not lost in Germany any more than in Italy and Hungary. It has made things seem possible—seem even for a moment accomplished—which had been till then mere visions; it had awakened a keen political interest in the people, stirred their whole life, and given them a sense of national unity such as they had not had since 1814. By showing the governments how insecure were the foundations of their arbitrary power, it had made them less unwilling to accept change; it had taught peoples how little was to be expected from the enforced good-will of princes. From this time, therefore, after the first reaction had spent itself, one may observe a real though slow progress toward free constitutional life. In some of the smaller states, and particularly in Baden, it soon came to be the policy of the government to encourage the action of the local parliament; and the Prussian assembly became in its long and spirited struggle with the crown a political school of incomparable value to the rest of Germany as well as to its own great kingdom.

One other thing more the events of 1848-1850 did most effectively for the Germans, if indeed that wanted doing: they made clear to the nation the hopelessness of expecting anything from the Confederation. During the last sixteen years of its existence, nothing, if we except the promulgation under its sanction of a general code of commercial law, was done by the Federal Diet for national objects: its deliberations had for many years been carried on in secret; it spoke with no authority to foreign princes, and behaved with sluggish irresolution in the question which was again beginning to agitate Germany, of the succession of Schleswig and Holstein, and the relation of these duchies to the Danish Crown.

The restoration of the Federal constitution in 1850-51 was at the time regarded as merely provisional, accepted
only because Austria and Prussia could not be got to agree upon any new scheme; and the successive projects of reform which thereafter emanated, sometimes from governments, sometimes from voluntary associations, kept the question of the organization of Germany and the attainment of some sort of national unity, constantly before the people. Thus, although nothing was done, and the weary discussions which went on moved the laughter of other nations, the way was secretly but surely paved for revolution. In 1859 the liberals organized themselves in what was called the National Union (National-Verein), a body containing numerous members in nearly all the German States, and among them many distinguished publicists and men of letters. It held general meetings from time to time; and, when occasion arose, its permanent committee issued pamphlets and manifestoes, explaining the views and recommending the policy of the party. This policy was not a very definite one, so far as practical measures were concerned, yet tolerably clear in its ultimate object—viz., the union of all Germany in one Federal state (whether republican or monarchical), and if necessary, the absolute exclusion of Austria therefrom. This last feature procured for it from her adherents and from the German conservatives generally, the name of the Little German (Kleindeutsch) party; and they, assuming the title of Great Germans (Grossdeutschen i.e., the advocates of a Germany which should include Austria), founded in 1862 a rival association, which called itself the Reform Union, and in like manner held meetings and issued manifestoes. It found strong support in Hanover, Bavaria and Württemburg, but comparatively little in the middle states, and of course still less in Prussia. Its policy was mainly defensive; while the National Union, whose tendencies would naturally have been philo-Prussian and aggressive, found itself embarrassed by what seemed
the resolutely reactionary attitude taken up by the Prus-
sian king and ministers in the affairs of their own kingdom.
A contest respecting the organization and payment of the
army had broken out between the Government and the
Chamber—a contest embittered first by the accession to
the throne of the feudally-minded King William I (hith-
erto Regent), whose assertion of the principle of the divine
right at his coronation at Königsberg had surprised and
displeased thinking people, and afterward by the admission
to the chief place in the ministry of a statesman who was
then supposed to be the champion of tyranny and feudal-
ism, even of the Austrian alliance. During the struggle
which raged in the years 1862–64, and which at some mo-
ments seemed to threaten revolution, it was impossible for
Germany to hope for anything from a power which refused
to work constitutional government at home, and treated
the representatives of the people with a roughness under
which no one could tell that there lay concealed a substan-
tial community of purpose.

The liberals of the South and West were therefore in
1863 disposed fairly to abjure Prussia as given over to a
reprobate mind; and Austria thought she saw her opportu-
nity. Encouraged by the partial success which had
attended his efforts to unite and pacify the different prov-
inces of the monarchy by the creation of a Reichsrath,
Count Schmerling conceived the hope of recovering by an
appeal to the nation the ancient primacy of the Hapsburgs,
and thrusting the now unpopular Prussia into
the background. Accordingly in August, 1863, the Emperor Francis Joseph invited the reign-
ing princes and representatives of the free cities
to meet him at Frankfort, to discuss a scheme of federal
reform which he there propounded, and which, while it
increased the power of Austria, appeared to strengthen the
cohesion of the Confederation, and to introduce, though
insufficiently, a popular element into its constitution. All save one attended; but that one was the king of Prussia. He had in the preceding year taken for his prime minister Otto Edward Leopold, Freiherr of Bismarck-Schönhausen in the Old Mark of Brandenburg, a man who, having been Prussian representative in the Federal Diet from 1851 to 1859, had learned by experience the weakness of that body and its subservience to Austria, and was now becoming impatient to try some speedier, and if necessary more forcible, method than diplomatic discussion of putting an end to the existing dead-lock. At his suggestion, the Prussian Court refused to have anything to do with the Austrian scheme, which fell therewith to the ground, and the Diet was troubled by no change for the rest of its unhonored life.

