Philosophies Of
Homophobia and Homophilia

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This chapter is an introduction to the meta-philosophy of homosexuality. That is, 1) it is an introduction only, not a final or exhaustive study, and only a limited number of examples purposely have been given; but it can help stimulate other, more detailed investigations. 2) "Meta-philosophy" (a recent term) or "the philosophy of philosophy" means, in this case, an analysis of all fundamental types of philosophy from the outside as it were, with as much objectivity as possible. Though everyone has a philosophy of his own, this writer included, this chapter will try to avoid its intrusion in spite of some inescapable clues. 3) "Homosexuality" has here its usual general meaning. But it will immediately be necessary to scrutinize this word and to replace it frequently with "homophilia," the self-accepting desire for others of the same sex. "Homophobia" is a convenient term for opposition to this. And we will also need a word for those who are neither favorable, nor opposed, to homosexuality, neutrally regarding it as equally valid as heterosexuality, and for this attitude the writer suggests the term "homoisala."¹

Materialism, idealism, and solipsism will be the philosophies presented first, and under the heading of "clear-cut cases" because they are comparatively easy to understand both in themselves and in their consequences for homosexuality. The second section of "complex cases" will contain most of the varieties of dualism where apparently no simple conclusions can be drawn. The chapter will end with a summary, and a prognosis both for dealing with homophobic philosophies and for constructing homophilic ones.

I. Clear-cut cases.

Materialism or "naturalism" is one of the simplest philosophies to expound.² This is because it is based on what has been called "naive realism"
or the belief that all the objects we experience in the external world are truly real — which is the daily philosophy of the greatest number of people, even if many of them additionally have a nominal belief in the existence of spiritual beings. Materialism takes this generally accepted "priority of external things" and constructs a rigorously consistent and total philosophy upon it. Traditionally (in the East as well as in the West), this has been accomplished by reducing all things to ultimate material "building blocks," in the Western tradition called "atoms." 3 (The original Greek word meant "uncuttables"; the recent "electrons," "protons," etc. do not represent any shift from this position, although they are the result of "cutting the atom" in the modern sense of this word, because they themselves in turn are "uncuttable" building blocks of all things, that is, they also are "atoms" or "atomic particles.") In the rare case of a naturalistic theory of one "material substance," the philosophy's vocabulary would initially appear different from what is presented below, but there would be no essential change in its conclusions.

Almost all materialists therefore are "pluralists"; reality consists of a (nearly?) infinite number of nearly infinitesimal particles, either all alike or of a number of types. There is nothing else. There is no God of course, no "guiding intelligence," not even "Mother Nature" or any personification of this sort. And the "scientific laws" that describe the behavior of the atoms are only the patterns that we human beings observe and then codify into a "system of physics"; these laws are not in themselves realities. Only the atoms are realities. And since they are material particles, not intelligences, they have no "intentions of doing anything," no goals whatever. Even the ultimate end of the universe — it might be "the thinly dispersed particles of energy, having lost all their organization through entropy, moving extremely slowly at a temperature just above Absolute Zero" — is clearly not the result of any planning by the atoms.

This is important for our understanding of materialism as a homoïsic philosophy. For nothing can be called either "good" or "bad"; everything occurs by the mechanical interaction of atomic particles, and the result is entirely neutral. To be sure, particles combine to form more complex collections, and these collections seem to behave in ways differing from the original atoms themselves; thus "protoplasm," a very complex collection of particles, seems to behave in distinctive ways such as moving, ingesting, excreting, reproducing, etc. And further there are very complex forms of protoplasm, which took eons of time to evolve, called "animals and/or human beings" (i.e., human beings are animals), which in turn seem to behave in their own distinctive ways — they appear to move to, or away from, certain things outside them, (knowing these things by "sensation" or the influence of external
atoms on the internal ones of their receptive "sense organs"). This movement
toward or away from things is named respectively "desire" and "fear"; and
whatever is desired is called "good for that animal or human being," whatever
is feared is called "bad." But "desire and fear," "good and bad," are value-
judgments relative only to those complex arrangements of protoplasm called
"animals and/or human beings" which, having evolved into existence over a
long period of time, may very well evolve out of existence in some indefinite
future; the universe cares nothing about them! The atoms make no value-
judgments; no values have any reality. For this philosophy, therefore, only one
"ethics" or value-theory is consistently possible; it has been traditionally called
"hedonism" or the "pleasure doctrine": If there are no real values, what else
can each person seek but whatever he or she desires at the moment? His
object or goal at that moment becomes "good" for him, and the satisfaction of
his desire, the sensation of achieving that object, will bring him a "good
sensation" or pleasure. Conversely, avoiding a feared object will save him from
a "bad sensation" or pain. So let everyone do exactly as he pleases; "Fais ce
que voudras."4

And what about homosexuality? Well, what about it? What's the
question? Homosexuality and heterosexuality, masturbation and zoerasty, sex
itself versus chastity — none of these has any difference in value; none of them
is either good or bad in itself. It is each person's pleasure that alone determines
what he will choose, his disinclination or "pain" that determines what he will
avoid. Homosexuality compared to heterosexuality is like a taste for rye bread
as compared to white bread: there is nothing to say about it. There is no
"problem" here, there is no "question" to begin with. Materialism or
naturalism's attitude to homosexuality is purely and totally homoïsïc.

So far we have been examining traditionally consistent materialism which
usually offers no "political doctrine" (or what might be the best society)
because all values are relative to the individual only. Just as among animals
where what is "good" for the predator will be "bad" for its prey, so also a
materialist in a society which values "justice," "honesty," "humanity," etc., will
advance his own interests as a predator by pretending to be just, honest, and
humane, playing the part like a good actor or "hypocrite" (original Greek
meaning), seeking to obtain and remain in power, even dictating the meaning
of "justice" itself, which is therefore only the "advantage of the strongest"
(Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, Stephanos II, 338). But, understandably,
various efforts have been made to "soften" this corollary of naturalistic ethics
and to develop some justification for a society in which at least overt violence
could be prevented, mutual contracts might be honored, and so on; probably
the best-known effort is Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (see below). To consider

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this "politicized materialism" and its potential attitude to homosexuality, however, we should first ask is it really consistent with the rest of materialism? And this suggests a short analysis of what "consistency" means, and why it is important particularly for us who are gay to examine the consistency of any philosophy.

If a person says, e.g., "Only material particles are real; they are the building blocks of the whole universe, and God will punish sexual deviation," we can immediately and confidently exclaim, "This is an inconsistent philosophy!" Now if he should remove the words "only" and "whole," and connect or relate the third clause with the first two, the sentence could change into "Material particles are real; they are the building blocks of the material portion of the universe; but God also exists, Who created and supervises these material particles, and He will punish sexual deviation." This is a satisfactory statement of a certain type of dualism. But whatever the philosophy may be, it should be made clear from the beginning. Only then can we know exactly what kind of philosophy confronts us and, if it appears homophobic, only then could we be fore-armed in our defense.

