserted because he himself set the example of desertion. Irritated by the inaction of their lord who failed to fulfill his duty of protection, the barons and towns of Normandy renounced their allegiance to retain their fiefs or privileges. John with his immense resources lost the game because he had not won the hearts of his men; he could measure the worth of the poet's words:—

It isn't the wealth of fur or ornament, of gold or silver, of forts or horses but the wealth of family and friends; a man's heart is worth all the gold of the realm.

The reduction of Normandy took two years (June, 1202–June, 1204). Henry II and Richard who had, with good reason, considered it the richest jewel in their crown had built up defences and castles, permanent bands of hired knights, and mercenaries. The incredible inertia of John gave Philip Augustus the richest country in the Angevin Empire, the most advanced in material, social, and intellectual, civilization in Western Christendom. Henceforward, the Capetian monarchy had established the security of their capital and become a maritime power while the English kings had lost their easy access to the West and the South.

The feudal system being based only on the personal bond and the sworn faith carried, within itself, alongside the spirit of chivalry, a leaven of brutal anarchy and warrior barbarism which only a strong and constantly vigilant
monarchy could prevent from developing. This became very apparent during the thirteenth century to the south of the Loire, particularly after the death of Eleanor who died an octogenarian on 31st March, 1204, when disorder began to increase. Philip Augustus had, at first, taken advantage of the instability and inconstancy of the barons of the West. He had formed an alliance with two powerful seigniorial houses. He makes sure of the conquest of Anjou and Touraine; he had conferred the seneschalship on William des Roches who had previously betrayed him and, henceforward, remained faithful to him; but Aimery of Thouars whom he made Seneschal of Poitou returned to John Lackland in 1206. Philip Augustus, in all, seized from the King of England not only Normandy and Maine but the lands on the Loire Basin and even Brittany which, at a later date, he entrusted to his cousin Pierre de Dreux, but he could not conquer Poitou which remained a cockpit of intermittent hostilities and feudal anarchy. It was Philip's successor, Louis VIII, who reduced Poitou in 1224 thanks to an alliance with Hugh de Lusignan, Count of La Marche; from that time the Capetians had in La Rochelle, Saint Jean d'Angély, and Niort, a port on the ocean and important commercial centres. Louis VIII left Poitou together with Auvergne as an appanage for his fourth son, Alphonse. When Alphonse, on reaching his majority, came to Poitou to receive the homage of his vassals (1241), the Poitevin barons tried to shake off the Capetian supremacy and called in the King of England, Henry III; the victories of Saint Louis at Taillebourg and Saintes brought Henry III to the decision to abandon Poitou and the Capetians finally established monarchy and order there.

III

ANGLO-GERMAN COALITION. BOUVINES

We must return to Philip Augustus. In 1206 he concluded a truce with John Lackland but it was not observed. From time to time, John had bursts of activity and as he was

1 CXLVII.
2 CXXI, iv, 1st part, bk. ix; DLXV, ii; DXVII, 224 ff.; CLXX, chap. iv and vii; CLXXI, 5-44; CLXIV, CLXXXIV.