Austria, however, would probably have tried to carry through her project had not another question suddenly arisen, which turned all thoughts in a different direction, threw the German powers into new relations to one another, and became at last the cause of the dissolution of the Confederation itself. In November, 1863, Frederick VII, king of Denmark, died; and the contest so long foreseen and delayed between the Danes and the Germans, respecting their rights over Schleswig and Holstein, broke out with unexpected vehemence.

The Danish constitution of 1855 had incorporated these two Duchies with Denmark for all purposes, although Holstein had always been a part of Germany, while Schleswig was by law indissolubly united to Holstein, and although the inhabitants even of Schleswig were in great majority of German speech. The Federal Diet had protested long ago against this constitution as an infraction of its rights, but it was not till October, 1863, that it decreed federal execution against Denmark. When, a few weeks later, Christian IX succeeded to the throne in virtue
of the arrangements which Frederick VII had been empowered to make by the Treaty of London in 1852, no steps had as yet been taken to give effect to the decree. But the eyes of Europe were at once turned upon the new sovereign, whose title was disputed, and when, under the pressure of the heated populace of Copenhagen, he acceded to the constitution incorporating the duchies with Denmark, he found himself and his kingdom at once committed to the struggle. Prince Frederick of Augustenburg* claimed Schleswig and Holstein, and was supported not only by a considerable party in both duchies, but by the general sentiment of the Germans, who saw in his candidature the only chance of saving them from the Danes. The agitation in Germany soon grew vehement, and that the faster because the question was one upon which all parties and sects could unite. The National Union and Reform Union met, fraternized, and appointed a joint permanent committee, which issued addresses to the nation, established Schleswig-Holstein Unions throughout the country, and promoted the enlistment of bands of volunteers, who hurried to the border. Even the Federal Diet, though the opposition of Prussia and Austria prevented it from recognizing Frederick as Duke, carried out (against the will of those powers) the resolution for federal execution by sending in December, 1863, a body of Saxons and Hanoverians to occupy Holstein.

Prussia had a difficult game to play, and she played it with consummate skill. Her ministers were unwilling to aid the Prince of Augustenburg, both because she was bound to Denmark as one of the signatories of the Treaty of London,†

* Prince Frederick had never assented to Frederick VII's arrangements, and contended that he was not barred by his father's renunciation of the rights of the family.

† The Confederation was not bound by the Treaty of London, as it had never been laid before the Diet. Prussia and Austria were.
and because their views of the future included other contingencies which it would then have been premature to mention. But if hope and the voice of the nation called on them to act, prudence forbade them to act alone. It was essential to carry Austria along with them, not only because the Austrian alliance would be needed if England, France and Russia threatened war, but because she could in this way be made to share the unpopularity which backwardness in the national cause was bringing upon Prussia, and because she was thus alienated from Bavaria, Hanover, and the other states of the second rank, with which her relations had been, especially since the Frankfort Congress, so close and cordial. When the co-operation of Austria had been secured—partly by adroitly playing on her fears of the democratic and almost revolutionary character which the Schleswig-Holstein movement was taking in Germany, partly by her own reluctance to let Prussia gain any advantage by acting alone against Denmark—the Prussian government resolved to take the control of the quarrel out of the hands of the Diet, so as to decide the fate of the two Duchies in the way most favorable to their own plans for the reconstruction of North Germany. Accordingly Prussia and Austria appealed, as they were undoubtedly entitled to do, to certain provisions of the Treaty of London, recognizing the special rights of Schleswig; and summoned Denmark to withdraw at once the law of November 18, 1863, whereby Schleswig was finally incorporated with the Danish monarchy. When the Danes refused, a strong Prussian and Austrian force was poured into the Duchies, not without considerable indignation on the part as well of the rest of Germany as of the Prussian liberals, who believed that the object of this invasion was to check the national movement, expel Prince Frederick, and hand over Schles-
wig to Christian IX. They were soon better informed. Early in 1864 the united army passed the Danewerk, stormed Düppel, overran Jutland, and had the Danish king and people entirely at their mercy. A Conference was summoned in London; but it broke up without effecting anything; and when the Germans resumed hostilities, and it was clear that the expected help from England, Russia or France* would not be forthcoming, Denmark submitted, and by the Treaty of Vienna (October, 1864) ceded Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to the allied powers absolutely. Prussia then pushed the Saxons and Hanoverians out of Holstein, and began to strengthen herself and make arrangements for the administration of the territory she occupied; while Austria, seeing this, began to hesitate, and suspect, and doubt whether her course had been altogether wise. She was soon to be still more cruelly undeceived.