Returning to "politicized materialism" (Hobbes's version): A hedonist seeks his own pleasure, yes, but he realizes that other hedonists have the same desire; he knows that just as he has no scruples about using violence or trickery for his own ends, so these others could use violence or trickery upon him. Therefore, gathering together with them, he and they all make a kind of contract, an agreement not to harm or be harmed, giving up their possible use of violence against others in return for the clear benefit of not suffering it themselves. Because such an agreement must be guaranteed by some external power (since these materialists are not likely to "take an oath on the Bible"!), they arm and authorize the "state," specifically the police power of the state, to intervene should anyone break the agreement by an act of violence, and thus prevent this crime to begin with or else punish it to deter future crime. But when will this "agreement not to harm or be harmed" be consistent with the rest of naturalism? When, say, fifteen people gather together, make this agreement and arm the police, then this contract will be valid for these fifteen people only (since only they voluntarily contracted, nor can they obligate even their own children) — and valid only for as long as they have contracted; (it is implausible that they would bind themselves for the rest of their lives; rather they would probably make such a contract for a limited period of time, say ten years, and subject to voluntary renewal). Now an agreement not to harm or be harmed made by fifteen people for ten years is reasonably consistent with naturalism. But if we allow this idea to drift into the usual concept of a "social contract" where not only are all the people of a society bound for life but they
are bound to a so-called "contract" they themselves never personally made, we have moved far beyond consistent materialism where the individual alone is the creator of all values.

For the fifteen who made an agreement for ten years, however, the implications of their contract will be as homoïsic as before. The police power they authorized will be concerned only with the prevention of violence and trickery as agreed on; it will have not the slightest interest in whether a person eats rye bread or white bread, or whether he or she is homosexual or heterosexual. Any state in which the police do take such an interest has surely broken away from its original naturalistic foundation, more likely was never based on it to begin with. We can repeat therefore that materialism or naturalism is a philosophy of homoïsaka, totally neutral to homosexuals and heterosexuals.

Idealism, although also a simple philosophy in itself, has been much more difficult to explain to the general public than materialism, partly because in America from about the Twenties to the Fifties it was the least prevalent: Transcendentalism had long lost its hold, "Science" and "the Bible" were felt to be the only two alternatives for life, and small idealistic sects like Christian Science were objects of considerable mockery. But in the last decade or so, two seemingly unconnected popular trends, the interest in the power of the mind over the body ("psychosomatic medicine"), and the "beat" and "hip" generations' fascination with Zen, Yoga, and the occult, have now combined to make the explanation of idealism noticeably easier.

Unlike materialism, idealistic philosophy has appeared in various "traditions," reflecting either different psychological emphases and/or national-cultural characteristics. It will be useful to mention these traditions immediately, not only as a basis for later reference to them, but also because they provide an "ostensive definition" of idealism, a "pointing out" just which philosophies are generally accepted in this category. The major traditions are 1) Taoism, the native idealism of China, its earliest writing the Tao Teh King by "Lao-tse" (c. 6th Cen. B.C.); and its later descendant Dhyana/Ch'anjian/Math Buddhism. 2) "Brahman"-ism, the native idealism of India, found earliest in the (nearly undatable) Upanishads, and formalized into both the "pluralistic" Sâkhya-Yoga and the monistic (Advaita) Vendanta. 3) The "Platonic tradition" (including predecessors like Parmenides) which as "Neo-Platonism" later absorbed the previously independent "Stoic tradition" and which
continued in both Near Eastern (e.g., Sufism) and Western forms to about the Seventeenth Century. 4) The "non-traditional" and individualistic idealists of Western Europe and America from about the Seventeenth Century to the present, including "Cartesians" such as Spinoza, et al., subjective epistemologists like Berkeley, and "Kantians" such as Hegel, et al., whose influence on the American Transcendentalists, strengthened by hypnotism's newly demonstrated power of the mind over the body, resulted in modern "New Thought" (Christian/Religious Science, etc.).

The word "idealism" comes from the Platonic doctrine of "eternal Ideas" ("idea" is the actual Greek word) which precede all material appearances and themselves derive from the highest Idea, "the One" or "the Good." We can explain this philosophy therefore in two ways: On one hand, idealism almost always claims there is only one "Reality" (Tao, Brahman, Absolute Divine Mind, etc.); there is nothing else; even though to the human mind the world seems composed of nearly infinite things. But these are only "appearances," they come and go like dreams, and idealism demonstrates them to be merely expressions of the One Reality by a variety of cosmologies varying from one tradition to another. On the other hand, idealism almost always claims that only mind (consciousness, awareness, etc.) is reality and that what seems to be a material world exists only in our own mind, just as dreams seem at the moment to be a world outside us. These two claims converge toward the same intuition: there is only One Reality which is a kind of consciousness or Mind and within Which every other thing (thought) exists, or from Which all other things (thoughts) "emanate" and decline into Appearance.

This One Reality is not alien to human beings. It is the same mind or consciousness that they have, and they are already portions of or emanations from it. When a person knows this unity of himself, or "his self," with the One, he is said to have found his real "Self." But most human beings continue living in the world of appearances, and idealism claims there can be no lasting satisfaction or happiness in the transient and dream-like experiences which constitute this world. True happiness can be found only by knowing one's Self and by communing or uniting with the One Reality. This is a subjective motivation; but there is also a metaphysical one: just as upon finding we are in error we seek to rectify it by discovering the truth, so also universally error tends to move toward truth, not vice versa. The movement from the "error" or unreality of transient appearances to the truth of the real Self is a necessary tendency, and some idealists interpret the efforts of all animals and human beings as simply the subconscious strivings of lesser minds toward the One. The One Reality is the "Good" therefore not only as the highest happiness or bliss but also as the inevitable Goal of all consciousness.
philosophy
homosexual, would equally distract from the goal of knowing one’s Self or its Identity with the One.

2) The aesthetic technique (found, e.g., in Taoism and Zen Buddhism as a primary though not exclusive method), where attention is focussed on all of what appears around us as “Nature” or “the World” in a quietly receptive effort to “feel” Its totality and unity, and our kinship or unity with It, including whatever other personal aesthetic experiences might contribute to this awareness.11 And 3) the passionate-emotional technique (found, e.g., in Sufism and the “psychedelic mysticism” of the recent “beat/hip” generations), where the whole consciousness is dynamically and aggressively directed toward an ideal or compelling experience, a symbol or even a person, which serves to inspire, enthuse (Gr. “enthousiazēn”: to be filled with the divine) and instill in the devotee a sense of communing or uniting with it, a foretaste or actual instance of uniting with the One.12 These two techniques should be considered together because any idealism in which either or both of them enter even as partial components will imply a (qualified) homophilia! Let us therefore analyze them carefully: The aesthetic technique claims that any experience enhancing our feeling of kinship or unity with the World is a means of reaching an awareness of our unity with the One. For example, imagine a panoramic landscape (cf. the great Taoist/Zen landscape painters of the Sung and related periods in China and Japan), or any feeling of kinship with Nature, like a “beautiful” (that is, spiritually-aesthetically stimulating) flower, or a “beautiful” person. Now this “beautiful person” could be of the same or opposite sex, depending on one’s sexual orientation; but whatever this be, only a beautiful person congenital to one’s orientation can be the appropriately elevating aesthetic object! In an abstract sense this could be called a homoïsic (and heteroïsic) doctrine since “it makes no difference whether a person is straight or gay,” he or she has the same potentiality for an aesthetic experience of this kind. But in the concrete, practical sense this philosophy should be considered homophilic (and heterophilic) because it is a positive spiritual value for a homophile to have a spiritually elevating homophilic aesthetic experience, (and for a heterosexual to have such a heterophilic experience). (To remove any lingering doubt as to the propriety of the “gay life” in idealism, we should repeat that human consciousness is a portion of or emanation from the One Reality; all “sexual-orientations” therefore are already contained in the One, Its “Divine Mind” is “pansexual,” i.e. “straight, gay, bi” and so on.) Turning to the passionate-emotional technique, it claims that any object of passionate devotion can offer a revelation of communion or union with the One. This “object,” as mentioned, can be an ideal, person, etc., and in the latter
case the person selected must be congenial of course to one's sexual orientation, while “passionate devotion” will become synonymous with words like “erotic-rapture” or “love.” Here again this could more abstractly be called a homoïsic and heteroïsic teaching; but insofar as a spiritually-passionate, erotically-rapturous homophilic love is hereby positively recommended to homophiles as a means of elevating consciousness into the One Reality, this “doctrine of idealistic love” is truly homophilic (i.e., relative to homophiles).