Now that the Danes were forever dispossessed, the question arose—what was to become of the Duchies. Everybody expected the recognition of Prince Frederick of Augustenberg; the Diet was clearly in his favor, and Austria seemed quite willing. Prussia, however, refused to consent. Her

*It had been commonly believed that Russia would not aid the Danes on account of her obligations to Prussia during the Polish insurrection; and that Louis Napoleon refused to stir because he was disgusted at the cold reception given to his proposal for a general European Congress not very long before. The inaction of England was attributed on the Continent partly to the personal influence of the Sovereign, partly to the supposed prevalence of "peace at any price" doctrines. But it really was in a large measure due to the fact that English statesmen and public writers found, when they looked into the matter, that the Danes were substantially in the wrong, though no doubt the hesitation of France, without whose aid it would have been folly to stir, had something to do with the matter.
crown lawyers, to whom the whole matter had been referred, while not attempting to advocate certain ancient hereditary claims that had been put forward on behalf of the house of Hohenzollern, pronounced in an elaborate opinion that the title of Christian IX, was legally preferable to that of Prince Frederick, and that, as his title had passed by the cession to the two allied powers, the latter were now entirely free to deal with the ceded territories as they pleased. Nevertheless, she professed herself ready to recognize Frederick as duke upon certain conditions, which were declared to be essential to the safety of Prussia on her north-west frontier, as well as to the protection of Schleswig-Holstein itself against the hostility of Denmark. These conditions included not only a strict defensive and offensive alliance of the new principality with Prussia, but an incorporation of its army and fleet with hers, an absorption of its postal and telegraphic system, the cession of its fortresses, and, in fact a pretty complete subjection to her authority in military matters and in external politics. These proposals were, as was expected, rejected by Prince Frederick, trusting to the support of Austria, and buoyed up by the general sympathy which his pretensions found not only in the rest of Germany, but even in the Prussian Chamber, which still maintained unshaken its opposition to the foreign policy and schemes of military organization of Herr von Bismarck's government. Meanwhile voices began to be raised in the Duchies for annexation to Prussia; Austria grew more and more suspicious; the relations of the officials of the two powers established in the conquered territory became daily less friendly. Things seemed fast ripening toward a war, when, on the mediation of Bavaria and Saxony, the Convention of Gastein was signed between the rival sovereigns in the autumn of 1865. By this treaty Schleswig was in the meantime
to be held by Prussia, Holstein by Austria, the question of the ultimate disposal of both duchies being reserved; while Austria sold her rights over Lauenburg to Prussia for 2,500,000 rix-dollars. This was felt to be a hollow truce, and its hollowness, despite the efforts of the Diet to arrange matters, was soon manifest. The Austrian authorities, knowing that they could not permanently retain Holstein, allowed an agitation to be kept up there on behalf of Prince Frederick. Prussia vehemently protested against this, and required Austria to maintain the status quo. Notes of complaint and recrimination were constantly passing between the two powers;* notes whose tone became always more menacing. Then each accused the other of arming, Austria summoning the Diet to prepare to restrain Prussia, Prussia beginning to shadow forth plans for a reform in the federal constitution. Meanwhile both states were arming fast, and it became clear that the only question was which could first strike a blow, and upon what allies each could rely.† Prussia had secured Italy: Austria managed to carry with her the majority of the great German princes. In the memorable last sittings of the Diet of June 11th and 14th, 1866, Austria's

* Austria at one time proposed to let Prussia have Holstein in exchange for part of Silesia: at another she offered to leave the disposal of the Duchies to be determined by the Diet. Prussia refused both propositions, well knowing, as regards the latter, that the decision of the Diet was foregone.

† The immediate cause of the war was the convocation by Austria of the states of Holstein, in order to pronounce on the rights of Prince Frederick. This Prussia declared to be an infraction of the Convention of Gastein; and her troops accordingly crossed the Elbe, in order to re-occupy Holstein in virtue of her condominate rights under the treaty of Vienna. Austria withdrew to avoid a collision; and made her final motion in the Diet which brought on the declaration of war.
motion to mobilize the federal contingents, with a view to execution against Prussia, was supported by Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, Hessen-Cassel, Hessen-Darmstadt, and several of the minor states, thus giving her a large majority; while, for Prussia's counter-proposition for a reform in the constitution of the Confederation, there voted only Luxemburg and four of the "curiae," consisting of northern and middle states of the third rank, seventeen in all out of the thirty-three. The partisans of both sides having thus committed themselves, there was no use in further resisting Austria in the Diet; so Prussia, having entered her protest against its proceedings, withdrew from the Confederation, declared war upon Hanover and Saxony on June 16th, upon Austria on June 18th and pushed her armies forward with a speed which seemed almost to paralyze her opponents.

The great military events of 1866 and 1870 are too fresh in our memories to make it necessary to recount them here; nor is it worth while to inquire who was technically in the right in the dispute which had arisen between Austria and Prussia relative to the administration of the duchies and the interpretation of the Convention of Gastein. Ever since Frederick the Great's time, it had been plain that the rivalry of the two great monarchies was an insuperable obstacle to the unity of the nation. It was no less plain to the resolute and clear-sighted minister who ruled at Berlin that this rivalry could be put an end to by the sword alone; and the question that remains, whether the importance of the object to be attained justified an appeal to force, with all its attendant miseries, is one which men will answer according to their estimate of the moral and political value of that object. Fortunately the military superiority of Prussia, and her alliance with Italy, made the struggle far shorter than onlookers in the rest of Europe had expected; and the victors had the good
sense to be content with something short of the complete fulfillment of their designs. For the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg and Peace of Prague, though they followed one of the most decisive victories of modern times, had nevertheless only half solved the problem that lay before Germany, and established a system which to patriotic eyes might well seem unsatisfactory. It is true that Austria was thereby excluded from the Germanic body, and the ground left free for Prussia to form a new Confederation, in which she should be dominant, and which the court of Vienna undertook to recognize. But with Austria went her German population of seven millions, filling the vast territories of Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria and part of Bohemia—districts which had during many centuries formed a part of the old Empire. The new league, moreover, at whose head Prussia placed herself, included only the states north of the river Main, and thus, if it drew closer than before the bonds between those states, drew also a more marked distinction than heretofore between the two halves of the country, leaving the great principalities of Bavaria, Württemburg and Baden in a much more complete isolation. Germany, in fact, might appear to have purchased the completer unity of her northern peoples by the sacrifice of her unity as a whole. It had been stipulated in the Treaty of Prague that the South German States should be at liberty to enter into a separate league of their own; and the French government doubtless hoped that now, when the scheme of a North German federation, broached in 1806, had been at length carried out, Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine, under the protectorate of France, would reappear in the South as a counterpoise to Prussia’s power. Very different was the turn which events took. Within a few months after the war of 1866, Bavaria, Württemburg and Baden—induced, it was supposed, by
their desire to be admitted to the new Zollverein which Prussia was forming—entered into military treaties with the North German Confederation, whereby they bound themselves to unite their armies to its army, in the event of any attack on Germany by a foreign power. Meanwhile the constitution of the North German Confederation, although it left a nominal independence to the minor princes, permitting them to send and receive diplomatic agents to and from other courts, levy local taxes, and summon their local legislative bodies as heretofore, effected a fusion of their military forces, which were placed under the command of the king of Prussia; vested in him, as president, the conduct of the foreign policy of the Confederation, and the right of making war and peace (this last with the consent of the federal parliament), and transferred to the control of the federal parliament, over which the king presided through his nominee, the federal chancellor, all legislation upon a variety of important topics, including the taxation for federal objects, and the control of the currency and the postal and telegraphic system. Prussia at the same time not only increased but consolidated her dominions by annexing the extensive territories of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hessen-Cassel, Nassau and the free city of Frankfort. There was thus formed what was substantially, if not nominally, a single or united rather than a federal state. And although much that was anomalous and incomplete might be remarked in its constitution, as could hardly fail to be the case where one member had twenty-four millions of population and the remaining twenty-one only five millions among them all, it had the advantage of trying the experiment of union where it was easiest, among the comparatively homogenous North German States. It formed a cohesive nucleus, all the more cohesive that it was comparatively small; and by accus-
toming the citizens of different principalities to act together in a common assembly, the North German Parliament, it gave them a feeling of common citizenship, which mitigated such discontent as might have been produced by the loss of local independence.