To summarize idealism's two basic attitudes to homosexuality: if the “ethical pattern(s)” are only “the turning away from the distractions of appearances” and/or only “the inner-intuitive technique of finding the Self or its identity with the One,” then the idealism will be purely homoïsic. But if the idealism involves, even if only partly and in combination with the other pattern(s), the technique(s) of “aesthetic contemplation that stimulates the feeling of unity with the World” and/or “passionate-emotional devotion as a revelation of communion or union with the One,” then it will be an example of (qualified or relative) homophilia.

As in the case of materialism, efforts have been made to “politicize” idealism; but these efforts are even more inconsistent, in spite of some famous names like Plato and Hegel having been involved. The inconsistency of the expression “idealistic government” is revealed by recalling that in this philosophy there is only one human goal: to turn away from appearances and return toward the One Reality. “The State,” “society” or any government has no ethical purpose unless it can help its individual members achieve this awareness of the One. But how could any government do this? Only by leaving its people completely alone to discover their own spiritual needs and techniques! By comparison to governments already in existence therefore, idealism’s political structure is a non-entity, a non-government, i.e., an “anarchy” (“no government” of anyone by anyone else). If, say, fifteen idealists decided to cooperate-in matters of food, shelter, etc. so as to have greater freedom for their spiritual pursuits, then this “society” would be in existence for these fifteen people and for as long as any of them continued cooperating. (Nor would they require a “police power” as in Hobbes’s example, since there is no need for violence or trickery against others when the goal of life lies only in the Mind.) But any government that might restrict total human liberty is immediately inconsistent with the doctrine that consciousness must be continuously free to move toward the One, so we will not need to discuss a so-called “idealistic government’s” implications for homosexuality.

Solipsism (Latin “solus” [only] + “ipse” [oneself]) is based on one idea: “Only I exist.” Its source is the epistemological intuition that “everything I know

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is what I know," or "for me there is nothing that I don't know" (since if I could assert "there is something I don't know" to this extent I would already know it). Called the "egocentric predicament," this problem of knowledge is taken seriously by solipsism and results in the metaphysical conclusion "I \equiv reality," that is, "I am all reality and all reality is me."

No other idea necessarily follows. Since the solipsist is all of reality, any other statement he or she makes, no matter how strange it may seem to others, is true for him. He could be a materialist, an idealist, a dualist, or any even seemingly inconsistent combination, simply by the flat of his decision; and as for homosexuality, he could be homophobic, homophilic, homoïsic, or any combination of these he desires! Solipsism's attitude to homosexuality therefore is "unpredictable."

At this point one might ask, "Why bother to mention solipsism?" to which there are at least two answers: First, this philosophy, although infrequently espoused openly, has been a constant potentiality in Eastern and Western thought, the subject of many efforts at refutation by those who sense its "dangers," and yet is almost impregnable to attack.14 Secondly, though an extremely homophobic form of solipsism can be imagined and some day may appear in writing, the same holds true for an extremely homophilic form of solipsism. So why not get this going immediately?! It's easy; a solipsist asserts or denies reality as he or she wishes. Start with "other homophiles," particularly "other homophiles congenial to me" (you, the solipsist), and claim them as "the only real creations of my mind, while everything else is comparatively unreal, and some things" (homophobes?) "don't exist at all." In this way a totally, passionately homophilic philosophy can be developed suited to your tastes and unfettered by any of the traditional philosophical requirements because based on nothing but the solipsistic principle "only I am reality."15

II. Complex cases (dualisms).

Dualism can be defined as maintaining the ultimate independence of two distinct types of reality, one always being the "material" in the common-sense meaning of the word, the other being called, for convenience, the "non-material," but naturally more difficult to describe. We should in fact distinguish at least three kinds of "non-material realities" (making at least three types of dualism): A. "spirit(s)," a kind of personality that can exist apart from a material body; B. "personalities in bodies," which can exist only within a body;
and C. "formal causes," borrowing the term from Aristotelian philosophy to apply to any non-material essence or quality which usually, though not necessarily, exists in close connection with its individual material expression. Placing dualism under "complex cases" may surprise a person who believes, for instance, in God's creation of the world according to Genesis, for we are so accustomed to this type of doctrine that even non-believers fully understand it. But dualism has a great number of varieties with equally various consequences for homosexuality; on this ground alone it must be separated from the comparatively uniform philosophies already discussed. Moreover it poses several difficult technical problems. Some of these — the metaphysical problem of how the non-material and material can influence each other, the epistemological topic of how the human mind gains knowledge of non-material things, and the psychological problem of how the human body can interact with the mind/soul/spirit — are not directly pertinent to homosexuality and will be omitted for reasons of space. But the "ethical problem," namely, how to determine the goal of life for a human being within a dualistic world-view, is not only difficult and complex but obviously of crucial importance for clarifying its attitude to homosexuality. Throughout this section therefore we will be probing and searching into the difficult question of what are the ethical consequences for homosexuality of this or that dualistic view; the results will be a series of suggested, tentative hypotheses.16

A. Belief in some kind of "spirit(s)" has been almost universal. Without implying any theory of derivation, we will start from the "earliest" or simplest cases of spirits and move toward the "later" more complex ones. (The first two types are pre-sexual but are important as a foundation.)17 1) Spirits of inanimate objects that are striking (but non-functional for human needs) such as unusually shaped rocks, mountains, etc.: What might be the ethical consequences when a striking rock formation is felt to be inhabited by a spirit? This rock undoubtedly would not be approached like an ordinary rock; rather whoever nears it would feel a special sense of awe — the rock itself is in some way sacred, in fact its sacredness may be so great that it becomes taboo to approach it. 2) Spirits of plants, trees, etc., particularly those used for food: If a plant has its own spirit, the same sense of awe will be felt in its presence. But if a person wants to use this plant for food, tearing off its leaves and fruit, even killing the plant itself, he will experience a conflict between his inner awe of the sacred/taboo spirit of the plant which he is offending by violating, and his clear

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need to eat. He undoubtedly will feel guilt, an unpleasant subjective condition which automatically suggests its removal through an act of atonement. His atonement could be a self-punishment unrelated to the plant, but more likely he may wish to appease the angered spirit directly by propitiation. (Yet he cannot promise the plant's spirit never to eat this plant or others like it again). So perhaps he will make a (fertilizing?) offering to a still-living plant of the same species; or, knowing the significance of a seed, he may plant it to insure future growth, stimulating the plant's fertility, not for his own selfish purpose (the origin of agriculture), but rather in this case as an act of atonement.