Temporary, however, as the organization of the North German Confederation evidently was, no one predicted for it a life of four years only, nor would most people have expected its development into a grander and more comprehensive union to be the work of its bitterest enemy. The alarm of France at the revelation and the increase of Prussia's military power by the campaigns of 1866, was heightened by the publication of the secret treaties with the South German States. Peace was with difficulty preserved when the question of the cession of Luxemburg arose; and from that time, at least, both countries felt that there existed only a truce full of suspicion between them. France seems to have been hurried into speedier action by the belief that the military treaties had been extorted from the South German powers, and that there was serious disaffection among the inhabitants of the newly annexed districts, which ought to be taken advantage of as soon as possible. But men were astonished, and our astonishment is hardly lessened by what we have since learned, that her ruler and his counsellors should have fired the train so suddenly, and should with a sort of judicial blindness, have chosen the most frivolous of pretexts, and done their best to make the war they declared against Prussia with so light a heart, a national war, in which all Germany felt its interests and feelings involved. This it at once became. Seldom had such a national rising been seen—so swift, so universal, so enthusiastic, sweeping away in a moment the heart-burnings of liberals and feudals in Prussia, the jealousies of North and
South Germans, of Protestants and Catholics. Every citizen, every soldier, felt that this struggle was a struggle for the greatness and freedom of the nation; and the unbroken career of victory which carried the German arms over the east and center of France, and placed them at last triumphant in the capital of their foes, proved, in the truest sense, what strength there is in a righteous cause. For it was, even more than the admirable organization of their armies, the skill of their generals, the corruption and weakness of the Bonapartist court—it was the passionate ardor of the whole German people, who felt that at last a crisis had come when every motive called on them to put forth their utmost efforts, when the cause of patriotism and the cause of justice were absolutely the same, that gave them that courage and devotion, that self-control even in the moment of victory, to which European history scarcely supplies a parallel.

Never before for centuries, nor even in the War of Liberation of 1814, had the whole people felt and acted so completely as one. All saw that the time had now come to give this practically realized unity its formal political expression; nor was there a doubt as to what that form should be. The imperial name under which Germany had won her first glories in the great days of the middle ages, was that to which the sentiment of the nation turned; and it had the advantage of sparing the susceptibilities of the sovereigns whose loyal adherence to the national cause had given them a better claim on the regard of their subjects, than most of them had before possessed. By a strange caprice of fate, it was in a hall of the palace at Versailles, which the archenemy of Germany had reared, that the first of the German potentates offered to the king of Prussia, in the name of princes and peoples, that imperial crown which his brother had refused in 1849. On the 31st of December, 1870, sixty-four years after the dissolution of
the old Empire, Germany became again a single state in the eyes of Europe.

The constitution of the new Empire is in its main features that of the North German Confederation, modified by the treaties whereby Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria, respectively, entered the pre-existing body. Each of these states obtained its due representation in the federal council and federal assembly, and each reserved for itself certain powers or immunities beyond those enjoyed by the North German States; Bavaria, in particular, retaining a control over her army, her postal, railway and telegraphic system, and her general legislation, which leaves her in a position of great comparative independence. It would, therefore, be a serious error to regard the work of unification as complete, or the Germanic Empire as a centralized state.* It is rather to be considered a very peculiar federation, which, as respects the North German members, is a strict one, conceding to them few and unimportant state rights; but, as regards the two greatest, Bavaria and Württemberg, is extremely loose, amounting to little more than a close defensive and offensive military alliance, with a joint foreign policy, a common commercial system, and a common legislation on a few topics. How far such a constitution can be smoothly worked, is a problem on which experience alone can throw light. For it cannot be supposed that the same unity of sentiment which displayed itself at a moment of excitement in the presence of a powerful enemy, will necessarily continue to exist in more peaceful times, or under the rule of less able

* The character of the Empire as a State, and not a mere federation, is perhaps most clearly seen in the position assigned to Alsace and the ceded parts of Lorraine as "Reichsländer," territories forming a part of the Empire but not of any one of the States which compose it, and governed immediately by the central imperial administration.
and patriotic ministers. Not only the existence of separate Courts, where a long-descended prince is surrounded by a dignified nobility, but also the differences of character, habits, historical associations, and religion among the various German races, place difficulties in the way of a complete national union, which long years will be needed to remove. It is hard to estimate the power of these centrifugal forces, as compared with those opposite ones which the habit of joint political action will create; but it is at any rate clear that the process of fusion must be a slow one. Outside, moreover, of this new organization, there still remain the seven millions of German-speaking subjects of Austria, of whose reunion to the German state there is no immediate prospect, and whose admission at present would make the problem of welding the nation completely together even more difficult than it now is.