3) Spirits of animals, fish, etc., particularly those used for food: This case is similar to the preceding one. Thus a person who, for food, kills an animal he believes has its own spirit, would feel a sense of guilt and need for atoning propitiation; nor could he promise to give up killing these animals in the future. He might therefore make an offering to the animal's spirit, or try to increase that species' fertility. Let's examine the latter case: animals (this would be less true for birds or fish), being structured much like human beings, (and assuming the "facts of reproduction" were already known), would be understood to have "fertility" in their sex organs; "increasing animal fertility" therefore would mean either mating a male and female of the same species, or simply any effort to stimulate their sex organs with this end directly or symbolically in mind. Thus the beginnings of zoerasty! But here this term does not mean the use of animals merely for satisfying one's own urges (which may be a later result), but rather the propitiatory effort to provide the animals with sexual excitement and its associated fertility, motivated by guilt and contrition over the offending of their spirit(s) by their being continually killed for food. This is propitiatory zoerasty, and it could easily be either heterosexual or homosexual. Thus a contrite, say, male butcher of sheep may try to mate a ewe with a ram as an atoning reparation, or he may propitiatingly stimulate the sex organs of either a ewe or a ram, which latter would be a kind of homosexual zoerasty. Insofar therefore as the belief in spirits includes only those categories already discussed (inanimate things, plants and/or animals) and not beyond, its attitude to propitiatory zoerasty, it is suggested, will be homoöic.

4) Spirits of human beings who are currently living (not implying continuation after death): The awe and reverence toward these sacred/taboo "human spirits" would be even greater than that for the animals. Yet in almost all societies there has usually been plenty of killing of other human beings, as in warfare, vendetta, cannibalism, etc. The inner conflict between the reverence for the sacred spirit and the clear violation of the taboo by slaying its body often resulted in a very strong, deep-seated guilt in the slayer's heart and a
consequent need for atonement. (Nor in view of the continuing possibility of war, etc. could he promise to abstain from this slaughter.) — But suddenly the analogy with the previous sections disintegrates! For human beings are not felt to be grouped into "species" governed by overall spirits as plants and animals are, but each "living human spirit" is considered autonomous with its own body, and not continuing after death, cannot be propitiated. Is there any other atonement possible? We recall (above, section 2 on plants) that there could be also a "self-punishment" unrelated to the spirit involved. The atonement for killing the body of a "living human spirit" therefore would have to be of this type, a self-punishment or, what is the same thing, a punishment accepted by the guilty party but administered by another person delegated for this purpose. This idea becomes all the more interesting when we reflect that warfare (this would be less true of vendettas, cannibalism, etc.) has been nearly universally waged by males against males, that is, it has been an intra-sexual phenomenon. In the environment of warfare, the reverence for the sacred human spirit, the violation of that spirit by killing its body and the subsequent deep-seated guilt and need for atonement would all have occurred in a psychological ambience that was male intra-sexual (or "homosexual" in the most abstract sense of the word). So if and when the atoning self-punishment was not directly self-inflicted but administered by a delegate, there is the inevitable suggestion here that it would have been courted by a guilty male seeking it to be inflicted at the hands of another male who, temporarily at least, would play the role of the punisher. This would be the foundation for what could easily become a purely voluntary homosexual sadomasochism. And since in this case of warfare the likelihood of a homosexual relationship is very much greater than a heterosexual one, we can suggest that, wherever there is a belief in spirits up to the "living-human" level and not beyond, we can find the possibility of a sado-masochistic homophilia. 18

5) Ancestor spirits: A wholly new attitude seems to develop with the belief in the continuation of the "human spirits" after their bodies have died. For reverence to or propitiation of these spirits must now also continue; and although it might seem that any living person could reverence any or all deceased spirits, practically speaking only their direct descendants are specifically required to remember them. They are truly "ancestors" therefore; a so-called "ancestor spirit" who no longer has any descendants us usually a forgotten spirit! Clearly it immediately becomes crucial for each living person to have as many descendants as possible lest, after death, his spirit some day be in the fearful limbo of having no one remember or reverence him. This is a powerful incentive to have many children and so to enter heterosexual marriage. The belief in ancestor spirits therefore is entirely heterosexually

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oriented and could very easily regard homosexuality as a waste of
reproductive power and an affront to all the possible ancestor spirits
whose memory might be blotted out thereby. Although this is our first con-
frontation with a truly homophobic philosophy, it must be kept in mind from
now on. For there is a tendency among the "later" beliefs in spirits to retain
characteristics from previous stages, so that all the remaining types of
"spirit dualisms" presented below, in spite of their own specific qualities, will
continue to be tinged with this apparently fundamental "ancestor-spirit
homophobia."

6) Hero(ine) — spirits, i.e., outstanding ancestors: A hero-spirit
(according to the belief) was at one time a living person but no longer needs to
have descendants because his deeds and charisma are so great that he is
reverenced, and his tale is retold by, all the people who acknowledge him.
Moreover, there are certain isolated examples of homosexual heroes and
heroines. But, as mentioned, if this stage of belief is the "latest yet achieved,"
any possible homophilia stimulated by these would be in conflict with the still
overwhelming number of ordinary ancestor spirits and its consequent strong
homophobia.

7) Polytheism or "belief in many gods": There is no sharp line between a
"great spirit" and a "god"; heroes were already equivalent to "demi-gods," and
Euhemerus' theory (c. 300 B.C.) was that all (Greek) gods were only heroes
originally. Usually a "god" has a distinct personality of his or her own and may
be only casually connected with this or that natural or psychological
phenomenon. Furthermore, like heroes, the gods are generally known through
stories or "myths" handed down, spoken or written, about them. The number
of possible types of gods is therefore very large. For example, a famous
world-wide "gestalt" or syndrome is that of the god(s) of agricultural fertility,
human fertility, and human immortality; here the story is recurrently told of the
god who dies and is reborn, or who alternates between death and life, thus
directly symbolizing and guaranteeing in various degrees both agricultural
fertility and human immortality (human fertility however somewhat indirectly
and more by association with the other two). But this far-flung belief, still very
pervasive up to the present, doesn't seem to have any clear implications for
homosexuality. And when we turn to the specific gods or symbols of
sexuality, such as Dionysus and Priapus in the West, the Lingam and Yoni in
India, etc., we find a heterosexual rather than a homosexual interpretation. On
the other hand, if we consider the priests (witch-doctors, shamans, etc.) of
these polytheistic or spirit religions, we discover a converse tendency: here the
ordinary worshipper's desire for a human intermediary with the spiritual realm
has favored the development of a spirit-oriented personality that is expected to

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be “different” — unworldly, even eccentric, given to visions, dramatic pronouncements and so on — an ideal opportunity for both male and female homosexuals.\textsuperscript{22}

8) Henotheism and monotheism: A transitional doctrine, “henotheism” is a polytheism where one of the gods becomes supreme, or in the reverse direction, a monotheism where the one god develops many divine helpers, which occurred in certain branches of Christianity and in the movement from Hinayana to Mahāyana Buddhism. Monotheism of course is “the belief in the existence of only one (personal) God.” In both cases what was previously perhaps oral mythology tended to be written down into “sacred scriptures,” sometimes considered “divine revelation.” These scriptures are generally very old (even most of the newer ones, such as the Book of Mormon or Bāḥa’u’llāh’s writings, are firmly grounded upon the older ones), and therefore like their linguistic function of preserving old words and forms they conserve older patterns such as (for our topic) the need to perpetuate the memory of ancestors by having as many children as possible in the face of high infant mortality.