Observers in other countries are hardly less liable to fall into the opposite error of misunderstanding the nature of the great political change of the last eight years, of supposing it to be more sudden and more accidental, so to speak, than it really is, and to be mainly due to the forcible means employed by the present Chancellor of the Empire. The truth rather is, that here, as in many similar instances which might be quoted, there had been, as years rolled on, a constant ripening toward change and a growing feeling for unity, although the strength of this feeling was not revealed till the moment came which gave it a field for vigorous action. First evoked by the great struggle of the War of Liberation, it has been slowly developed and directed by a variety of concurrent forces; partly by that desire for political freedom and equal civil rights which found its nearest enemy in the tyranny of many of the petty princes; partly by the decline, so evident through all Europe, of the ancient sentiment of per-
sonal loyalty, and the substitution therefor of a rational conception of the nature of government and the power of the popular will; partly by the better knowledge of their brethren which increased facilities of communication gave to every division of the German race; but most of all by what we call the feeling or passion of nationality, the desire of a people already conscious of a moral and social unity, to see such unity expressed and realized under a single government, which shall give it a place and name among civilized states. The most powerful factors in the creation of this national spirit, were the brilliant literary activity of Germany since the days of Lessing, and the awakened interest and pride of the people in their earlier history, which was one of the first fruits of that literary revival. Causes not dissimilar were at work in Italy, though there the actual oppression of foreign rulers made the sentiment more passionate. And it need not be doubted that the example of the efforts which Italy, Hungary, and Poland, not to speak of smaller peoples, were making to attain or reconquer national political life, had its influence upon the Germans, however little sympathy those efforts may have found among them.

Time, and the long labors of many noble hearts addressing their countrymen through the press and in the Universities, were needed to mature this feeling of moral, to strengthen this passion for political unity, to make it familiar and dear to the mass of the people, to give it a hold upon their imagination. It was not wonderful that in looking on the apathy of their fellow-citizens and the selfishness of their princes, these great men should sometimes have despaired of success. And even when the feeling had been created and the occasion came which displayed its strength, it might have failed to fulfill its work, had not the power to use and guide it been lodged in the hands of a forceful and keen-sighted practical statesman.
It was with Germany even as with Italy, where the work of Gioberti, Manin, Mazzini and their brethren, might have remained unfinished but for Cavour. And, as in Italy, the work was not carried through in the way or by the means which the first laborers had for the most part intended or desired. The creation of a state de novo on ground cleared of all the existing principalities, a state which, even if in form a monarchy (though most would have preferred a republic) should be based on the recognition of popular rights, was what the ideal politicians of both countries had looked forward to. But in both it was by the advance of an existing state, which extended itself to include wider and wider territories, and gave to them its organization, that the unity of the nation was brought about. And this was done with little or no change in the internal constitution of the growing kingdom, little or no movement toward a resettlement of society on democratic foundations. In the constitution of the North German Confederation and the new German Empire, there is no mention and little indirect recognition of those “Fundamental Rights of the German people,” on which the Frankfort Parliament of 1848–49 spent so much precious time and toil.

Too much has perhaps been said of late years about Prussia’s mission. Neither in the words or acts of her great Frederick (nor indeed in those of his predecessors) is there a trace of what may be called Pan-Teutonic patriotism, of any enthusiasm for the greatness and happiness of Germany as a whole. His purpose is to build up a strong and well-administered Prussian kingdom: for his German neighbors he has no more regard than for Frenchmen or Swedes: for the German language and literature little but contempt. The policy of his
three successors was distinctly Prussian rather than German; and the romantic Frederick William IV disappointed the hopes of the nation almost as grievously in 1849 as Frederick William III had done thirty-five years before. No European court has been more consistently practical than that of Berlin; nor any apparently less conscious of a magnificent national vocation. Her rulers have eschewed sentimental considerations themselves, and have seldom tried to awaken them in the minds of the people, or to turn them to account where they existed. When their interests coincided with those of Germany at large, it was well: but they were not accustomed to proclaim themselves her champions, or the apostles of her national regeneration. Nevertheless it had for a long time been evident that if a political regeneration was to be brought about by force, it was from Prussia alone of the existing principalities that anything could be hoped, since she alone united the character, the traditions, and the material power that were needed to lead the country. Ever since the Reformation the Hapsburg princes and their policy has been regarded with aversion by the more intelligent and progressive part of the nation; while Prussia, recognized from the days of the Great Elector as the leading Protestant power, naturally became the representative of intellectual liberality and enlightenment. In recent times she had, by the foundation and wise encouragement of the two great universities of Berlin and Bonn, conferred eminent benefits on German learning and science, and gained a corresponding hold upon the respect of the educated classes. If her people were in some respects less richly gifted than those of the middle and southern states, she yet possessed a practical energy and decision in which they were sometimes deficient; she acted while they speculated and waited. She had given the
first example in Germany of a well-governed modern state, compact, effective, full of life; and in creating it she was really rendering the greatest possible service to the German people. For this state being a strong reality, which had stood the test of adversity and been matured by experience, whose well-knit administrative organization commanded the respect, if not always the affection, of its subjects, was found able to expand itself, so as to embrace the other populations and territories which from time to time were added to it. And it expanded, not only, as Austria had done in earlier centuries, toward the east, among peoples alien in blood and speech, who remained unfriendly to the original German nucleus, but also and chiefly westward, or at least over districts whose inhabitants, being themselves Germans, were rapidly fused and became not less patriotically-minded than those of the Mark of Brandenburg itself. After the fall of Napoleon it acquired and soon assimilated the superb Rhenish and Westphalian provinces: in 1866 it was enlarged by other territories hardly less important, while at the same time its military, and to a great extent its financial system, were applied to Saxony, Mecklenburg, and the minor North German principalities. Thus the enormous difficulty of creating a state _de novo_ was avoided by the extension of the existing state; and if Germany, as the more idealistic school of politicians complain, has been in this way turned into a larger Prussia, the practical school may ask whether this result (if the matter be more than a question of names) is not one that may be acquiesced in when the object of national aspiration has been substantially attained. Moreover, if Germany is Prussianized, so will Prussia be in the same process Germanized by the infusion or addition of the South German races.

Looking therefore to the form which the political re-
construction of Germany has taken, this reconstruction may fairly be said to be Prussia's work. But that work could never have been accomplished without the efforts of those very "sentimental" or "romantic" politicians who found themselves first persecuted as agitators, and then pushed aside when the moment for action came. For it was they who prepared the feelings of the nation for this revolution, and who raised to the height of a great national movement, justified by the popular will, what would otherwise have been a career of violent, self-aggrandizement. It was with Germany as with Italy, where the work of Cavour could never have been accomplished without the previous labors of the greater and loftier Mazzini.

The question which has often been asked of late, How far this new Empire is the lawful successor or representative of the Empire which expired in 1806, need not, after what has been said in earlier chapters, receive here more than a passing mention. For it will be remembered that the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the creation of Otto the Great, was formed by the union (which eventually became a fusion) in one person of two quite distinct political entities, the German kingdom, which was then passing from primitive tribe-chieftainship into a feudal monarchy, and the Roman Empire with its claims of universal autocratic sway, expressing on its historical side in traditional reverence for the name of Rome, and on its theological the idea of the unity of all Christians in a visible state and church. In the new Empire there is no such union: it represents one only of those two elements, the German kingdom which Otto received from his father before his fatal journey to Rome. It has put away, let us hope forever, the dream of dominion over peoples of a different blood and speech, for
it is based upon, has indeed been created in virtue of, that very principle of nationality to which the theory of the Holy Empire was most conspicuously opposed.

The imperial name has indeed been revived, both on account of its venerable associations and because it best seems to express the titular superiority of the head of the state over the kings and grand dukes whose dominions compose its body. But the idea of an Emperor of a district, be it great or small, was wholly repugnant to mediæval doctrine, which could imagine one Emperor only, lord of all Christians, just as it could recognize only one Pope. And it is, perhaps, some lingering respect for this feeling that has caused the official style of the present sovereign to be "German Emperor," that is, "Emperor in Germany," instead of "Emperor of Germany."