For an example of a sacred scripture we may concentrate on the Hebrew-Christian-Muslim tradition’s common foundation, the Old Testament. In this scripture there are at least seven sentences (\textit{Lev.} 18,22; 20,13; \textit{Deut.} 23,18; \textit{I Kings} 14,24; 15,12; 22,47; and \textit{II Kings} 23,7; Masoretic numbering) which specifically, and negatively, refer to male homosexuality. In addition to the general suggestion already made, that this homophobic attitude was based on reverence for ancestor spirits, a more immediate reason is strongly implied in \textit{Lev.} 18,27: After verse 22 (“You shall not lie with a male as with a woman, it is an abomination”), verse 27 continues, “For all of these abominations the men of the land did, who were before you, so that the land became defiled.” That is, homosexuality had been current among the indigenous Canaanites, into whose land the Hebrews were at that time moving, and from whom they were very concerned to differentiate themselves, lest the native culture threaten the survival of their group by infiltrating their own distinctive customs — an infiltration which occurred in part as the four sentences from Kings reveal. Now the Canaanite culture at a very early period had involved fraternal polyandry, or the plurality of brother-husbands to one wife, which made homophilic relations among these brothers living together conveniently easy and as natural as fraternal affection itself. Secondly, Canaanite religion was of the agricultural/animal/human fertility type, with a conspicuous place for the sex goddess Ashhtar, also known as “Kadesh” (holy), and a sex or fertility god Lahmu; sexual/fertility rites therefore were naturally part of this religion. The combination of these two factors produced male as well as female “temple
courtesans," the Hebrew word for whom was "kādēšh" (masculine singular), that is, "holy or cloistered male," and it is this word which has been so pejoratively translated as "sodomite(s)" by the King James and other Versions. Thus what for the Canaanites was a natural expression of their fertility cult as influenced by an ancient polyandry, became for the Hebrews an "abomination," based (it is suggested) on two needs felt necessary to their nation's existence: the retention of their traditional culture in a new land, and the remembrance of ancestral spirits, the purity of whose genealogical lineage indeed was of utterly absorbing interest to them (cf. Gen. 25, 31-34, Esau's selling Jacob his primogeniture, as an example).

In very recent years there have arisen new "gay churches and synagogues" whose general ethical program remains within the Hebrew-Christian tradition but which refuse to accept the homophobic pronouncements in the Old Testament (and their reflections in the New Testament). Since almost the whole orthodox law of the Old Testament was thoroughly reinterpreted and re-cast by the Talmud, and transformed if not nullified by Christianity (including two of the "most sacred Ten Commandments" — "graven images" and "seventh-day Sabbath"), it shouldn't be difficult for gay Jews or Christians to demonstrate to heterosexual Jews and Christians how the essential teachings of these religions ought to transcend any homophobia. And there are isolated homophilic scriptural passages such as the stories of David and Johnathan (I Sam 20,41; II Sam. 1,26) or Ruth and Naomi (Ruth 14-17) or even Jesus and his "beloved disciple" John (John 13,23) which should help mollify or neutralize the rage of the homophobes. But, as all know, these gay churches and synagogues are being met with continuing hostility.

B. "Personalities in bodies" is a phrase meant to suggest the very frequent attitude of "taking people seriously," being concerned about their opinions, that is, dealing with human personalities as if separate from their bodies but without actually thinking of them as in any way continuing after death. Unlike the "belief in living human spirits" (above, section 4), this philosophy does not involve spirits or any other non-material reality, and may be considered the metaphysically weakest type of dualism. But it is ethically strong: these human personalities are of utmost importance in the business of daily living; their opinions can "make or break" a person, i.e., can bestow on him "high status" or "low status." We might call this philosophy "status dualism" therefore, since the goal of life is to retain or increase one's status (or
“honor”) by remaining in everyone’s good opinion, and to avoid blame, shame or “stigma” by falling into general contempt, very much like the “other-directed” personality-type proposed and analyzed by David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950, pp. 22 on), a kind of person who gains his or her values only from the members of his immediate peer-group because of his intense desire to conform to their expectations, avoid their disapproval, and obtain a sense of their support.

Since this is purely imitative of others, status dualism cannot ordinarily *create* an attitude to homosexuality, but it can very tenaciously *maintain* whatever happens to be current. And because most current social attitudes are homophobic (for whatever reason), status dualism and its “other-directed” devotees constitute the major social problem for nearly all gay people, namely, how to avoid “exposure” by staying “in the closet” and so on. On the other hand, the same sense of “support” that is offered by the peer-group in status dualism can be developed among homophiles too; they can support one another, and this would seem to justify every gay effort toward and every successful instance of mutual contact, yea, even the bushes, baths, and tearooms! For no matter how “primitive” or “oppressive” these environments may seem, any such meeting between gay persons, even just a conversation between an openly gay man and gay woman, provides a measure of support which counteracts the current “made in Straightland” stigma. And extending this, increasing the number of gays involved, parlaying the momentum into clubs, “cruising areas,” whole neighborhoods, etc., could actually create a new *homophilic* version of status dualism, with the same “personalities in bodies” and “other-directed” individuals, but now operating within a framework of values that are homophobic (or at least homoïsic). The Alpine County project in California (which failed) and the maintenance of Cherry Grove on Fire Island, New York as a gay resort (which has been successful for more than 25 years), are examples of environments for such a homophilic status dualism. This philosophy therefore, though mostly homophobic in historical fact, is not inherently so, and can become homoïsic or even homophilic with proper planning and effort.