It is therefore in strictness not to Otto the Great and his long line of successors down to Francis II that the Emperor William succeeds, but to the German kings Conrad I and Henry the Fowler, that Henry the Fowler who in one of his expeditions against the Wendish heathen stormed their fort of Brannibor, and founded there, to guard the northeastern frontier, that Mark of Brandenburg which has grown into the Prussian monarchy. The power of the modern sovereign is indeed of a very different nature from that of those remote predecessors, far more effective in his patrimonial lands than Henry's was in Saxony; far more limited over Bavaria than was that of the Frankish and Saxon princes, even in the days of Duke Arnulf the Wicked. This loose and anomalous federal constitution is the heritage of the old Empire, which in endeavoring to win for the Emperor a commanding European international position, allowed kings and princes to spring up beside him in Germany, and wrest from him nearly all the domestic power which had once been his. But if in this the influence of that great shadow of the past be thought perni-
cious, it ought not the less to be remembered, that to it is in great measure due this last renewal of national life. It is the tradition of a glorious unity, in the days when Germany led the world, that has made Germany again the central power of continental Europe, and the arbiter of its destinies.

The parallelism between the course of events in Germany and in Italy which has several times already been referred to, appears most strikingly in the events of 1870. As it was by the war of 1866, which, in putting an end to the long dualism of Austria and Prussia, made a united Germany possible, that Italy recovered her Venetian provinces, so it was the war of 1870 that, even while it re-established the Germanic Empire, completed the unity of Italy by making Rome again her possession and her capital. The Popedom which, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries inflicted a fatal wound upon the Holy Empire, had in modern times allied itself with Austria and the petty despotisms of the peninsula, had done its utmost to check as well the union as the freedom of the Italian people, and had raised those pretensions to a temporal sway which had been one chief cause of its hostility to the medieaval Emperors almost to the rank of an article of faith. It now found itself involved in the fall of its ancient ally France, and saw that temporal dominion perish with the triumph of its ancient Teutonic enemies. The first German victories compelled the recall of the French troops from Rome, and allowed the Italians to establish themselves there; a few months later the swelling current of success brought about the union of North and South Germany in a single state. The same great struggle which restored political unity to the one nation completed it in the other; and at the very moment when the imperial name was revived in the Transalpine countries, the ancient imperial seat upon the Tiber
became the capital of an Italian monarchy. The two
great races whose national life had been sacrificed to the
mediæval Empire regain it together, and regain it by the
defeat of that Empire's old antagonists, the ecclesiastical
power and the French monarchy. The triumph of the
principle of nationality is complete; the old wrongs are re-
dressed; the old problems solved: we seem to have closed
one great page in the world's history, and pause to wonder
and conjecture what the next may have to unfold. No
one who has looked below the surface of the events that
have passed in Europe during the last thirty years can
have failed to be struck by the rapidity and completeness
of the changes those years have witnessed, and by the new
aspect which political thought, as well as practical politics,
has taken. Through western and central Europe the
small states have disappeared, and the great states have
reached their natural boundaries of race and language.
Free and even comparatively democratic constitutions
have been established in many; and where this has not
been the case, the rights of the subject have yet been in
theory substantially admitted. It is now the passions and
interests of peoples rather than of princes that are the
potent factors in politics. The divine right of kings and
aristocracies, the authority of the state to control the in-
dividual conscience or enforce religious conformity, find
scarcely a defender: the principles of the Holy Alliance
seem to lie centuries behind. Meanwhile other questions,
other difficulties, begin to thicken upon us, as on a stormy
day a new mass of clouds rises from the darkening west
before the last one has been scattered into the blue or
swept beneath the opposite horizon. One of these prob-
lems, an old one indeed in a new form—that which re-
spects the attitude of an infallible church under an in-
fallible head to the temporal government—the German
state has already been called on to confront; others of an
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economical rather a purely political character threaten the stability of society there as they have long done in France. The foundation of kingdoms on a national basis does not seem to have made the contagion of social disturbances less dangerous; nor need Germany think that with the restoration of the Empire there has begun for her, any more than for the rest of Europe, an era of peace, ease and happiness. Yet there is reason to trust that that spirit of patriotism and self-control which lately shown forth on so great a theater and with such splendid results, will enable the German people to succeed, not only in perfecting the internal unity of their state and developing the popular element in its constitution, but also in overcoming the more serious perils which threaten it, like the other great industrial communities of the world, from the mutual jealousies and conflicting interests of different classes in society. To have created a great military state is much, yet it is only a small part of the task which lies before the civilized nations of the present.