C. As noted, the term “formal cause(s)” has been borrowed from Aristotelian metaphysics; it means a characteristic of a thing that is co-existent with and inseparable from its material substance or “material cause” which in turn individualizes it from all other identical examples; (e.g., the identical “form
of a dime" exists in every dime but the actual metal is different in each one). A very similar metaphysics existed in the "Li School" of Neo-Confucianism (Eleventh Cen. A.D. and after), where there was the same dualism between the matter (ch'i) and form (li) of every particular thing; this type of philosophy therefore has appeared at many times and places. But for our purposes we must ask, how is the form of any particular thing known or discovered? And in both Aristotelian and Neo-Confucian "formal-cause dualism" the answer is that first we experience individual things, finding the characteristics or forms many of them have in common, and then we isolate these forms in our mind and speak of them as logically independent from the material substance of which the original things are also made. So the theory of knowledge for formal-cause dualism is actually the same kind of "empiricism," or "sense perception leading to inductive generalization," which is so consistent with the philosophy of materialism, but which in dualism immediately runs the danger of being overly pretentious, as if some new kind of knowledge is being gained of a realm of truth which is, however, only an abstraction from our own experience. For example, what is the "form or true nature of a cow?" In materialism we understood that nothing has any constant "nature"; there are cows and cows, and animals transitional between cows and something else — there is no such thing as a "normal cow." But in formal-cause dualism we evidently look at familiar cows and, generalizing from our experience, develop the idea of what is the "true form of a normal cow." Clearly nothing comes out of this kind of philosophy that was not already put into it! Therefore, if a formal-cause dualist lives in a society that regards heterosexuality as proper and "normal," he will of course find the "form or true nature of a human being" to be heterosexual, so that homosexuality becomes "deviation from the form or norm." But if that dualist lived his whole life in Cherry Grove on Fire Island, New York, he would undoubtedly have exactly the converse definition! The conclusion is that formal-cause dualism, for all its subtlety and traditional philosophical importance, is like status dualism: it cannot create any attitude to homosexuality; it can only maintain some attitude already in existence for other reasons.

III. Summary and prognosis.

We have found consistent materialism always to be homoïsic; consistent idealism always to be at least homoïsic when involving only its pattern(s) of "turning away from distractions" and/or "inner-intuitive technique for attaining
Self/Reality," but relatively homophilic when involving any element of its "aesthetic" and/or "passionate-emotional" techniques; while solipsism we found to be unpredictable. In the case of dualism our conclusions are more complex; they can be summarized by suggesting that 1) a true homoisaia is found only in the "earliest" forms of the belief in spirits, where inanimate, plant and/or animal spirits are revered. 2) One stage beyond, the belief in spirits of living human beings, may have generated a type of homophilic "sado-masochistic" (i.e., dominant/submissive) pattern based on male intra-sexual guilt and atonement. 3) With the belief in ancestor spirits a distinctive form of homophobia becomes developed which permeates all "later" stages of spiritual dualism up to the concluding monotheisms. 4) Rare exceptions may be found among these homophobic types, such as homophilic heroes, gods, or isolated passages in scriptures. 5) Philosophies such as "status" and "formal-cause" dualisms have no inherent significance for homosexuality and merely reflect already existing attitudes. 6) Actual homoisic/homophilic examples of status dualism and even Hebrew-Christian monotheism can be and have been developed by gay people.

What are the chances of reducing or removing the world-wide homophobia based on the feeling that our ancestors depend on direct descendants for remembrance and thus for their happiness in the afterlife? I suggest that the idea of reincarnation (in which after death we do not enter a "single place of afterlife" but rather repeatedly return to one life, or "plane of existence," (after another) would have two helpful, intertwining results. First, it would mean that everyone has innumerable parents and other forebears, a different set for each of our past and future lives, thereby greatly reducing the uniqueness of our "obligation" to our forebears of this life. Secondly, reincarnation implies that our deceased ancestors are already busily living other lives, and are no more remembering "us, their former descendants," than we are currently remembering "our former descendants in previous lives"; and if they do not remember us, they will not need to be remembered by us. I suggest, therefore, that the more a reincarnation doctrine supplants the belief of a "single afterlife," the less emphasis will be placed on the production of descendants via heterosexual marriage, that is, the less homophobia.

For readers who are religiously Hebrew-Christian-Muslim, I offer a second suggestion: the idea of subjective revelation. This means that God has been, is, and will continue to be revealing Himself, even if in small ways, to individuals throughout the ages. Any person reflecting on his or her life and finding the "hand of God" in it would be justified in accepting this intuition as "God's voice speaking to him" or a "revelation." On July 2, 1969, a man calling himself "Olm" was lecturing in New York City on how God had
revealed to him that the purpose of life was to have as much sexual intercourse as possible, as a divine ritual of communion with God; and when I asked him if this applied to homosexuals also, he said “yes.” Similarly any gay person who sincerely feels that his or her life as a homophile is rewarding enough to see the “hand of God” in it may accept this as his “subjective revelation.” And if increasingly many gay people have this same intuition, these subjective revelations will accumulate into a historically new “objective revelation.” Bāḥa’u’llāh, Joseph Smith, Mary Baker Eddy, et al., all have comparatively recently proclaimed their own “objective revelations.” So the time may be approaching for a new, objective Divine Revelation of homophilia.

The two preceding paragraphs have been “coping with homophobia”; but what are the chances for a truly homophobic philosophy, one that asserts gay superiority? To construct a consistent homophilia the following seem to be requisites: 1) The keystone must be the “essence of homosexuality,” that is, the idea of “identity or great similarity” as compared to the heterosexual “difference.” 2) To insure the significant use of this “essence,” the importance of interpersonal relationships, where alone this distinction properly applies, must be demonstrated. 3) Any philosophy which is inherently non-committal (homoisic/unpredictable/imitative) must be rejected as an unsafe foundation; (thus the suggestion made earlier of a solipsistic homophilia is vulnerable to solipsism’s unpredictability which could just as well spawn homophobia). For a safe foundation we have discovered apparently only two philosophies that could be called homophilic: certain types of Idealism, and the belief in (but not “beyond”) “living human spirits.” Here I will select only the former as perhaps less hypothetical and more currently possible. The reader will recall that in idealism the “aesthetic” and “passionate-emotional” techniques both placed a cosmic value on interpersonal relationships as one means of elevating consciousness toward the One Reality. The first method stresses a quiet, receptive appreciation of a “spiritually-beautiful person” who could induce an inner reverberation of a “beautifully-spiritual experience”; the second stresses a dynamic, aggressive love or erotic-rapture leading to an intimate communion or union with another person as a foretaste or revelation of the One. In both cases there is need for the deepest kind of relationship, the innermost sympathetic or empathic stimulation and/or response. Sympathy (“feeling with”) and empathy (“feeling inside”, i.e., the almost physical sensation that we experience when someone, e.g., cuts his finger) are based on similarity; the more similar any two people are, mentally/emotionally (sympathy) or physically (empathy), the more easily they can reverberate or commune with each other. This is the “essence of homosexuality” of course, identity or great similarity. We can suggest therefore that homophilic relationships are better
able to produce "spiritually elevating aesthetic experiences" and/or "erotically rapturous feelings of communion or union" than heterophilic ones. And in the world-view of idealism this means that homophiles are more predisposed to attaining the One Reality than heterophiles, or what is actually the same thing, that the One Reality manifests itself more immediately and clearly in the gay consciousness than in the straighth one. Whatever the reader's opinions of this kind of idealism may be, it is at least an example of a consistently-constructed doctrine of gay superiority!

NOTES

1The word "homosexuality" has two disadvantages: first, it combines the Greek prefix "homo-" (the same, as opposed to "hetero-", other, different) with the Latin root "sexus," a faulty construction to begin with; but more importantly, in our language "sexual" hardly connotes mere anatomical gender (the original intention) but rather stimulation of the sex organs or "sex," and as gay people know, this is only one of the many motivations for homosexuality; but the words "homosexual-ity" will remain useful for a vague, generalized reference. "Homoeroticism," which is purely Greek in derivation, also mostly suggests sexuality; though "erôs" meant love in general, in English "erotic" now implies sex. But "homophilia," from the Gr. verb "philein" (to like, kiss, love), has remained in conformity with its original meaning (helped by the root's continued use as, e.g., the suffix "-phile" as in "Anglophile"); so also the concrete noun "homophile" and the adjective "homophilic." In this chapter these words will have a connotation slightly different from "homosexual-ity"; they will connote a favorable attitude to one's own homosexuality as in the popular word "gay(ess)." "Homophobia" is actually an abbreviation for "homophilephobia," since strictly speaking it would mean "dislike for those of one's own sex," clearly not the intention; "male homophobes" do not "dislike other males" but rather "dislike those (male or female) who are attracted to their own sex." For the attitude that is truly neutral about homosexuality, Liddell & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed., Oxford, 1940; p. 836) gives a somewhat rare but valid noun "isaiâ" (equality) which has the advantage of only 3 syllables like "philia" and "phobia"; [other, longer possibilities are the 4-syllable "isaxia" (equal worth), and the 5-syllable "isomerelà" (equal share), "isonomia" (equal rights) and "isotimia" (equal privilege)]. This gives us the abstract noun "homoisala" (spelled with the diaeresis to avoid suggesting the prefix "homoi-," similar to); but notice that this also is an abbreviation for "homophileisala," since it doesn't mean "neutrality to those of one's own sex"
but "neutrality to those who are attracted to their own sex." The adjective "homoisic" is based on the analogy with "homophilic" and "homophobic"; but the concrete noun should also be "homoisic" since there is nothing here corresponding to "-ophile" or "-phobe"; (nor would "homoise" be acceptable! and there are many cases in Eng. where the Gr. adjective ending "ikos" serves also as a noun, such as "mystic," etc.).

2Because "materialism" has frequently been used derogatorily by this philosophy's opponents, its adherents have sought other terms, such as "naturalism." Wishing to avoid lurking value-judgments, I will use both words interchangeably as needed, and synonymously.

3For a classic presentation of these ideas see Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Book I, lines 216 f. (basic building blocks of matter); 330 (empty space); 420 f. (nothing but matter and space); 482 f. (solid, eternal atoms); II, 83 (motion of atoms); 402 f. (sensation, pleasure and pain); III, 161 (material nature of mind & "soul"); 417 (mortality of soul). Hedonistic doctrines are found in Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (e.g., The Philosophy of Epicurus, tr. Geo. Stroodach; Evanston, Ill., 1963); pp. 178-185.

4"Do as you wish," the only rule in Rabelais' Abbey of Thélème (Gargantua and Pantagruel, Book I, Ch. 57).

5"I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on the condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner" (Leviathan, p. 132 in orig. 1651 ed., rpt. Oxford, 1909).

6I have omitted the Buddhist tradition because, like the Hebrew-Christian-Muslim tradition, it has been an intermixture of both monistic and dualistic elements, though with greater emphasis on the idealistic/monistic than the H-C-M. Both religions have idealists such as Vasubandhu and Angelus Silesius, but they were more influenced by "Brahman"-ism and Neo-Platonism respectively than by their religions.

7The exposition is naturally abbreviated and some of these generalizations may appear untrue now of this, now of that example. Thus 1) "Tao" was first conceived as the "Essence of Nature" more than a "mind"; but Chuang-tse (only 2 cen. after Lao-tse) already stressed the relativity of waking and dreaming (II, p. 197 in Legge's trans., see note below), the primacy of
mind, and Tao more as "Essence of Thought." 2) Sānkhyā/Yoga is called "pluralistic" since each person's self (Purusha) is numerically separate from every other, but without any further qualitative difference and so hardly distinct from Vedanta which reduces "all selves" to "One Self." 3) Spinoza is sometimes not called an idealist because he makes "mind" and "extension" co-equal "attributes of God or Substance"; but since this One Reality is prior to both, it could itself be grasped only by the highest kind of consciousness or Mind.

8Cf. the Neoplatonist Proclus: "O Absolutely Transcendent . . . all keen desires or lusts, all painful passions are yearnings only for Thee" ("Hymn to God"); and "Therefore the whole of our life is a struggle toward that Vision" (Commentary on Plato's Parmenides); both quotes from L. J. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus: the Final Phase of Ancient Thought (New York, 1949), p. 204.

9"What now is the Noble Truth of the origin of suffering? It is craving . . . What now is the Noble Truth of the extinction of suffering? It is the complete fading away and extinction of this craving . . . wherever in the world there are delightful and pleasurable things, there this craving may vanish" (Dīgha Nikāya, 22, tr. the Bhikkhu Nyanatiloka (1935), found in A Buddhist Bible, ed. Dwight Goddard; Dutton: Boston, 1938). And from the Stoic Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, Ch. 17 (tr. Geo. Long; Philadelphia, 189 . . .): "I desire to be free from passion and perturbation; . . . not only when I am awake, but also when I am asleep . . . filled with wine [or] melancholy. 'Man, you are a god.'"

10Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, Bk. I, sutra 51; III, 51,56; IV, 33. Also the Vedantist Śankara's "Blessed am I; I have attained the consummation of my life . . . I am that Self-effulgent, Transcendent Ātman . . . I am verily that Brahman, the One without a second . . . I am the Universal, I am the All . . ." (Vivekachudāmani, tr. Swami Madhavananda; Mayavati, India, 1952; slokas 488, 507, 514, 516).

11This 2nd and the 3rd techniques' significance for homophilia suggests somewhat fuller quotation here and in the next quote. The Taoist Chuang-tse (The Texts of Taoism, tr. Jas. Legge; Oxford, 1891; rpt. Dover: N.Y., 1962; Book XIV, pp. 348-351) says: "You were celebrating, O Ti, a performance of music . . . in the open country near the Thung-thing Lake . . . The Perfect Music . . . showed the blended distinctions of the four seasons and the grand harmony of all things; . . . the brilliance of the sun and moon . . . like the music
of a forest produced by no visible form. . . This is what is called the music of Heaven, delighting the mind without the use of words.” In Zen and the Fine Arts (Kodansha Ltd., 1971), Shin-ichi Hisamatsu derives all Zen arts from the “Formless Self” and demonstrates how they conversely stimulate awareness of this Self (pp. 51-52 esp.). A western example, Geo. Berkeley (Principles of Human Knowledge, Par. 148) writes: “We do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity — everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by Sense being a sign or effect of the power of God.”

12The Sufi, Jelālu’d-dīn Rūmī says, “O lovers, . . is time to abandon the world: . . With each moment a soul is setting off into the Void . . . O Soul, seek the Beloved, O friend, seek the Friend” (‘Divanı Şamsı Tabrızı,” tr. R.A. Nicholson; p. 55 in F.H. Davis, Jelālu’d-dīn Rūmī, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, India, 1907). Shamsı Tabrızı is said by Davis to have been Jelāl’s homosexual lover (pp. 31-32). Another Sufi, Fārīd al-Dīn ‘Attār (Readings from the Mystics of Islam, ed. & tr. Margaret Smith; Luzac: London, 1950 & 1972; Pars. 88, 97) writes: “A third moth rose up, intoxicated with love, and threw himself violently into the candle’s flame . . . As he entered completely into its embrace, his members became glowing red like the flame itself . . . In truth, it is the one who has lost . . . all trace of his own existence who has, at the same time, found knowledge of the Beloved . . . Now I am made one with Thee . . . I am Thou and Thou art I — nay, not I . . . I have become altogether Thou.” A psychedelic example: “I took my pill [mescaline] at eleven . . . The Beatific Vision, Sat Chit Ananda, Being-Awareness-Bliss — for the first time I understood, not on the verbal level . . . but precisely and completely what those prodigious syllables referred to” (Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception; N.Y., 1954; pp. 16, 18.

13In the Republic (Stephanos II, 368) Plato slips into his doctrine of the “ideal society” ostensibly to illustrate the relationship of each individual’s psychic elements to one another by “magnifying” this into the “larger and more visible picture” of a whole society, though in his philosophy “psyches” are real, mere collections of psyches are not (Hegel (The phenomenology of Mind, tr. Balhie, 2nd ed.; Allen & Unwin: London, 1931) clearly says “The goal . . . is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit” (last page, 808), while “state-power” (last mentioned on p. 535) “means nothing else than . . . a moment of self-conscious life, i.e., it is only by being sublated [transcended].”

14A famous presentation is Max Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum (Leipzig, 1845; Eng. tr. S. Byington, The Ego and Its Own; N.Y., 1907 & 1918); also a recent defense by William Todd, Analytical Solipsism (Martinus Niijhoff: the Hague, 1968).
15 The respective implications of materialism (neutrality), idealism (neutrality/favorability) and solipsism (unpredictability) for homosexuality would seem to be equally applicable to certain more specialized phenomena in the gay life such as transvestitism, pederasty and sado-masochism. Provided that every relationship is purely voluntary, I feel that the three “clear-cut” philosophies would have nothing different to say about these “specialized phenomena.” (This will not hold true for the “more complex dualisms” below.)

16 Why are dualistic ethics generally more obscure than the other philosophies? In the Fall of 1944, Prof. J. H. Randall, Jr. of Columbia U., himself a kind of Aristotelian dualist, in one of his lectures made a distinction between “holoscopic” and “meroscopic” world-views which contains an implied answer: a “holoscopic” (whole-viewing) system, he said, starts with universal principles, deducing all particulars from them (materialism, idealism, and solipsism are examples); a “meroscopic” (part-viewing) philosophy takes up the many questions of life first, then constructs a total outlook from the various answers found. The dualisms are usually meroscopic, and naturally we cannot swiftly discover a goal of life if we must first respond to the variety of questions that our lives apparently offer.

17 See “Animism” in Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh, 1908-22); the arrangement of categories is different from mine; also, the definition of “animism” in the Schaff-Herzog Encyc. of Religious Knowledge (N.Y., 1910-12), Vol. III, p. 194.

18 To deal with some possibly strong reader resistance at this point, I must mention A) the pansexual (straight/gay/bl) Eulenspiegel Soc. (founded in N.Y.C., 1971), an “S/M Liberation” group whose 4-year program of forums and C.R. sessions has developed the general consensus that i) “S/M” refers to any case of “dominance vs. submission” (the infliction of pain implied by the more extreme term “sado-masochism” being only a special instance, and not necessarily involved even in the text’s example); and ii) not only sexual, but emotional and psychic satisfactions justify the seeking of “S/M experience” (the removal of guilt by atonement is a “psychic satisfaction”); and B) “homophilia” here means “a much greater likelihood of homosexual than heterosexual expression,” because, occurring at the stage in “spirit-belief” where homophobia has not yet surfaced, this is tantamount to simple acceptance.

19 Two examples are Ganymede and Penthesilea. The former name
means either “joyful counsel” (medos) or “joyful genitals” (medea), and the story of how Zeus in the form of an eagle abducted him is well-known. See New Century Classical Handbook (ed. C.A. Avery; N.Y., 1962) p. 491: “... [he] supplanted Hebe in her function as cup-bearer, ... In Latin the name appears as Catamitus, whence the English term catamite” (i.e., passive partner in anal intercourse). The first clause symbolically suggests the later, more bisexual attitude in Greece. Penthesilea (possibly “gracious [hileos] in mourning [penthesis]” referring to Achilles’ being struck by her beauty after killing her) was an Amazon queen, fathered by Ares, god of war; “P. led her 12 princesses into battle ... slashed about her mightily and the Greeks fled in panic ... she leaped like a leopard to meet [Achilles]” (Handbook, p. 842).

20A) When the transvestite “Gallop,” male priests of the Earth Mother Cybele, occasionally castrated themselves in her honor (Hastings, Encyc. IV, 377-378) they were indeed ancient analogues of the modern transsexuals; but transsexuality and transvestitism not being limited to homosexuals, this is not “an implication for homosexuality.” B) When the “gay churches” maintain “Jesus died for all people, straight and gay,” it seems totally consistent with the Christian doctrine that His death guaranteed immortality for all, transcending “moral” distinctions (cf. the thief in Luke 23, 40-43), which is to this extent homoisic; but the question is whether, once in heaven, these immortal spirits still require remembrance from their descendants on earth.

21“Phallism,” Hastings, Encyc. The “Dionysian orgies” involved men and women with probably only incidental homosexuality, while Priapus and his phallic symbols (like other cultures’ enormous ithyphallic forms) were worshipped mostly by heterosexual women. Similarly the Lingam (penis) and Yoni (vulva) were revered by the opposite sex, and though among the Lingayats (Hastings, VIII, 69 ff.) both men and women wear the lingam amulets and/or caste marks, it is merely a “group identification symbol” of this sect whose purpose was to overcome caste distinctions. In his documentary motion picture “Phantom India” (viewed on T.V., 8/20/74), Louis Mallé suggests that, though surrounded by extreme visual eroticism of temple bas-relief, Hindus are sexually undemonstrative and more concerned with traditional child-bearing marriage.

22“Shamanism,” Hastings, Encyc. Also the converse long-standing opinion of male and female homosexuals as “wizards,” “witches,” etc.

23“Canaanites,” Hastings, Encyc. References to “temple courtesans”
(Revised Standard Version: “cult prostitutes”) in the O.T. are associated with the phallic posts called “ashērîm” from the Heb. root “š-h-t” meaning either “to be erect” or “to be happy.”


25 “Formal cause” in Greek: “eidos,” “logos.” “Li”: third tone: character formed from the 96th radical and a phonetic which is also the 166th radical, thus not the same as the famous “li” or “ritual.” In Fung Yu-lan, Short History of Chinese Philosophy (N.Y., 1948), Chu Hsi, major philosopher of the “Li School” of Neo-Confucianism, says “There is no form without matter and no matter without form” (p. 300), and “for the bamboo chair there is the li of the bamboo chair” (p. 296), practically identical with Aristotle’s “formal cause,” though it is true the li were also conceived in a realm by themselves (like “Platonic Ideas”).

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